



Improving  
Policing  
Across  
Scotland

# Strategic review of policing the Commonwealth Games 2026





# HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland

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HM Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland (HMICS) is established under the [Police and Fire Reform \(Scotland\) Act 2012](#) and has wide-ranging powers to look into the 'state, effectiveness and efficiency' of both the Police Service of Scotland (Police Scotland) and the Scottish Police Authority (SPA).

We have a statutory duty to inquire into the arrangements made by the Chief Constable and the SPA to meet their obligations in terms of best value and continuous improvement. If necessary, we can be directed by Scottish Ministers to look into anything relating to the SPA or Police Scotland as they consider appropriate. We also have an established role in providing professional advice and guidance on policing in Scotland.

- Our powers allow us to do anything we consider necessary or expedient for the purposes of, or in connection with, the carrying out of our functions.
- The SPA and the Chief Constable must provide us with such assistance and co-operation as we may require to enable us to carry out our functions.
- When we publish a report, the SPA and the Chief Constable must also consider what we have found and take such measures, if any, as they think fit.
- Where our report identifies that the SPA or Police Scotland is not efficient or effective (or best value not secured), or will, unless remedial measures are taken, cease to be efficient or effective, Scottish Ministers may direct the SPA to take such measures as may be required. The SPA must comply with any direction given.
- Where we make recommendations, we will follow them up and report publicly on progress.
- We will identify good practice that can be applied across Scotland.
- We work with other inspectorates and agencies across the public sector and co-ordinate our activities to reduce the burden of inspection and avoid unnecessary duplication.
- We aim to add value and strengthen public confidence in Scottish policing and will do this through independent scrutiny and objective, evidence-led reporting about what we find.

Our approach is to support Police Scotland and the SPA to deliver services that are high quality, continually improving, effective and responsive to local needs.<sup>1</sup>

**This strategic review was undertaken by HMICS in terms of Section 74(2)(a) of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 and is laid before the Scottish Parliament in terms of Section 79(3) of the Act.**

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<sup>1</sup> HMICS, [Corporate plan 2025-28](#) (March 2025).

# Contents

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# **Our review**

This strategic review sets out our independent assessment of Police Scotland's approach to planning for the policing of the Commonwealth Games 2026. It considers the state, effectiveness and efficiency of policing arrangements at this stage of preparation, and the evolving nature of planning activity as delivery approaches. The review was undertaken in line with our published [terms of reference](#).

In carrying out this work, we examined Police Scotland's governance, planning and assurance arrangements; its management of threat, risk and harm; resourcing and workforce wellbeing; partnership working; and its ability to sustain business-as-usual policing alongside Games-related demand. Our approach was proportionate and evidence-led, focusing both on current readiness and the service's capacity to respond to emerging risks and dependencies.

Overall, we found that Police Scotland has established a strong and credible foundation for the policing of the Games, supported by clear strategic leadership and effective governance. Senior officer oversight is visible and robust, with well-defined Gold, Silver and Bronze command arrangements underpinned by regular governance cycles, challenge and scrutiny. Internal and external assurance mechanisms are well embedded, including structured oversight by the Scottish Police Authority (SPA) and the proactive commissioning of independent external reviews. Collectively, these arrangements provide confidence that planning activity is subject to appropriate oversight and professional challenge.

Police Scotland has well-structured and mature operational planning arrangements in place, supported by an experienced and appropriately resourced planning team. Planning is intelligence-led, risk-aware and informed by learning from previous major events. The appointment of experienced commanders at an early stage has supported continuity and operational familiarity. Resourcing and workforce planning have been purposefully integrated into the planning process, with early identification of officer and staff requirements, clear deployment models, and structured engagement with local policing divisions.

Integration of intelligence, counter-terrorism and protective security planning has strengthened the overall policing approach. Intelligence has been embedded at an early stage and informs strategic decision making, operational planning and venue-level security arrangements. Collaborative working within intelligence, cyber and counter-terrorism functions is well established and incorporates learning from previous major events and recent high-profile visits. These arrangements provide a strong foundation for the management of threat, risk and harm across a geographically-dispersed Games footprint.

Police Scotland's approach to assurance, testing and exercising is generally robust and reflects an understanding that preparedness must be validated progressively rather than deferred until the latter stages of delivery. A structured programme of internal and multi-agency exercising is in place and has already informed planning refinement. Specialist exercising activity provides targeted assurance in higher-risk areas. However, assurance on fully integrated, organiser-led command and control arrangements remains partially dependent on future activity, though we expect this to be concluded in a suitable time frame in advance of the Games.

Police Scotland has taken a comprehensive and considered approach to staff wellbeing, embedding welfare considerations into governance, resourcing, logistics and testing arrangements. Learning from previous major events has clearly informed planning assumptions, and wellbeing is treated as integral to operational effectiveness and workforce sustainability. While arrangements remain to be tested at scale during delivery, established monitoring and escalation mechanisms provide confidence that emerging welfare issues can be identified and addressed in a timely manner.

Importantly, this review has been undertaken several months in advance of Games-time delivery, at a point where Police Scotland's planning arrangements were continuing to develop and mature. The Games will take place from 23 July to 2 August 2026, and it is therefore expected that further refinement, including testing and exercising activity, will continue up to the point of delivery.

In line with our terms of reference, during our review we provided high-level feedback to Police Scotland on areas that required further development prior to Games delivery. These largely reflected that stage of the planning lifecycle and areas of dependency on organiser-led activity, including the finalisation and testing of elements of the Games concept of operations,<sup>2</sup> venue-level command and control arrangements, and system interoperability.

Details of the feedback provided have been outlined on page nine of this report for purposes of transparency. However, we are satisfied that positive progress has since been made against several areas for development. We have highlighted those that have since been resolved and those that will require ongoing attention as planning for the Games matures. Our findings are consistent with what we would expect to see at this phase of preparation for a complex international event.

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<sup>2</sup> A concept of operations (CONOPS) is a user-oriented document that describes how a proposed system, project, or military operation will function to achieve its goals. It is intended to bridge the gap between high-level objectives and technical design from the perspective of users and stakeholders.

Based on the evidence gathered, we are confident that Police Scotland's senior leadership and established governance groups are well sighted on key issues and are actively progressing them. There is clear organisational capacity, effective leadership oversight, and a demonstrable track record of successful events planning. We therefore consider that while most of the areas for development identified in this report have already been addressed, the remainder will be resolved appropriately in advance of the Games.

**Craig Naylor**

His Majesty's Chief Inspector of Constabulary

June 2026



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# Key findings

- Police Scotland has established a strong and credible foundation for the policing of the Commonwealth Games 2026. Strategic leadership is clear and sustained, with robust Gold, Silver and Bronze command arrangements supported by effective governance, structured scrutiny and well-embedded internal and external assurance mechanisms.
- Planning activity is well advanced and appropriately mature for this stage of preparation. Operational planning is intelligence-led, risk aware and informed by significant learning from previous major events. The early appointment of experienced commanders and a well-resourced central planning team has supported continuity, consistency and operational credibility.
- Arrangements for the management of threat, risk and harm represent a notable strength. Intelligence, counter-terrorism and protective security functions are well integrated within planning and governance structures, supported by strong national and international partnerships and tested through recent high-profile events.
- Police Scotland has adopted a proportionate and forward-looking approach to assurance, testing and exercising. A structured programme of internal, specialist and multi-agency exercising is in place and has already informed planning refinement. However, some assurance over fully integrated, organiser-led command and control arrangements remains dependent on planned future activity.
- Resource planning and workforce readiness are generally effective and well governed. Early workforce identification, clear deployment models and strong integration between planning, resourcing and wellbeing functions provide confidence that Games-related demand can be met while sustaining business-as-usual policing, albeit within a context of continued organisational pressure.
- Staff wellbeing is treated as integral to operational effectiveness. Learning from previous events has been embedded within planning, logistics and governance arrangements, with clear mechanisms in place to monitor and respond to emerging welfare issues during delivery.
- Partnership working is a consistent positive feature of planning for the Games. Police Scotland maintains constructive and appropriately challenging relationships with the Organising Company, SPA, local authorities and blue-light partners. Some organiser-led elements are yet to be finalised, but the risks associated with these are recognised, governed and actively managed.

- A few areas require continued attention as preparations move towards delivery. These include finalising and testing aspects of the Games-wide concept of operations, venue-level command and control, information system interoperability, organiser-led exercising, and completion of key agreements.
- There are several measures in place to assess the effectiveness of the operation which should be continually reviewed to ensure learning is captured, shared and considered for future events.
- Taken together, these findings indicate that Police Scotland is well positioned at this stage of preparation. The identified areas for development are consistent with the maturity of planning some months ahead of delivery and do not undermine confidence in overall preparedness.

The background is a solid teal color. In the center, there is a lighter teal rounded rectangle. Inside this rectangle, there is a faint, light-colored icon of a checklist with four items, each with a checkmark. The text is overlaid on this graphic.

# Recommendation and Areas for development

## Recommendation

Police Scotland should maintain its robust focus on planning arrangements for the Commonwealth Games 2026, while working closely with key partners. By addressing the following areas for development, it can build on the positive progress made during the early stages of planning for the event.

## Areas for development

### Governance, assurance and risk

- Maintain development of police concept of operations, outlining clear command protocols. **Resolved**
- Progress strategic multi-agency Gold group meeting. **Resolved**
- Work required to align operations and share learning from Organising Company and Scottish Multi–Agency Resilience Training and Exercising Unit (SMARTEU) testing and exercising. **Ongoing**
- Conclude the Delivery Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Police Scotland and the Organising Company. **Ongoing**
- Progress testing and exercising of Police Operations Command Centre/Multi-agency Command Centre/Games Operational Centre arrangements including CLIO (Central Logging of Intelligence and Operations)/RAVEN alignment – ensure all partners are kept informed. **Ongoing**

## Areas for development continued

### Operational planning, logistics and preparedness

- Maintain engagement with venue security partners to ensure clear understanding of Command, Control and Communications (C3) arrangements and protocols. **Ongoing**
- Finalise mutual aid command arrangements and contingencies (including mobilisation, briefings, pairings, staging posts, officer tracking). **Ongoing**
- Finalise health and safety arrangements for the event. **Ongoing**
- Progress equality, diversity and inclusion (EDI) strategy for the event. **Resolved**

### Business as usual, local policing and community engagement

- Continued monitoring of wider demand pressures (including parallel events) will be necessary to maintain business as usual (BAU). **Ongoing**

### Specialist policing functions

- Progress communication strategy and planning with Organising Company and partners in the event of sensitive incidents/issues. **Resolved**
- As part of post-event analysis and learning, compare post-event data (crime, counter terrorism reports, arrests, disorder, suspicious activity) to pre-event intelligence picture. **Ongoing**



# Methodology

01. We published our terms of reference (ToR) for this review in December 2025, outlining our aims and objectives, and methodology. This set out our intention to assess the state, effectiveness and efficiency of policing arrangements for the Commonwealth Games 2026 (CWG26) across the following areas:
- governance structures and oversight arrangements for the Games
  - planning arrangements and operational preparedness for the Games, including local and specialist policing
  - the effectiveness of testing and exercising activity
  - security assessments and planning (including counter-terrorism arrangements)
  - BAU capacity and capability arrangements to sustain non-Games-related policing activity
  - arrangements for monitoring and supporting staff wellbeing
  - Police Scotland's co-ordination, management and mobilisation of resources, including mutual aid support.
02. We undertook a range of activities to evaluate progress against these themes, using the HMICS Inspection Framework and the EFQM model, and considered them in terms of leadership and vision, operational delivery and outcomes.

03. Our methodology included the following:



examination of relevant documentation including strategies, policies, procedures and plans

interviews with 22 police personnel and 10 key stakeholders



observation at relevant governance and planning meetings, and training and exercising activity

consideration of the extent to which organisational learning from previous events had informed planning.



04. We provided feedback to Police Scotland and the SPA during the course of the review and, prior to publication, outlined areas for development considered to have a significant impact on continued planning for the Games.

The background features a dark blue gradient with several large, semi-transparent puzzle pieces in a lighter shade of blue. The pieces are arranged in a way that suggests they are part of a larger assembly, with some overlapping and others partially visible. The word "Background" is centered in white, bold, sans-serif font.

# Background

05. The Commonwealth Games will take place from 23 July to 2 August 2026, across four main venues in the Glasgow area. This is the second time in 12 years that Glasgow has hosted the Games and it will be the largest international event held in Scotland since the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) took place in Glasgow in 2021.
06. Glasgow 2026 Limited will deliver the Games (with an anticipated budget of £150 million) and will meet the costs associated with policing the event. Under Operation Lannair, Police Scotland is responsible for policing the Games and the King's Baton Relay across Scotland. It is also responsible for developing and implementing the overall policing plan for the Games, working in close partnership with key partners and stakeholders.
07. As the UK's second largest police service (with over 16,000 officers and more than 5,000 staff), Police Scotland has extensive experience in managing major events. Since its establishment in 2013, the service has successfully policed a range of high-profile occasions, including:
  - the Commonwealth Games 2014
  - the 2014 Ryder Cup
  - the European Athletics Championship 2018 (co-hosted with Berlin)
  - the visit of the President of the United States in 2018 and 2025
08. Police Scotland has formed a strategic oversight board, chaired by the Deputy Chief Constable for Operational Policing, to work with partners to ensure a safe and secure CWG, with minimal impact on the wider community. A command structure has also been developed, with police Gold, Silver and Bronze commanders appointed and a core planning team established.
09. The SPA has statutory functions that include maintaining the Police Service of Scotland and holding the Chief Constable to account for policing in Scotland.




**Governance,  
assurance and  
risk**

## Governance

10. Police Scotland participates in a range of CWG26 governance structures at both internal and external levels. While this review considers aspects of external governance, its primary focus is on internal policing governance and oversight arrangements within Police Scotland and the SPA. As part of our review, we observed both Police Scotland CWG26 Gold governance meetings and SPA CWG26 policing oversight group meetings. These demonstrated that Police Scotland has established clear and mature leadership and governance arrangements, providing effective strategic direction, oversight and accountability for the policing of the Games.

Figure 1 - Commonwealth Games 2026 governance structure



Source: Police Scotland

11. Within these governance arrangements, we observed a well-defined command structure across all relevant business areas involved in the Games. There are three command levels, Gold (strategic), Silver (tactical) and Bronze (operational). For these particular Games, the Gold commander is an assistant chief constable (ACC), the Silver commander is a chief superintendent (CS) and the Bronze commanders vary in rank from inspector through to chief superintendent. The command structure is supported by scheduled governance processes, including six-weekly Gold and Silver governance meetings.

12. We reviewed the planning documentation for the Games, including the strategic plan. This plan sets out ten specific and measurable aims for a safe and secure CWG. We also reviewed tactical and operational plans to assess their consistency with the aims outlined in the Gold strategy. At the time of our review, several of these plans remained in draft form, with commanders describing them as live documents that continue to be refined as planning progresses.
13. We found effective reporting lines in place to support the development and refinement of plans. Commanders we spoke with told us that they received appropriate and timely support from the planning team, which assisted them in developing their plans. In particular, several commanders highlighted the value of one-to-one engagement with the Silver commander to review plans in detail. We also found that the planning team provides effective oversight of the development of these plans. At this stage of preparation, we are satisfied that the tactical and operational plans are progressing well and remain aligned with strategic aims.

### Internal oversight

14. We identified that scrutiny is provided through Police Scotland's CWG26 strategic oversight board, which operates under a clear ToR and meets regularly. Its purpose is to maintain a consistent strategic focus and ensure police accountability for Games planning. The oversight board provides a forum for the executive team to scrutinise planning progress and emerging issues. In addition, the chief constable has held one-to-one meetings with the planning team to review planning arrangements in detail.
15. Police Scotland has also set up a number of internal challenge panels, enabling peer scrutiny of Games planning. Such panels support effective challenge and command resilience by ensuring a detailed and informed understanding of plans in advance of delivery. Our review of these panels found that they were thorough and that they contributed positively to the overall development and refinement of Games planning.
16. The SPA has established a dedicated CWG26 policing oversight group, comprising a four-member panel, including a chairperson, drawn from SPA board members. This group has been in place since March 2025. Our review of documentation submitted to the group found Police Scotland had prepared well-structured and comprehensive papers, providing board members with timely and detailed information on progress with Games planning.

17. We also observed the oversight group's meetings, which gave us a greater insight into the scope and effectiveness of its scrutiny of policing preparations. Through constructive challenge, the SPA maintained a strong focus on risk, assurance and accountability, with the level of scrutiny increasing incrementally as the Games has drawn closer and planning has become more refined. Members of the oversight group raised specific questions about public safety, staff welfare, resourcing, technology, finance, risk, internal and external audit, contingencies and preparedness for the Games.
18. Given that funding arrangements for these Games differ from previous events, there has been particular scrutiny by SPA members on financial arrangements. The SPA has been clear that there should be no financial detriment to policing in Scotland as a result of the Games. Police Scotland has indicated that financial matters are on track, which appears to have provided a level of assurance to board members at this stage.
19. This was reinforced by interviews we conducted with individuals attending the oversight and governance meetings, both internally and externally. These interviews, along with our observations of the meetings, confirmed they are operating as intended, with clearly defined ToR, regularly scheduled meetings and effective challenge and assurance processes that demonstrate leadership oversight and accountability at each level of command.
20. During the course of our review we spoke with a number of partners involved in the planning process with Police Scotland. They were positive about their working relationships with the police during Games planning and highlighted that Gold and Silver commanders listened, engaged constructively and provided appropriate challenge.
21. It is also notable that the SPA – in conjunction with the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) – has a role in scrutinising the work of the British Transport Police (BTP) operating in Scotland. Scrutiny of the BTP is carried out via the Scottish Railways Policing Committee (where the SPA has representation), providing an opportunity to ask BTP about CWG26-related activity. Although HMICS has no remit to review BTP plans for the Games, our interviews with BTP staff have shown that BTP planning is at an advanced stage and it has a sound and effective relationship with the Police Scotland planning team at all levels.

## External oversight

22. As indicated, Police Scotland sits on a number of external governance groups, the main one being the Organising Company Safety and Security Group. Police Scotland is a critical partner in this group and provides advice on safety and security, particularly in relation to venue security. The Counter-Terrorism Security Co-ordinators (CT SecCo) have provided detailed advice regarding the four main Games venues.
23. The funding model for these Games means that Police Scotland does not hold a dedicated CWG26 budget, and overall financial responsibility rests with the Organising Company. Consequently, any advice on safety and security measures that Police Scotland gives that has a financial implication, has to be considered by the Organising Company in terms of its overall budget. We are aware that there are ongoing discussions between the police service and the Organising Company regarding safety and security measures that Police Scotland has recommended.
24. The Scottish Government has established a Ministerial Oversight Group, which, at the time of our review, was chaired by the Health Secretary. While the Scottish Government does not hold financial responsibility for the CWG, it has a significant interest in the delivery of an event of this scale in Scotland, particularly regarding public safety and security. Police Scotland, alongside the Organising Company, has a role in providing assurance to the Scottish Government that appropriate safety and security arrangements are in place for the Games.

## Command roles

25. Police Scotland has filled most senior command roles with experienced officers and staff. While a small number of commanders are newly trained and will be undertaking their first event of this scale, all are appropriately trained and accredited, with testing and exercising activity providing further command experience.
26. Many of the command roles have resilience in place, ensuring that commanders have suitable rest periods throughout the ten days of the Games. This has proven more challenging in specialist command areas, since such roles require specific training and experience. The specialist nature of these roles, combined with the relatively small number of individuals who fulfil them, makes these functions more vulnerable to issues such as sickness, ill health or retirement. Police Scotland has identified areas where resilience is limited and has developed workable plans to ensure that specialist command roles have appropriate resilience in place for the Games.

27. As part of the planning process, Police Scotland identified Bronze venue commanders at an early stage, to ensure that they were involved from the outset of planning. Venue commanders have conducted detailed familiarisation of the venues. This has included consulting with venue operators so that good working relationships are established before the Games begin. The venue commanders hold significant operational command experience, and have all completed their Event Policing Lead (EPL) training to enable them to command the venues they will be operating in.
  
28. We reviewed Police Scotland's intelligence, cyber and counter-terrorism (CT) arrangements for the Games and the related partnerships that support these functions. We found that Police Scotland has clear and well-defined intelligence, CT and protective security roles, supported by structured reporting and multi-agency co-ordination. Strong partnership working is in place within Scotland and across the wider UK, with evidence showing that such arrangements were recently tested during the 2025 visits by the President and Vice President of the United States of America.
  
29. These arrangements have been strengthened through a dedicated intelligence cell with co-located partners from across the blue-light services, including the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) and the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS). Arrangements are also in place for cyber and CT threats, with established links across the UK, and regular meetings planned during the Games to support information sharing. Collectively, these arrangements provide a solid foundation for Games planning and align with the wider command and governance structures already described in this report.

## Assurance

30. Police Scotland and the SPA have also been proactive in seeking assurance reviews of their planning arrangements from external bodies. In addition to this review by HMICS, there have been independent reviews conducted by external bodies such as [BDO](#), who provide accountancy and business advice to businesses and the public sector. A separate peer review was also conducted by the [National Police Coordination Centre](#) (NPoCC), which provides support to police forces across the United Kingdom.

31. The stated purpose of the BDO review was to:

*“Provide management and the Audit, Risk and Assurance Committee (ARAC) (of the SPA) with assurance over the design and operational effectiveness of the controls relating to the SPA/Police Scotland’s planning on the 2026 Commonwealth Games.”*

This included document reviews and interviews with staff involved in planning for the Games.

32. The main aim of the NPoCC peer review was to:

*“Provide an independent assessment of plans relating to key elements of the safety, security, and logistics operation.”*

NPoCC brought together subject matter experts in these areas and interviewed staff and documentation before providing its report to Police Scotland.

33. Both reviews conducted were largely positive in their findings regarding planning, with only minor areas identified for consideration by Police Scotland. It should be recognised that scrutiny can place an additional burden on planning teams trying to prepare for a major event. It is therefore encouraging that Police Scotland has sought external scrutiny in this way and taken on the additional work to support those reviews. This demonstrates openness, and a clear commitment to preparedness and assurance. The outcomes of the independent reviews also indicate that Police Scotland is well advanced in its planning for the Games.

## Testing and exercising


34. We found that Police Scotland's testing and exercising arrangements for the Commonwealth Games 2026 are well established. It has a structured, planned and progressively delivered programme of activity in place, designed to test command and control arrangements, specialist capabilities and multi-agency interoperability as plans mature.
35. Police Scotland has developed a dedicated testing and exercising strategy that frames exercising as an iterative process rather than a one-off event. This approach aligns testing activity with the Gold strategy, statutory resilience responsibilities and established governance arrangements. It is intended to support the progressive validation of assumptions, identification of gaps, and refinement of plans as delivery approaches advance – rather than reliance on final stage assurance alone.
36. Early testing and exercising activity have already informed planning refinement, and our observations confirmed that exercises are being delivered in practice rather than remaining theoretical. Relevant commanders and partners have contributed to testing command, co-ordination and information flow arrangements in a manner consistent with the stated assurance objectives.
37. Police Scotland has also established a comprehensive programme of specialist testing and exercising. CT exercising spans strategic, tactical and specialist capabilities, while firearms exercising is planned for specialist firearms commanders and tactical firearms commanders. Public order arrangements are scheduled to be tested through a dedicated Silver-level challenge event.
38. External assurance mechanisms, including the previously-mentioned NPoCC peer review, are appropriately positioned as complementary to internal testing and exercising, rather than substitutes for it. This reinforces the importance of operational exercising in proving readiness, with external scrutiny providing an additional challenge and assurance.
39. The Organising Company retains responsibility for leading its own exercising activity, including an organiser-led command post exercise. While Police Scotland has mitigated this dependency through continued internal testing and exercising, targeted workshops and command-level tabletop activity, these measures do not fully replicate consistent organiser participation in integrated, multi-agency exercising.

40. The Organising Company has commissioned a private company to undertake its testing and exercising programme on its behalf. Police Scotland is utilising SMARTEU to undertake blue-light exercising. Due to planning timescales, it has been challenging to ensure both programmes align and complement the overall planning for the event. However, this has now been addressed, and a joint command post exercise is planned for 25 June 2026, which meets the objectives of both organisations.

### Concept of operations

41. With any significant event such as CWG26 there must be effective command and control structures in place to manage the event effectively. The Organising Company is developing an overarching CONOPS with contributions from Police Scotland – in particular from Command, Control and Communications (C3) division, which has developed its own Bronze operational plan. It is important that the CONOPS for the event operates smoothly, and we have been informed that there are plans to trial the CONOPS plan during testing and exercising activity to provide assurance on its operability.
42. Police Scotland has established the key multi-agency structures for the Games, in the form of the Police Operations Command Centre (POCC), which will be situated in Govan, Glasgow. This has been described as a Multi-agency Command Centre (MACC) as there will be other agencies within this command centre including representation from SFRS and SAS. As such, it is more akin to a multi-agency command centre than a police-only POCC. The Organising Company will also be operating a separate Games Operational Centre (GOC) from a different location in Glasgow. Police Scotland is working with the Organising Company to examine how the GOC, the POCC/MACC, and the four separate venue control rooms will connect with each other and share information in line with the developing CONOPS. This multi-agency command and control structure is illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2 - Multi-agency command and control structure and information flows



Source: Police Scotland

43. The command centre models described above mirror some previous major events that Police Scotland has been involved in. Police Scotland and other blue-light partners (alongside Glasgow City Council and others) will be embedded within the four venues. As there are separate venues and separate POCC/MACC and GOC in place, many of the daily meetings will take place virtually during the Games. Therefore, ongoing testing will be important to ensure that the structure will operate smoothly once the Games begin, without introducing avoidable risk.
  
44. An area requiring specific assurance is the use of separate information management systems (IMS) by blue-light services and the Organising Company. The blue-light services will be using the Central Logging of Intelligence and Operations (CLIO) IMS, while the Organising Company will be operating the Raven IMS. Both systems will be available in the POCC/MACC and GOC, as well as each of the individual venue control centres. However, thorough testing is required to ensure interoperability, effective information flow, and timely access across command structures. As the Games CONOPS continues to develop, Police Scotland should maintain ongoing refinement of its own CONOPS documentation, setting out clear command protocols and information sharing arrangements.

45. A multi-agency Gold group has been established and held its initial meeting in April. While we are confident that strategic leaders liaised on a regular basis, the establishment of this group is a positive step that will support oversight, risk ownership and collective assurance as the Games approach.

## Communication

46. Communication is a key factor of governance and assurance for the Games, both internally and externally, providing oversight and confidence in the effectiveness of operational planning and delivery arrangements. Internally, Police Scotland has communicated effectively, with regular briefings and reliable information flow across teams. These communication arrangements are supported by established command briefing structures, providing appropriate oversight and consistency.
47. There is ongoing contact between the planning team and police divisions to ensure officers and staff are given as much notice as possible regarding their duties during the Games. The communication Bronze plan emphasises maintaining BAU visibility and general policing messages. Structured frontline and line manager briefings support consistent internal and public messaging. The Gold commander has also published a number of CWG blogs on the police intranet to provide organisational-wide updates and assurance on planning progress.
48. A dedicated Police Scotland communications cell will operate during the Games, providing operational co-ordination of internal messaging and supporting command centre communication flows. External communication arrangements are set out through a corporate communications strategy, supported by intranet resources and established social media channels. Plans are in place for misinformation management, with messaging being developed to provide clarity and reassurance to the public where misinformation is considered a potential risk.

## Legal requirements

49. [The Police and Fire Reform \(Scotland\) Act 2012](#) outlines a number of general duties for police officers in Scotland. These include the duty to prevent and detect crime, to maintain order and to protect life and property. This will have relevance for public safety in respect of policing the Games, however, as noted elsewhere in this report, the Organising Company has responsibility for venue-specific security.
  
50. Decisions taken in support of police responsibilities are subject to scrutiny both during and after the event, particularly for CT and firearms planning. Police Scotland has applied established legal and ethical principles when planning CT and firearms prevention measures, ensuring that all decisions are lawful, necessary and proportionate. A formal information management strategy is in place, providing assurance that legal, ethical and data protection requirements are embedded within operational planning and decision making.

## Ethical considerations

51. Police Scotland has put governance arrangements in place to ensure that ethical considerations, including community impact, public confidence and reassurance, are included in its planning. An equality and human rights impact assessment (EqHRIA) has been completed as a formal control to record these considerations and document the rationale for decision making. This provides assurance that planning is anchored within a lawful, necessary and proportionate human rights framework.
  
52. Evidence shows that Police Scotland has drawn lessons learned from previous major events to inform and shape current planning for the Games. It will also use any learning from these Games to inform future events (in conjunction with its partners), using post-event evaluation and debrief arrangements, with day-to-day learning captured on the CLIO IMS. Planned activity includes a staff survey and a structured debrief involving a staff panel convened prior to the Games, supporting organisational learning and post-event assurance.

## Risk

53. Policing an event of this scale involves the identification and management of a range of strategic and operational risks. While some risks are owned by the Organising Company, others are shared; Police Scotland has a significant role in mitigating risks that affect public safety and security.
54. We found that Police Scotland has sound risk management structures in place to identify, monitor and review strategic risks for the Games. Regular internal meetings support risk awareness, shared ownership and collective responsibility for mitigation. Risks are documented, mitigations are recorded, and there are clear routes for escalation where risk levels change, or issues cannot be resolved at operational level.
55. Police Scotland works closely with the Organising Company on shared risks, with planning leads describing clear escalation routes for raising concerns. Evidence gathered shows confidence in managing difficult discussions relating to threat, risk and safeguarding. Police Scotland maintains oversight through established governance and escalation arrangements and has demonstrated willingness to challenge decisions where it believes risks are not being mitigated to an acceptable standard.
56. Consistent with the governance and escalation arrangements described earlier in this report, safety and security advice provided by Police Scotland to the Organising Company is recorded on the CLIO IMS, including whether advice is accepted, declined or partially accepted. This provides a clear audit trail and assurance that decisions, mitigations and residual risks are formally documented and subject to appropriate scrutiny. At the time of writing, there has been no requirement to activate formal escalation routes.

## Financial arrangements

57. As outlined, the financial arrangements for these Games differ from those in place for the 2014 CWG. While funding for the 2014 Games was provided by the Scottish Government, funding responsibility for the CWG26 rests with the Organising Company.
58. Police Scotland has worked closely with the Organising Company to agree a Delivery Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) covering planning costs, and submitted invoices to date have been paid in full. These costs include full cost recovery for all staff within the Police Scotland planning team, providing assurance that policing has not incurred financial detriment during the planning phase. Work is ongoing to finalise the MoA covering policing costs associated with the delivery phase of the Games.
59. At this stage, Police Scotland leadership reports no financial pressure or concerns regarding the funding model and remains confident that there will be no financial detriment to policing as a result of the Games. We would, however, expect the delivery MoA to be concluded at the earliest opportunity to provide full financial assurance ahead of delivery.

## Vetting and accreditation

60. Police Scotland cannot provide full assurance in certain risk areas that remain the responsibility of the Organising Company, including vetting, accreditation and safeguarding. Evidence shows that Police Scotland has actively raised concerns about these areas, particularly regarding the safeguarding of volunteers.
61. Police Scotland continues to work with the Organising Company, providing policing experience and guidance to ensure appropriate vetting and accreditation for all involved in delivering the event.

The background features three faint, light-blue icons: a handshake on the left, a person silhouette in the upper center, and an envelope on the right. A large, thin, light-blue circular line loops around these icons, framing the central text.

# **Operational planning, logistics and partnerships**

## Overview

62. Police Scotland has established a well-structured, intelligence-led and increasingly mature approach to operational planning, logistics and preparedness for the policing of CWG26. Effective leadership, partnership working and established command arrangements provide strong foundations across strategic, tactical and operational levels, supporting confidence in overall readiness at this stage of delivery.
63. Planning benefits from clear command structures, regular governance cycles and early workforce commitment, informed by learning from previous major events, including COP26 and Operation Roll (the policing operation for the US President's visit). Early allocation of most required officer posts reflects a disciplined and forward-looking approach to resourcing.
64. While the overall position is positive and proportionate to the current planning phase, some areas require continued focus as preparations mature. These include finalising aspects of venue-level command and control, health and safety assurance, and the full embedding of EDI considerations. These issues are recognised by Police Scotland and are being actively managed through established governance and planning processes, and do not detract from the overall strength of the foundations in place.

## Command structure, capability and resilience

65. Police Scotland's established Gold/Silver/Bronze command framework provides a strong platform for the delivery of the Games policing operation, underpinning clear accountability and effective decision making.
66. Command resilience has been purposefully built into planning arrangements, with provision in place to access additional experienced commanders, alongside established deputy and shadow arrangements, ensuring continuity of command should individuals become unavailable or operational demands intensify. Defined escalation routes exist to support timely decision making at Silver and Gold level, complemented by established national co-ordination and support mechanisms, including access to specialist or additional command capability where required.

67. We found that command capability and cohesion are further strengthened by the fact that Gold, Silver and Bronze commanders continue to work together operationally in the policing of large-scale, high-risk sporting events as part of BAU policing. These deployments provide ongoing opportunities to operate collectively, exercise joint command arrangements and maintain familiarity with command interfaces, decision-making processes and multi-agency working. This continuity of operational experience supports confidence that command arrangements are not solely theoretical but grounded in recent and relevant practice.

### Planning capacity, structure and co-ordination

68. Police Scotland has invested appropriately in a well-resourced and experienced planning function capable of delivering the CWG26 policing operation to an acceptable standard. The planning team is fully staffed, with planners selected for their relevant major event experience and specialist competencies, providing a strong foundation for the scale and complexity of the task.

69. The planning team told us they have sufficient resource to carry out all the key planning tasks. Their structure is settled and effective, supported by dedicated planning cells that cover the different functions, with clear ownership, co-ordination and accountability across all areas.

70. Planning operates within established governance and co-ordination arrangements, including regular Silver-level oversight and structured engagement with the Organising Company and other relevant partners.

71. There has been good progress against key planning milestones. The majority of Bronze plans have been submitted, and a structured programme of testing and exercising, led by SMARTEU, is in place. This activity is providing positive momentum across the programme and supports confidence that planning demand is being met within available capacity.

## Threat, risk and harm management

72. Threat, risk and harm management for the Games is structured, intelligence-led and subject to clear strategic oversight. A standalone strategic risk register is maintained and reviewed regularly, evidencing disciplined risk ownership and governance, and informing planning and delivery decisions.
73. Risk identification has been proactive and proportionate to the current planning stage. Early escalation of key risks, including volunteer vetting and accreditation, recovery of policing costs, the impact on BAU policing and potential for protest activity demonstrates effective horizon scanning and planning.
74. This approach is further strengthened by arrangements to identify and manage cumulative or concurrent risks arising from parallel events that could affect policing demand or resourcing. Close liaison with Glasgow City Council on city-wide events demonstrates awareness of the wider operational environment beyond the Games and supports early identification of compound risk.
75. Threat assessment is informed by strong intelligence integration. We found that national and venue-specific CT threat assessments, informed by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) outputs, feed directly into risk management, venue security planning and tactical development. While some formal intelligence products will continue to mature in line with the planning, there is no evidence at this stage of unmanaged or unidentified critical risks.
76. Threat and risk management arrangements have been informed by external peer review activity, including engagement with the NPoCC. This has given additional confidence in CT, firearms and public order planning (including preparedness for Operation Plato-related incidents),<sup>3</sup> and in the overall threat and risk management framework.
77. While some recognised risks and external dependencies remain, we found that these are well understood, actively managed and subject to appropriate governance. At this stage, they do not undermine confidence in Police Scotland's ability to identify, assess and mitigate threat, risk and harm for the Games.

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<sup>3</sup> Operation Plato is the UK national code name for the police and emergency service response to a marauding terrorist attack.

## Integrated intelligence and threat assessment

78. The integration of intelligence into planning and preparedness for the Games is well developed and represents a clear operational strength. It is positive to note that intelligence leadership has been embedded within command structures from an early stage, ensuring intelligence informs strategic intent, operational priorities and preparedness activity, rather than operating as a separate or reactive function.
79. This integrated approach extends beyond competition venues to include non-competition environments such as athlete accommodation, where safeguarding, protest, crime and CT considerations require consistent intelligence oversight. This reflects a broad and realistic understanding of the Games footprint and the range of risks that may arise beyond core venues.
80. Police Scotland has established coherent arrangements to integrate both conventional and CT intelligence in support of Games planning. A dedicated intelligence capability is being developed to manage non-CT risks, including crime, public order, protest activity, safeguarding and emerging demand. This capability operates alongside established CT intelligence structures, with the two domains remaining distinct while connected through aligned tasking and information sharing.
81. We found that there is a structured and proportionate intelligence assessment cycle that underpins operational readiness. Intelligence products are provided at defined planning milestones and will increase in frequency as the Games approach, supporting both planning and Games-time command decision making. CT threat assessment is treated as dynamic, so that risks are reviewed continuously and given a Games-specific threat grading. These assessments are appropriately balanced with conventional intelligence relating to crime trends, protest activity, cyber risk, community tensions and safeguarding.
82. Intelligence is translated effectively into operational activity. This includes the planned use of intelligence-led protective security tactics, such as Operation Servator<sup>4</sup> deployments, to provide visible reassurance, test hostile reconnaissance and support disruption and deterrence across venues, transport hubs and the wider Games footprint. Intelligence also informs deployment decisions, resource prioritisation, venue-level preparedness and protective security planning, including for crowded places and transport-linked environments.

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<sup>4</sup> Operation Servator is a policing tactic used by Police Scotland to deter, detect and disrupt a range of criminal activity (including terrorism), through high-visibility patrols using unpredictable deployments.

83. Clear escalation routes ensure that relevant intelligence informs Silver and Gold command in a timely manner, while dedicated and scalable resourcing across both intelligence domains supports Games-time demand without adversely affecting BAU policing. CT preparedness is also supported by proportionate awareness training to the Organising Company and wider partners, including [Action Counters Terrorism](#) (ACT) and [See, Check and Notify](#) (SCaN). This promotes a shared understanding of hostile reconnaissance indicators and reporting pathways, reinforcing intelligence-led protective security arrangements.
84. Strong police-to-police and national CT partnerships further support situational awareness, with intelligence assessments aligned to national threat understanding and protective security guidance.
85. We identified that some risks remain as planning matures, including the previously-mentioned system interoperability; timely dissemination of appropriately-sanitised intelligence beyond policing; and the complexity of assessing risk across a dispersed accommodation and venue footprint. However, we concluded that these issues do not undermine the overall strength of intelligence integration, provided they remain subject to focus, oversight and testing as preparations progress.

### Information sharing and situational awareness

86. Information sharing arrangements for the policing of the CWG26 are generally effective and reflect a coherent and structured approach to integrating intelligence, command and partnership working. Information sharing is embedded across strategic, tactical and operational planning, supported through established intelligence cycles, governance forums and multi-agency co-ordination arrangements, providing a sound basis for situational awareness and decision making.
87. Within policing, mechanisms for sharing intelligence and operational information are well developed and aligned to the command structure. The deliberate integration of CT and conventional intelligence supports a coherent assessment of threat, risk and harm, enabling proportionate and timely information sharing at appropriate command levels as preparations mature.

88. At a partnership level, information sharing is established through sustained engagement with the Organising Company, Glasgow City Council, blue-light partners, transport policing and national specialist units. Planning for the POCC/MACC represents a significant enhancement to real-time information sharing and shared situational awareness during Games-time operations. This intent is well understood among senior planners and partners and reflects learning from previous large-scale events.
89. We identified some variability in how information sharing arrangements are understood at Bronze command and partner operational levels. While strategic intent and governance frameworks are clear, full operational assurance remains partly dependent on the maturity of C3 arrangements and the finalisation of organiser-led documentation and CONOPS. A continued focus on system interoperability, exercising and the practical articulation of information sharing arrangements at operational level will further strengthen assurance as planning progresses.

### Venue-level security planning and delivery arrangements

90. We found that venue security planning is developing well and is clearly structured. Police Scotland provides intelligence-led oversight and professional advice, while responsibility for venue-specific security, crowd and traffic management appropriately rests with the Organising Company. This separation of roles is well understood and consistently reflected across planning documentation, providing clarity of responsibility and accountability.
91. Gold, Silver and Bronze command arrangements are in place to support delivery at venue-level. Trained and suitably experienced venue Bronze commanders were appointed at an early stage and are supported by the central planning team. Where required, additional experienced commanders provide enhanced oversight, supporting effective co-ordination, escalation and alignment with Gold-level strategic intent. Venue plans are subject to Silver-level oversight, providing a clear mechanism for co-ordination, escalation and alignment with wider operational planning.
92. Venue security arrangements are strongly informed by intelligence integration, including sustained engagement with a CT SecCo, Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) and relevant national partners. This includes formal site assessments and walkthroughs of venues, fan zones and transport-related locations, helping to shape the design of proportionate protective security measures. Advice covers access control, physical security and vehicle mitigation, supporting a balanced approach that prioritises public safety while maintaining public reassurance.

93. CT venue security is overseen through a co-ordinated CT security function, providing consistency across the Games footprint. At several principal venues, locally embedded CT security capability further strengthens venue specific planning. There are also ongoing improvements to baseline security infrastructure as preparations mature.
94. We found that police influence at venue level will be further strengthened through the embedding of a Police Scotland planner within the GOC. This arrangement will provide direct police input into venue-level operational and security decisions led by the Organising Company, improve real-time visibility of emerging issues, and enable timely professional challenge where required.
95. Clear escalation mechanisms are in place where venue-related risks cannot be mitigated locally. These include escalation through the Organising Company Safety and Security Group, the Games Operations Board, and the relevant Local Authority Security Advisory Group. Collectively, these arrangements provide a credible and proportionate framework for challenge, escalation and resolution at venue level.
96. We found that venue security planning is supported by strong multi-agency co-ordination, involving Police Scotland, local authorities, emergency services, BTP, CT partners and private security providers. Joint site visits, exercising and planned use of established multi-agency co-ordination arrangements during Games-time operations support integrated delivery and shared situational awareness.
97. We identified that C3 arrangements to support venue security are progressing, although aspects of venue-level command and control were still being finalised at the time of our review. While the overall command model for the Games is well conceived, more clarity is needed about venue control room operation, decision-making authority, escalation routes into the MACC, and the management of emerging public safety and operational risks at venue level, including the effective handover between organiser-led security and police response.
98. Police Scotland should maintain its ongoing engagement with venue security partners, supported by the continued development, finalisation and testing of both internal and organiser-led CONOPS. This will support a shared and consistent understanding of venue-level command, control and communications arrangements and strengthen confidence as Games-time operations approach.

99. Responsibility for the vetting and accreditation of the venue security workforce appropriately rests with the Organising Company. Early Police Scotland advice, scrutiny and professional challenge have informed the Organising Company's approach to vetting, reducing access-related risk to within tolerable levels. Proportionate, risk-based vetting for all volunteers has now been agreed by the Organising Company, but arrangements were still being refined at the time of our review. Effective implementation of this by the organiser will be key to sustaining confidence in venue security.

## Resource planning and workforce readiness

100. Police Scotland has established a structured and coherent approach to resource planning for the policing of the Games. This is underpinned by a dedicated People and Resourcing Strategy, which provides a clear framework for workforce identification, deployment, sustainability and officer welfare. Early and sustained engagement between the Resource Deployment Unit (RDU), Silver commander and the central planning team has enabled resourcing considerations to inform operational design from the outset, rather than being applied retrospectively.

101. Resource planning is supported by clear and established oversight arrangements, providing a stable framework as planning transitions from development into operational delivery. Learning from previous major events has informed the approach (with an emphasis on early workforce identification, sustainability and wellbeing), supporting effective deployment during the Games.

102. Early integration of the RDU into the planning team represents a notable strength. RDU provides specialist advice on deployment models, shift patterns and workforce agreement considerations, supported by Games-aligned resource advisers who provide continuity between national planning teams and local policing divisions.

103. A bespoke workforce agreement has been reached between Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Federation and, since our review, has been signed off by both parties. The planned use of a bespoke agreement is likely to enhance policing of the Games by improving flexibility, resource alignment and operational resilience. It is also expected to support officer welfare and reduce the risk of disputes, enabling commanders to respond effectively to operational demands.

104. Resource planning is led by RDU and supported by a structured, establishment-based methodology that allocates officers proportionately across divisions based on capacity, while explicitly factoring in specialist capability requirements. The operation involves appropriate and proportionate policing deployments over the 10 day period including conventional and specialist policing resources.
105. We found that specialist capability requirements, including public order, firearms and CT roles, were prioritised ahead of conventional resourcing, reflecting a deliberate sequenced approach. Governance and escalation routes are in place; these will protect specialist capacity, ensure accreditation and refresher training requirements are met, and prevent specialists being diluted into general roles.
106. We note that efforts have been made to maintain continuity of resources throughout the event, ensuring consistent deployment across shifts and roles. This approach supports stronger situational awareness, improved communication, and helps build rapport with attendees and partners. Maintaining continuity also enhances operational effectiveness by reducing handover gaps and ensuring a consistent policing presence.
107. Police Scotland implemented a planned and effective resourcing process from within their ranks through seeking volunteers to undertake shifts. Volunteers were identified early and integrated into BAU-sensitive planning arrangements. The volunteers included police officers, staff members, special constables and Police Scotland youth volunteers, strengthening both operational effectiveness and community engagement.
108. We identified that engagement with local policing divisions is conducted through formal resourcing requests, Silver-level governance arrangements, and regular interaction with the central planning team. Dedicated resource advisers provide continuity between RDU, divisions and planners, supporting dialogue on abstractions, workforce availability and local pressures as planning progresses. However, we did not engage directly with divisional commanders out with Glasgow Division during this review and, as a result, assurance is limited regarding the consistency of understanding and management of resourcing impacts across all policing divisions.

109. Some elements of the resourcing picture remain assumption based. Important elements such as organiser-led security delivery, final venue security standards and the maturity of venue-level CONOPS were not fully resolved at the conclusion of our review, creating a risk of late adjustment to resource numbers, skill mix and specialist capability. These risks are explicitly captured within a dynamic risk matrix, incorporating legal requirements, workforce agreements, welfare considerations and impacts on training, leave and rest days. The matrix is monitored and updated, with mitigation actions escalated through Silver and Gold governance as assumptions mature.
110. Where internal specialist capacity was assessed as requiring support, early engagement with national partners, including NPoCC, has enabled the timely consideration of specialist resilience and mutual aid options. These arrangements are supported through established governance and escalation routes, ensuring that mutual aid is appropriately framed as a targeted contingency measure, rather than a default resourcing solution.
111. The availability of key operational enablers to support workforce readiness has been factored in. Body-worn video (BWV) availability is treated as a BAU capability, so was not regarded as a Games-specific operational risk in planning assumptions. Its rollout was progressing at the time of our review and has since been completed within Greater Glasgow division. There will be sufficient availability of BWV devices at operational staging posts for the officers deployed during the Games.
112. Custody arrangements are incorporated within wider workforce and operational readiness planning, including the appointment of a dedicated Criminal Justice Services Division Bronze commander. Designated Glasgow custody centres have been identified as the primary facilities for Games-related arrests, with contingency plans in place to open additional centres if required. At the time of this review, no concerns were identified about custody capacity or resilience.
113. Officer welfare is treated as an integral component of workforce readiness and is informed by learning from previous major events. Shift patterns, fatigue management and rest day protections demonstrate a focus on sustainability, although many arrangements remain largely untested at scale.

114. Financial governance arrangements are in place and subject to senior oversight. However, challenging planning timescales relating to the baton relay, ceremonies and fan zone, continue to create uncertainty about resourcing scale, workforce demand and cost. These elements remain particularly exposed to late change and will require focused monitoring to improve operational and financial certainty as delivery approaches.

### Mobilisation and mutual aid arrangements

115. Mobilisation and mutual aid arrangements for the CWG26 demonstrate positive progress and have benefited from early engagement and national co-ordination. Police Scotland engaged at an early stage with NPoCC and the Home Office Major Events Team, providing assurance that national capacity considerations are understood and that mutual aid requests can be progressed promptly if required. This early engagement supports a co-ordinated and proportionate approach and reduces the risk of late or reactive mobilisation activity, should operational demand escalate.

116. We found that the overarching mobilisation framework is credible and reflects learning from previous major events. Staging posts and associated mobilisation concepts have been identified and aligned with wider resourcing, logistics and wellbeing strategies, including consideration of accommodation, travel, welfare, briefing and familiarisation requirements for any incoming officers. These arrangements include provision for Scots law and procedural inputs, demonstrating a structured approach to deployment, command oversight and staff welfare.

117. Current planning assumptions indicate that mutual aid is expected to be limited in scope. Most operational and specialist capability is intended to be delivered from within Police Scotland, and mutual aid is not currently anticipated for general duties or public order policing. This position is appropriately caveated, recognising that changes in threat, parallel operational pressure or unforeseen events may require reassessment as delivery approaches.

118. Mutual aid planning appropriately reflects resilience considerations associated with specialist functions. Police Scotland has recognised capacity pressures and availability constraints within areas such as specialist firearms, consistent with wider national demand patterns. These risks are managed through established governance and escalation arrangements and mitigated through access to UK-wide specialist mutual aid and strategic reserve provisions, which are well rehearsed and designed to ensure continuity of specialist capability during periods of heightened demand.

119. While the strategic approach to mobilisation of mutual aid is sound, several components remained under development including confirmation of logistical arrangements.

120. Completion and testing of these elements will be essential to ensure consistent command, control and accountability during Games-time operations and to support the effective integration of assisting forces.

### Testing and exercising – operational readiness

121. Testing and exercising activity is supporting Police Scotland’s operational readiness for the Games. Exercising has focused on testing and refining command and control arrangements, specialist capabilities and multi-agency interoperability as plans mature, and has provided increasing confidence in the police-led response.

Figure 3 - Testing and exercising cycle



Source: Police Scotland

122. The previously-mentioned phased programme of testing and exercising by SMARTEU has enabled early testing of key assumptions at an appropriate stage of planning. We observed exercising activity and heard from Bronze commanders, specialist teams and functional leads that this had helped to clarify roles, test command arrangements and identify practical issues before final plans are confirmed.
123. This has also supported operational learning and refinement. We observed multi-agency tabletop exercises, workshops and command and control activity. These involved relevant commanders and partners, and contributed to testing command, co-ordination and information flow arrangements with evaluation reports evidencing the capture of strengths, learning and areas for improvement.
124. Specialist exercising has contributed positively to readiness in higher-risk areas. CT exercising spans strategic, operational and specialist capabilities, while firearms and public order arrangements are subject to planned challenge activity. These exercises provide targeted assurance on the most complex and risk-critical aspects of the policing operation.
125. Cyber capability is well connected to national policing and security partners, and contributes specialist advice and intelligence to planning. Planning activity is progressing well between the Scottish Cyber Coordination Centre (SC3), Police Scotland, the Organising Company, the National Crime Agency and cyber security partners. The group has arranged a series of meetings to explore the coordination structures that would be activated, as well as communication and notification pathways, in the event of a cyber incident. This has helped to establish a clear, shared understanding of how information, reporting, and intelligence will flow into and through the command structures that have been established.
126. The partners will continue to assess cyber threat levels and undertake scenario planning to develop a proportionate response. They also intend to establish a daily multi-agency cyber situational awareness group during the Games – as implemented for other major events – to monitor the broader cyber threat landscape.

127. In terms of onsite emergency response from the SFRS and SAS, including having fire and ambulance service appliances based at the Games venues, we found that this is being considered as BAU by the services and the Organising Company. A small number of SFRS resources will be based at venues. The SAS and SFRS will both be represented within the MACC.
128. As stated earlier in this report, the Organising Company retains responsibility for leading its own exercising activity, which is delivered through a commissioned provider, including delivery of an organiser-led command post exercise. Continued effort is needed to ensure alignment between police-led and organiser-led exercising, shared learning and strengthened joint assurance, reflecting the Organising Company's central role in safety and security delivery.

### Staff wellbeing and workforce support arrangements

129. We found that Police Scotland has treated staff welfare and wellbeing as a core component of CWG26 planning and delivery. Evidence demonstrates a proactive, structured and learning-informed approach, with wellbeing treated as integral to operational effectiveness and workforce resilience, rather than as a supplementary consideration.
130. Wellbeing arrangements are embedded within the Games People and Resourcing Strategy, ensuring that welfare considerations inform workforce planning, deployment decisions and abstraction modelling. This integrated approach reflects a clear intent to balance Games-time operational demand with BAU resilience, fairness and workforce sustainability. Learning from previous major events has informed both strategies, supporting a coherent and consistent approach to people management.
131. There is a dedicated Games wellbeing strategy, developed to meet such commitments and aligned to Police Scotland's wider people and workforce principles. Oversight and assurance are provided through a formally constituted wellbeing governance group, and staff association meetings. We found active scrutiny of wellbeing-related risks, constructive challenge and engagement from relevant departments and staff associations, and appropriate escalation of issues to Silver command.
132. We also found that wellbeing considerations are actively reflected within resourcing, logistical and deployment planning, rather than being managed separately. Planning documentation, including a guide for officers and staff, demonstrates that decisions on deployments, shift patterns and staffing models explicitly consider fatigue management, rest periods, overtime control, excusal processes, accommodation, catering and transport.

133. Arrangements are in place to monitor staff wellbeing during Games-time operations. These include daily debrief processes and the use of a Citizen Space questionnaire, enabling officers and staff to raise welfare or logistical concerns promptly. Such mechanisms complement established supervisory and command escalation routes, supporting the management of issues in near real time.
134. We found that wellbeing-focused guidance, FAQs and staff communications are being finalised in advance of deployments – reflecting recognition of the importance of providing clarity and certainty to reduce anxiety and support wellbeing.

## Health and safety arrangements

135. Health and safety arrangements are embedded within established governance structures for the CWG26. Dedicated health and safety representation is in place at Gold commander meetings and within the Wellbeing Governance Group, providing structured oversight, professional advice and clear escalation routes. Governance arrangements are clearly developed and provide organisational grip, with evidence that health and safety considerations are routinely discussed and integrated with wider welfare and logistics planning.
136. A dedicated health and safety risk assessment is in place, setting out a comprehensive assessment of hazards and controls across venues, routes and operational activity. This includes consideration of officer and staff safety, welfare provisions, staffing, equipment, training, Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) standards and multi-agency working. The risk assessment incorporates assurance mechanisms, including briefing and debriefing arrangements, SCoPE<sup>5</sup> reporting and ongoing monitoring, intended to support oversight during delivery. Documentation makes clear that operational plans are to be read alongside the health and safety risk assessment, reinforcing the integration of health and safety within operational decision making.
137. Planned familiarisation visits to venues and routes, including joint working with partners, are intended to support the practical identification of operational risks and agree mitigation measures. Bronze leads indicated that existing arrangements support safe delivery, while recognising that further detail, validation and assurance will be required as plans are finalised.

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<sup>5</sup> SCoPE is the in-house developed application used by Police Scotland as a national HR/duty management system since the inception of the service in April 2013.

138. We identified the finalisation and testing of health and safety documentation as an area for development, particularly at Bronze level. Further work is needed to complete and confirm remaining health and safety plans and to finalise details in the health and safety risk assessment, including the testing and validation of identified control measures. Completion of this will strengthen assurance that health and safety arrangements are fully developed, consistently applied and ready for implementation across all venues and routes, ahead of delivery.

## Workforce awareness and briefing arrangements

139. Police Scotland has developed a clear, coherent and credible framework for briefing officers and staff in preparation for policing the Games. Briefing is recognised by senior leaders as a critical enabler of safe, lawful and proportionate policing and is embedded within the command structure as the primary means of translating strategic intent into frontline delivery.

140. Briefing arrangements are structured around a defined cascade model. Gold command sets the overarching direction, tone and risk appetite for the operation, including expectations relating to ethics, human rights and organisational values. Silver command translates this direction into tactical priorities and control measures, while Bronze command is responsible for developing and delivering role-specific and venue-specific briefings to officers and staff. This model is well understood by the commanders interviewed and reflects established practice from previous major event policing.

141. The use of Gold commander blogs and wider senior leader messaging represents a positive feature of the overall briefing and engagement approach. These communications provide visible leadership, reinforcing organisational values such as proportionality and policing by consent, while giving reassurance to officers and staff about the maturity of planning and levels of senior oversight.

142. Police Scotland has developed a dedicated CWG26 intranet site to support briefing and information sharing. The site is intended to provide a central and authoritative source of information about the Games, including planning updates, operational guidance and welfare messaging. At this stage, the site reflects good practice and demonstrates a commitment to accessibility and consistency of information, particularly for officers and staff who may be abstracted, returning from rest days or joining the operation at different points.

143. Police Scotland has planned a structured programme of briefings, including pre-deployment briefings, venue and role-specific briefings, and daily or shift-based briefings during delivery. These are expected to cover the intelligence and threat context, public order considerations, suspicious activity reporting, venue-specific risks, escalation routes, and legal and ethical expectations.
144. While briefing is clearly recognised as an essential control measure, formal assurance mechanisms confirming briefing coverage and understanding were still developing. This is proportionate at this stage; however, these arrangements will need to strengthen as Police Scotland transitions from planning into delivery.

### Complaints and conduct arrangements

145. Police Scotland has established clear and appropriate arrangements to manage complaints and conduct matters arising from the Games. A dedicated Bronze commander has been appointed, with responsibility for complaints and conduct, providing defined ownership, senior oversight and clear accountability within the command structure. Deployed officers will receive a briefing on how to address and manage any complaints that may arise.
146. In addition, a comprehensive Professional Standards Department (PSD) complaints and conduct strategy is in place. This sets out detailed and structured arrangements covering the full range of potential complaints and conduct matters and provides a clear framework for delivery, escalation and assurance. These arrangements align appropriately with existing BAU PSD processes, which are well embedded and understood across the organisation.
147. The PSD strategy clearly defines what constitutes a Games-related complaint, crime or offence. This includes the application of specific markers within PSD systems to ensure accurate identification, monitoring and reporting, enabling effective oversight of Games-related matters and supporting timely escalation where necessary. Collectively, these arrangements provide confidence that complaints and conduct matters arising from the Games will be visible, auditable and subject to appropriate scrutiny.
148. At the time of our review, the awareness of Games-specific complaints and conduct arrangements among other Bronze commanders was variable. Since our review, the Silver commander all Bronze has briefed all Bronze commanders on these arrangements, which have also been incorporated into officer briefing materials.

149. Detailed arrangements are in place for managing complaints involving mutual aid officers. These are underpinned by a mutual aid agreement signed under [section 98 of the Police Act 1996](#) by all UK chief constables, which confirms that forces remain responsible for complaints concerning officers from their own force. In line with this agreement, clear processes have been defined whereby criminal complaints relating to mutual aid officers will be investigated by Police Scotland, while non-criminal complaints and conduct matters will be progressed by the officer's home force. These arrangements provide clarity of responsibility and support a consistent and proportionate approach.

### Equality, diversity and inclusion arrangements

150. Police Scotland has demonstrated a clear intention to ensure that EDI considerations inform the planning and delivery of policing for the CWG26. This intent is reflected across strategic documentation, governance discussions and emerging operational arrangements, which emphasise legitimacy, proportionality and the maintenance of public confidence.

151. A key mechanism supporting these arrangements is the EqHRIA referenced in the governance section of this report. This sets out a commitment to lawful, proportionate and human rights-compliant policing; identifies potential impacts on communities and individuals; and provides a basis for the consideration and mitigation of equality and human rights risks as planning progresses.

152. Beyond the EqHRIA, EDI-relevant activity is evident through safeguarding arrangements, workforce wellbeing governance and community engagement structures. We identified evidence of strong partnership working, active consideration of proportionality and visibility in policing models, and engagement approaches intended to support reassurance, accessibility and public confidence. Taken together, this indicates that EDI principles are present within existing governance and planning arrangements.

153. Since our review, the Bronze community impact structure<sup>6</sup> and processes have developed significantly. The operation will adopt Police Scotland's EDI Strategy and policies. Throughout delivery community advisors will be available to support the operation and a dedicated team will monitor community impact and sentiment, reporting trends to the Silver commander. The Community impact Bronze commander will provide support to the Organising Company as required throughout the operation.

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<sup>6</sup> The Bronze community impact structure is led by a Bronze commander and supported by a Policing Together team responsible for monitoring and assessing community impact, including EDI issues and hate crime.

## Learning, continuous improvement and legacy arrangements

154. Drawing together learning referenced elsewhere in this report, this section focuses on how Police Scotland is capturing, applying and assuring organisational learning during the Games, and how this will be retained for the policing of future major events.
155. Learning has been applied at an early stage of preparation rather than being deferred until post-event evaluation. Strategic and functional planning documentation consistently references historic learning, with evidence that lessons have informed early assumptions relating to command resilience, proportionality, intelligence governance, logistics and workforce wellbeing. Previously tested approaches have been adapted to reflect the scale, risk profile and constraints of the Games, demonstrating purposeful and contextual application rather than replication.
156. We found that formal mechanisms to support learning during the planning phase are well established. These include learning summaries, challenge panels, independent scrutiny, and structured testing and exercising supported by facilitated debriefs and evaluation reports. Learning from these processes is considered at appropriate governance levels and used to refine plans ahead of delivery. In addition, the use of focus groups and structured engagement sessions is a strength, capturing experiential learning from officers and staff with recent major event experience and adding practical insight into command clarity, welfare, communications and logistics.
157. Arrangements are also in place to support learning during delivery. Performance dashboards covering crime, arrests, complaints, injuries, finance and resourcing are intended to provide near-real-time insight to support informed operational decision making and reflective adjustment. Specialist functions have established routine incident and exercise debriefing arrangements, which are expected to continue throughout the event period. The planned use of CLIO to record decisions, security advice and outcomes will support auditability and provide a clear foundation for both immediate review and post-event learning.
158. Post-event debriefing and operational data collection arrangements are in place for the capture of reported crime, CT-related reports, arrests, disorder and suspicious activity. Responsibility for crime-related data collection and supporting analytical insight appropriately sits with the Commonwealth Games Crime Coordination Unit. There are several measures in place to assess the effectiveness of the operation including the Gold Commander's Acceptable Outcomes, Success Measures and Planning Debrief documents. All should be continually reviewed to ensure learning is captured and shared and considered for future events.

159. As a result, assurance remains limited about the extent to which it will be possible to assess whether deployed mitigations were proportionate to the assessed threat, risk and harm, or how effectively intelligence-led assumptions translated into operational outcomes.
160. Learning and legacy arrangements are currently dispersed across multiple documents and workstreams. While learning activity is extensive, there is limited evidence at this stage of a single, consolidated mechanism to centrally capture, prioritise and track learning arising from exercises, governance activity, focus groups and external scrutiny.
161. Establishing a clearly defined and consistently applied process, with agreed ownership, governance and reporting arrangements, would strengthen assurance regarding the accuracy of the intelligence picture, the proportionality and effectiveness of deployed mitigations, and the organisation's ability to evidence learning and legacy from intelligence-led major event policing.

The background features a dark purple color with a central graphic of two interlocking gears. Two large, thick, curved arrows are positioned around the gears, one at the top pointing left and one at the bottom pointing right, suggesting a circular or cyclical process.

**Business as usual,  
local policing and  
community  
engagement**

## Business as usual

162. Police Scotland has integrated BAU requirements into Games planning, with early engagement across local policing divisions giving them clear sight of expected abstractions. As indicated, Police Scotland decided at an early stage to ask for police officers and police staff to volunteer for shifts on the Games, which is a departure from usual practice on similar events. However, it has had a good response, with the planning team receiving hundreds of replies. Local Policing divisions were given the opportunity to review their volunteers to ensure that they were not losing a business-critical member of staff from their BAU role.
163. Police Scotland's approach to the Games espouses proportionality, reassurance and policing by consent, with adjustment to deployments, firearms activity, CT measures and venue security planning designed to minimise any unnecessary visibility. CTsAs have carried out structured venue and public space walkthroughs to support proportionate and reassurance-focused security planning. This has reduced the number of police deployments in comparison with the much larger Games held in 2014.
164. As part of its overall resourcing model, Police Scotland has taken proportionate steps to reduce the number of resources required for the Games, while maintaining sufficient resources to mitigate the risks presented. However, the Games are of a size and scale that there will still be a requirement for a significant number of resources to safely police it. The number of resources required for an event of this scale will not only affect Greater Glasgow local policing division, but other local policing divisions across the country (Scotland's single police service structure is well suited to this type of internal mutual aid).
165. We have been told that resources will be drawn mainly from the east and west of Scotland and that – apart from some specialist functions – there will be a limited impact on northern divisions. The exception to this are those selected from the list of volunteers. The rationale for limited use of northern officers is due to geographical limitations on travelling to and from the venues each day. There will be staff based at the Scottish Police College in Fife for the duration of the event, who will travel to and from the Games venues each day.
166. Interviews with BAU staff indicated confidence that resourcing requests associated with the Games can be managed alongside ongoing demand, supported by volunteer uptake, established co-ordination processes and the limited requirement for abstraction of non-deployable officers beyond logistics roles.

167. Continued monitoring of wider demand pressures, including parallel events, will be necessary to maintain BAU across Scotland. We are aware that the planning team has brought together a group looking at parallel events during the Games period to ensure that all events, including the Games, can be safely managed. However, it is the nature of policing that there are always unforeseen/spontaneous events that can take place and will need resourcing. And the reduction in policing numbers over recent years will no doubt mean that policing will be tested over this summer period.
168. We are aware that all divisions carry an element of abstractions in sickness and modified duties and are trying hard to reduce these abstractions to ensure frontline officers are supported as best they can. It should be noted that there is no intention to move local policing to 12-hour shifts (as has occurred at other events), and officers will remain in their core shifts during the Games period.
169. We have been told that a central overview of BAU resourcing will continue up to and throughout the Games period. One of the advantages of a single service is the ability to flex resources where they are needed. Early visibility of anticipated abstractions, supported by engagement between the planning team, resource advisers and divisional leads, will enable divisions to plan ahead and minimise disruption to day-to-day policing.

## Community engagement

170. The draft community impact assessment shows that there is a structured, proactive approach to maintaining public confidence, legitimacy and equality. Evidence shows that community impact feedback is routinely gathered through monthly Bronze meetings, including input from local area commanders and minority and diversity groups that Police Scotland has links into. Community impact monitoring and EqHRIA considerations underpin this approach.
171. We have been informed that Operation Servator will commence from May 2026. Deterring hostile reconnaissance and providing a proportionate visible police presence can provide helpful reassurance to businesses and the public during high-profile events such as the Commonwealth Games.



# **Specialist policing functions**

## Overview

172. Police Scotland has established a structured, risk-led and increasingly mature approach to the provision of specialist policing functions in support of the CWG26. Specialist operational, investigative and protective policing capabilities are clearly identified, appropriately prioritised and aligned with the assessed threat, risk and harm profile associated with the Games.
173. Strategic oversight of specialist capability planning is clear and well embedded within Gold and Silver-level governance arrangements. Engagement with national policing and security partners is effective and supports a shared understanding of capability requirements, dependencies and resilience considerations. These arrangements provide a credible foundation for co-ordinating specialist resources and ensuring that specialist functions are integrated within the wider operational policing model for the Games.
174. Planning documentation demonstrates that specialist functions are embedded within core command, decision making and escalation structures, rather than treated as standalone or peripheral elements of delivery. This integration supports coherence between protective security, operational response, investigation and the maintenance of BAU policing across Scotland.
175. Training, accreditation and exercising arrangements for specialist functions are generally well governed and informed by learning from recent major events. Specialist capability assumptions are risk based and aligned with national standards. Where capability pressures or constraints exist, these are recognised within planning assumptions and managed through proportionate mitigation, including national co-ordination and mutual aid frameworks where appropriate.
176. While the overall position is positive and proportionate to the current stage of preparation, some elements of specialist capability continue to mature. These include the further consolidation of assurance arising from planned exercising activity, and the completion of planning elements dependent on external confirmation and organiser-led activity. These issues are recognised by Police Scotland and are being actively managed through established governance processes.

## Specialist training, capability and readiness

177. Police Scotland has effective and proportionate arrangements in place to identify and deliver the specialist training required to support the safe delivery of the Games. We found that these arrangements are clearly risk led, aligned with national standards, and supported by established governance and assurance processes.
178. Specialist policing capabilities required for the Games have been identified through structured planning activity and formal threat, risk and harm assessment processes. Training and accreditation requirements are embedded within strategic and operational planning documentation and are subject to regular review, ensuring continued alignment with the evolving risk profile associated with a high-profile international event.
179. We found that the approach to identifying specialist training needs demonstrates a clear and appropriate link between assessed risk and capability development. Equality, human rights and authorisation considerations provide assurance that officers will be deployed only where they hold appropriate training, current accreditation and legal authority. Specialist refresher training and accreditation status are actively monitored, with clear escalation routes through the RDU and Silver and Gold governance arrangements where risks to capability emerge.
180. At an operational level, specialist expertise is reflected within venue-specific planning and command arrangements, demonstrating that training is being applied in practice. We established that some specialist activity remains ongoing, consistent with the live nature of Games planning, and will require continued oversight to ensure timely completion as delivery approaches.

## Specialist policing functions and crime capabilities

181. Police Scotland has effective and proportionate operational support and crime-related specialist capability arrangements in place to support the policing of the Games. Specialist operational resources are assessed, planned and governed in a manner that supports both Games-time delivery and the maintenance of BAU policing across Scotland.
182. Planning demonstrates that the specialist capabilities required to manage disruption, protest activity and high-impact incidents have been identified early and resourced proportionately. Arrangements seek to minimise abstraction from local policing divisions while preserving sufficient specialist depth to respond to emerging risk.

183. Public order capability is assessed as sufficient. Planning reflects the increased level of protest activity experienced by Police Scotland in recent years and considers the potential for concurrent protest activity both inside and outside the Games footprint. Incidents within the Games footprint will be led by designated public order commanders, while lower-level incidents elsewhere will continue to be managed by local policing divisions.
184. Firearms capability and command resilience have been considered as part of operational support planning for the Games. Arrangements are aligned to established national standards and designed to support both Games-time demand and BAU policing. Governance and contingency arrangements provide assurance that armed policing capability can be sustained and escalated where required, without disproportionate impact on wider operational resilience.
185. In addition to public order arrangements, we found that CID capability is embedded within Police Scotland's operational support arrangements for the Games, rather than treated as a standalone function. CID resources, working alongside public protection teams, will provide dedicated investigative capability during the Games, integrated within the command structures. Crime is planned to be triaged through established command arrangements, ensuring that investigative activity is proportionate, prioritised and aligned with wider operational decision making, while maintaining BAU investigative capacity.
186. Police Scotland has identified cyber as a relevant specialist capability for the policing of the Games. Experienced cyber investigators are available and report having sufficient capacity to support the event while maintaining BAU responsibilities. Key cyber-related risks have been explicitly recognised within planning assumptions, including potential disruptive attacks, fraud-related activity and emerging technological risks. Cyber capability is embedded within core command structures and provides specialist advice and intelligence to police command, the Organising Company and its dedicated cyber security partner, supporting the collective management of cyber-related risk across the Games footprint.
187. As outlined previously in this report, the Organising Company, the SC3, police and cyber security partners have collaborated on the assessment of cyber threats and a proportionate response – a process that will continue throughout the Games.

## Safety and security arrangements for dignitaries

188. Police Scotland has established robust governance, specialist capability and national partnerships to deliver safety and security arrangements for dignitaries attending the Games. Such protection is clearly recognised as a priority risk and is appropriately embedded within Gold-level protective security and CT governance arrangements, ensuring that protective security considerations directly inform decision making.
189. We found that arrangements are supported by a structured multi-agency governance framework, including the Dignitary Security Working Group, which brings together Police Scotland Royalty and VIP (RVIP) teams, Royalty and Specialist Protection (RaSP), the Metropolitan Police Service, the Home Office and Games planners. This forum provides clear ownership of dignitary-related risk, supports co-ordination of protective security, communications and protocol considerations, and enables issues to be escalated and resolved through established governance routes.
190. Relevant specialist capability is available and aligned to dignitary protection requirements. This includes RVIP policing capability, specialist firearms resources, counter-terrorism intelligence inputs and planners experienced in providing security for previous major events. CT security co-ordination arrangements are well established, with CT SecCo and intelligence representatives embedded within command structures, ensuring that refreshed threat assessments directly inform protective security planning as preparations mature.
191. The protective security approach adopted for dignitaries demonstrates an appropriate balance between safety, proportionality and public reassurance. Approved measures include the use of intelligence-led disruption and reassurance tactics, aligned with broader Games protective security arrangements. These measures are proportionate to the assessed threat profile and consistent with policing by consent.
192. We found that aspects of detailed planning remain dependent on external confirmation, including the final composition of international and domestic dignitary attendance. As a consequence, a small number of Bronze-level plans and deployment arrangements require further refinement once confirmations are received. We are satisfied that these dependencies are anticipated and appropriate at this stage of preparation for an event of this scale and complexity, and are recognised, tracked and managed through established governance and escalation arrangements. They do not undermine confidence in overall dignitary protection capability.

193. To strengthen assurance on dignitary security arrangements, Police Scotland should work with the Organising Company and relevant partners to formalise and test communication and escalation arrangements for sensitive incidents involving dignitaries.

194. In particular, clearer validation – through exercising of decision-making authority, escalation routes and agreed media-handling protocols – would support timely, co-ordinated responses, reducing any risk of confusion or reputational harm in circumstances where responsibility for public communications rests with the Organising Company.



# Conclusions

195. Police Scotland has made considerable progress in planning for the delivery of policing the Commonwealth Games 2026. Arrangements are commensurate with the current stage of preparation and demonstrate appropriate organisational grip, professional expertise and risk awareness.
196. Particular strengths include the clarity of police command and governance, the integration of intelligence and protective security into planning, and the systematic attention given to workforce sustainability and wellbeing. These elements provide a strong platform from which to move confidently into the final stages of preparation and delivery.
197. The remaining work is limited, clearly identified and largely focused on validation rather than design. Assurance will be strengthened through the completion and testing of fully integrated, organiser-led command and control arrangements, further exercising of Games-wide systems and interoperability, and the finalisation of a small number of partner-dependent plans and agreements. These matters are appropriately owned, governed and time-bound.
198. Providing that momentum is sustained and outstanding dependencies are resolved as intended, we are confident that the service will be able to deliver safe, effective and proportionate policing of the Games.



**Improving  
Policing  
Across  
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#### **About the Strategic review of policing the Commonwealth Games 2026 front cover**

The Strategic review of policing the Commonwealth Games 2026 front cover has been created with the assistance of Artificial Intelligence (AI) from images that HMICS has obtained from Police Scotland and HMICS assets enhanced by AI.

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978-1-910165-96-6

HMICS/2026/05