



**HMICS** HM INSPECTORATE OF  
CONSTABULARY FOR SCOTLAND

**Thematic Inspection**  
Police use of firearms  
in Scotland

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January 2009

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## SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

This thematic inspection of the police use of firearms in Scotland is based on the recommendations made by the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) in its 2006 *Protective Services Capability and Capacity Review (PSCCR) – Police Use of Firearms Workstream* report. The thematic inspection follows directly from the ACPOS request for HMICS to assess the progress made (see recommendation 7 below).

The police use of firearms is heavily guided by legislation, guidance and policy documents, the key examples of which are included at Appendix A of this inspection report. The processes and guidelines contained within them have been informed by previous firearms incidents and the enquiries following them, and indeed should be the starting point for any subsequent enquiry into such an incident.

These key documents also contain clear guidance on how a force should conduct a Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (ST&RA), the findings of which should then inform each force's approach to providing firearms services locally.

The cost of providing such services is considerable but, in common with other areas of policing, co-operation between forces can help to bring about efficiencies. To this end, two groups have been formed in Scotland: the West Strategic Alliance Coordination Unit (SACU), which brings together Strathclyde, Northern and Dumfries and Galloway police forces; and, the East SACU which comprises Central, Fife, Grampian, Lothian and Borders and Tayside police forces.

### **Summary of recommendations from the 2006 ACPOS *Protective Services Capability and Capacity Review – Police Use of Firearms Workstream* report and our findings from this thematic inspection**

All ACPOS recommendations were endorsed by the ACPOS Council meeting in November 2006.

Rec. No.	ACPOS Recommendation	HMICS Conclusion
1	That the proposed Protective Services Framework be considered which incorporates the use of collaborative arrangements and Lead Forces.	<b>While there are clear collaborative arrangements within each SACU, progress continues to be slow. Despite the recommendation being approved, it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.</b>
2	That the baseline requirement identified be considered and approved.	<b>Although this recommendation was approved, those forces without a robust ST&amp;RA are not in a position to contribute fully to the development of an agreed baseline. Therefore we do not regard this recommendation as discharged.</b>
3	That the specialist support identified be considered and approved.	<b>Although this recommendation was approved, persistent delays and inaction mean that it has not yet been implemented or complied with. We therefore do not consider it to be discharged.</b>



4	Subject to approval of the above recommendations, that generic service level agreements be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision.	<b>Although this recommendation was approved, we find that it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.</b>
5	That costed options be developed in support of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service delivery.	<b>Although this recommendation was approved, it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.</b>
6	That ACPOS approve the recommendation that the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms; the ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons and the National (Police) Firearms Training Curriculum continue to set the national standard in relation to the Police Use of Firearms in Scotland.	<b>We fully support ACPOS' recommendation but have found its implementation to be partial and slow. We are particularly concerned that the development of ST&amp;RAs, which should underpin forces' approach to the use of firearms, has been inadequate in several forces.</b>
7	That HMIC be invited to conduct a thematic inspection in two years to assess the progress made.	<b>HMICS regards this recommendation as discharged.</b>
8	That HMIC include the baseline service requirement within its inspection protocols as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness.	<b>We believe that this recommendation has been superseded by the need for individual forces to respond to the findings of their own ST&amp;RAs.</b>

In our opinion the recommendations of the ACPOS report were sound. Therefore we believe that where these have not been implemented there remains merit in pursuing them with vigour.

HMICS found training to be well-structured, with a nationally consistent approach that reflects the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Manual of Guidance (MoG) and is supported by the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC). Compliance with the NPFTC is co-ordinated by the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA).

While forces in Scotland have adopted the ethos of the NPFTC, the majority have yet to embrace the scrutiny and improvement process associated with its licensing arrangements. We believe that applying for a provisional licence of curriculum compliance and working towards a full licence will require forces to address many of the areas where progress has to date been slow. By collating the data required to comply, forces will have more complete information to inform their decisions on what baseline and specialist services are required.

Consequently we have made only one additional recommendation in this report:

**HMICS recommends that all forces work to achieve NPIA NPFTC licensing within six months from the date of publication of this report. This will require forces to produce robust and comprehensive ST&RAs, and will bring them under continuing scrutiny in the short term.**



## INTRODUCTION

1. In Scotland and the rest of mainland UK, unlike the majority of police forces in the world, only certain police officers, Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs), are issued with firearms, and only then in specific circumstances. The definition of an AFO and criteria for issue of firearms are provided at paragraphs 4-7 in Appendix A.
2. Moreover, the role of an AFO, is a voluntary one, meaning that a police officer in the UK cannot be required to carry a firearm. The average percentage of AFOs per force across Scotland is 3.7%, ranging from 2.2% in Strathclyde to 8.6% in Northern. It should be noted that although CS incapacitant spray also falls within the terms of firearms legislation it is now routinely issued, alongside the police baton, to most officers in Scotland. Such standard personal protective pieces of equipment were not considered in this inspection.
3. It is an unfortunate reality that necessary improvements in the police use of firearms have often followed shootings by police. However, the inquiries carried out following such events have yielded valuable learning points for the service. Where members of the public and police officers have been injured or killed during operations or training it is wholly appropriate that police use of firearms be subject to a highly structured and auditable review process.
4. Data on the frequency with which firearms are used by forces in Scotland are collated by HMICS and these statistics, which are updated annually on the HMICS website<sup>1</sup>, are provided at Appendix B.
5. It is to the credit of Scottish forces that the number of occasions on which the police discharge conventional firearms during operations is very low. Since 1997/98<sup>2</sup> there have been three instances (all of which were non-fatal) where conventional firearms have been discharged at persons, and 43 instances requiring the destruction of an animal. The range of options available to officers for resolving very dangerous incidents has improved over time, ensuring that the police response is proportionate and involves only reasonable force.
6. Public accountability is an essential element of any scrutiny process, even of operationally sensitive aspects of policing where a greater degree of professional discretion is called for. For this reason we are particularly grateful to have had the assistance of John Scott, a lawyer with considerable experience in the field of human rights. Through his lay involvement in this inspection he has had access to all documentation supplied by forces, thus ensuring that relevant areas of public concern have been considered.
7. This thematic inspection responds directly to recommendation 7 of the 2006 restricted ACPOS *Protective Services Capability and Capacity Review (PSCCR) – Police Use of Firearms Workstream* report, (see paragraph 81). The purpose of the Review was “to carry out an assessment of national specialist tactical firearms capability and covert firearms support for extended pre-planned operations encompassing serious and organised crime and counter terrorism”. It was one strand of a wider review co-ordinated by Chief Constable Ian Latimer on behalf of ACPOS.
8. In June 2008, we met with the ACPOS portfolio holder for the police use of firearms to ensure that our remit was consistent with current needs.
9. In recognition of developments such as the 2006 publication of the *Firearms Threat and Risk Assessment Guide*, and of recent significant incidents and their associated learning opportunities, the following remit for this inspection was agreed between ourselves and ACPOS.

1 HMICS website: <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/public-safety/Police/15403/Statistical>

2 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary Annual Statistical Return 2006/2007



### *Terms of reference*

**10.** HMICS will examine this subject to identify areas of good practice and, where appropriate, make recommendations to the Service on how procedures may be improved. The inspection will focus on the following areas:

- Progress made on implementing the recommendations of the *ACPOS Protective Services Capacity and Capability Review* of 2006 in respect of the *Police Use of Firearms Workstream*.
- Any revisions to the above ACPOS approach resulting from significant and relevant events.
- The process of firearms strategic threat and risk assessment development, implementation and review.

## KEY ISSUES

### HMICS INSPECTION

**11.** The *ACPOS Protective Services Capability and Capacity Review (PSCCR) – Police Use of Firearms Workstream* report made eight recommendations:

1. *That the proposed Protective Services Framework be considered which incorporates the use of collaborative arrangements and Lead Forces.*
2. *That the baseline requirement identified be considered and approved.*
3. *That the specialist support identified be considered and approved.*
4. *Subject to approval of the above recommendations, that generic service level agreements be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision.*
5. *That costed options be developed in support of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service delivery.*
6. *That ACPOS approve the recommendation that the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms; the ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons and the National (Police) Firearms Training Curriculum continue to set the national standard in relation to the Police Use of Firearms in Scotland.*
7. *That HMIC be invited to conduct a thematic inspection in two years to assess the progress made.*
8. *That HMIC include the baseline service requirement within its inspection protocols as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness.*

In November 2006 ACPOS Council endorsed the above recommendations.

### *Our findings*

**12.** The governance and standards for police use of firearms are dealt with in recommendation 6. Therefore, to comment on the recommendations in a structured and cohesive manner it is helpful to begin with that recommendation.

***Recommendation 6 – “That ACPOS approve the recommendation that the ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms; the ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons and the National (Police) Firearms Training Curriculum continue to set the national standard in relation to the Police Use of Firearms in Scotland”***



13. That this recommendation is worded ‘continue to set the standard’ reflects the fact that the ACPO MoG and the ACPOS Statement of Intent were already the core references for forces. The recommendation also recognises the separation of the training element of the manual to form the NPFTC, and the role of the ACPOS Statement of Intent in adopting these for Scotland. Further detail of these documents are included at Appendix A.

14. HMICS has also considered the implementation of the content of the documents referred to within the ACPOS recommendation in the belief that it is insufficient to set a standard unless action follows to comply with it.

### ***The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment***

15. The Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (ST&RA) process is outlined in the ACPOS Statement of Intent and forms the foundation of a force’s approach to the police use of firearms. Details of the guidance given to forces in respect of their ST&RA can be found at Appendix A, paragraphs 14-16.

16. The inspection found that all forces had completed at least one firearms ST&RA. As the process has improved and evolved, some forces had revised their documents to incorporate improvements and reflect the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) guidelines. Several forces had completed a second version, Strathclyde a third. Furthermore, there was considerable disparity in the content, analysis of information and use made of the document.

17. Whilst many forces had a breadth of relevant data within their ST&RA, we make the following observations:

### ***Timescales***

18. Force ST&RAs should be completed on an annual basis. They are documents that should be updated regularly and used throughout the year to inform the force on the matters listed above.

19. Most of the current ST&RAs supplied to us by forces had not been annually and comprehensively updated. One force indicated that it was its intention to review the document on a three-yearly basis. Another had a draft document which had been compiled but which had not yet been approved four months later, by which time further data would be expected to be available and included.

20. Where forces supplied a draft of their forthcoming ST&RA there was evidence of significant improvement and attempts to become more NPIA-compliant. However, we remain concerned about the time it takes forces to collate and approve documents.

### ***Ownership***

21. Each force is required by the Statement of Intent to have an officer of at least assistant chief constable rank (ACC) as the lead for the police use of firearms. It is this officer who ‘owns’ the force ST&RA, although it is a matter for individual forces who is then delegated to complete the assessment. It was clear to us that the best documents had involved the collaboration of a number of persons within an individual force.



22. While it is desirable to have an overseer to draw elements of the ST&RA together, it is questionable whether either a firearms training department or an operational firearms unit should take on this role and thus be put in the position of 'justifying' their resources, deployment model, training or budget through the document. Given the nature of the ST&RA, analysts have an integral role to play. HMICS observed a link between the involvement of analysts and the quality of ST&RA reviewed.

### *Content of ST&RA*

23. Paragraphs 14-16 in Appendix A outline the broad contents of a ST&RA. The NPIA guidelines contain a list of expected appendices and the data to be included. Table 1 below shows how the better and less well developed ST&RAs of the Scottish forces compare against the NPIA recommended appendix.

**Table 1**

	<b>Spectrum of standard found by HMICS</b>	
<b>NPIA recommended appendix</b>	<b>Description of information supplied in better developed ST&amp;RA</b>	<b>Description of information supplied in less developed ST&amp;RA</b>
1. Force firearms policy	Standard Operating Procedures and policies relating to the force's deployment and use of firearms by police.	No information supplied in the ST&RA, although separate documents were available.
2. Firearms certificates and recovered firearms	Information regarding licensed shotguns and firearms legally held in a force and firearms which are recovered by being handed in, found, seized or otherwise obtained.	No information supplied, or only information on registered firearms/shotguns in the ST&RA.
3. Potential obligations under mutual aid	Known arrangements that a force has to support another force in the firearms arena.	No information supplied in the ST&RA. One made mention of other forces supporting a particular force but no detail was attached.
4. Responsibilities in respect of national emergencies and nationally-based plans	Known arrangements that a force has to support another force in the event of a national emergency in the firearms arena.	No information supplied in the ST&RA.
5. PESTELO	Environmental scanning of issues affecting the force in the Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal and Organisational areas.	No information supplied in the ST&RA.






	<b>Spectrum of standard found by HMICS</b>	
6. Crime/Incident pattern analysis of firearms-related crime	Information on: the number of incidents involving firearms, including non-police discharges of weapons, types of crime involved, murder, robbery etc.	Information supplied but not broken down to times or days of incidents.
7. Firearms incidents	Information on: the number of incidents involving firearms, and the police reaction to them, the number of firearms authorisations given, weapons recovered, time and day of incidents etc.	Information supplied but no mention of police response, authorisations given etc.
8. Operational demands	Specific operations where a force has a firearms commitment to respond to, such as the protection of an airport or a VIP who resides in the area.	No data or very limited information on operational deployments.
9. Training – overview and venues	Summary of training commitments to maintain the force firearms capability and the facilities it has to support this.	No information supplied in the ST&RA.
10. Resources	Details on the number of firearms officers, both general AFOs and those with additional specialist firearm skills. Details of equipment available in the force.	Total numbers of AFOs but no breakdown of what specialisms they have and no mention of commanders and ancillary roles.
11. Communications	Summary of communication protocols and the resilience for a force responding to a firearms incident.	No information supplied in the ST&RA.
12. Control measures to reduce risk	Risk assessment outlining a task and what the force has in place to reduce the danger to officers performing that task.	Generic risk assessments supplied.
13. Threat and risk register	Outline of issues raised by the ST&RA, what the risk is to the force if nothing is done, recommendations for resolving issues and a subsequent assessment of risk to the force if the recommendations are not implemented.	Generic risk assessments, but no follow up to risks or issues noted in the ST&RA.



- 24.** In the least developed ST&RA the information reproduced in Appendix B of this inspection report, which HMICS collect and report annually, was not included in the force document.
- 25.** There was also considerable variation in the ST&RAs in the recording of sources used. Some examples included comprehensive bibliographies showing public source information, internal data from force recording systems and specialist reports with restricted circulation available from organisations such as the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA) and Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Such references not only help when updating the document but are useful in sharing good practice between forces.
- 26.** As can be seen, at Appendix A, from the purpose of the ST&RA, the analysis of up-to-date accurate data is key to informed risk-assessment and decision-making. This can only be done effectively using the expertise of analytical staff.
- 27.** Several forces identified intelligence gaps in their recording. This was often either due to difficulties in retrieving information from their respective command and control systems, or the result of variations in what information was being collated.
- 28.** This problem was exacerbated by the varied definitions used by forces, often with the same expressions, such as ‘deploying an Armed Response Vehicle (ARV)’ meaning different things to different forces. In one force, the term ‘deploying an ARV’ meant that the crew were authorised to access their mobile armoury and attend the incident according to the directions of the tactical/silver commander. In another, the term merely meant to send the ARV to a rendezvous point, and did not mean that authority would be given either to issue weapons or act further. The first force used the term ‘re-locate an ARV’ to mean this. As a result, to compare the numbers of times a force had ‘deployed’ an ARV to an incident could prove misleading.
- 29.** A practical example of the use to which a ST&RA should be put is to make informed decisions on the need for one or more ARVs and the hours of the day or night when they should be deployed.
- 30.** In some forces which have ARVs on duty at all times, there was data, including the times and days of the week, showing the incidents requiring their use. Conversely, in some forces which have no or only part-time ARVs, such data was not collated or presented, thus their approach to the use of ARVs did not appear to be supported by analysis.
- 31.** Another practical purpose of the ST&RA is to record and examine the method or tactic used to resolve an incident. By doing so a force will be in a better position to understand the most common types of incident it faces and the tactics it uses, and therefore to identify the most appropriate type of training required.
- 32.** The ST&RA should also ensure that due consideration is given to the diversity of the communities that the force serves. We found evidence of good practice in this regard in the assessment prepared by Lothian and Borders Police, which included the following data table:
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Figure 1



**33.** The table shows the ethnicity of the 45 subjects traced during operations arising from 73 occasions on which the issue of firearms was authorised, during the period from 1st January to 31st December 2007. The gender of these subjects was also recorded, all 45 being male.

**34.** Given the role of the ST&RA in informing strategic decisions and training requirements, we were encouraged to see that Lothian and Borders had rightly identified this information as being relevant and included it as standard in its core document.

**35.** We were, however, surprised to note the lack of reference to Special Population Groups<sup>3</sup> (SPGs) in any of the forces' ST&RAs. This is despite extensive mention of the need to consider SPGs in the ACPO MoG at all levels of AFO and command training. Public domain data<sup>4</sup> states that approximately 50% of police shootings in the UK 'show some evidence indicating a suicidal motive in those shot, with further indications of irrational behaviour in a number of the other cases'.

**36.** The functions of an ST&RA are detailed at paragraphs 14-16 in Appendix A. They include identifying risks to the public, gaps in policies, procedures and training and evidencing a link between threats and current firearms establishment. The absence of data regarding such a significant proportion of police shootings raises doubts as to whether sufficient consideration has been given to the training, tactics and less lethal options required to deal with situations involving SPGs.

<sup>3</sup> Special Population Group – term used to describe a group of people who do not behave in an expected, rational manner as a result of some form of mental impairment (either permanent or temporary). ACPO MoG chapter 5, para 13.17

<sup>4</sup> Best, D et al. *Police Shootings as a method of self harming: A review of the evidence for 'Suicide by cop' in England and Wales between 1998 and 2001*. London: Police Complaints Authority, December 2002. (<http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/firearmsreport.suicidebycop.pdf>)



### ***Risk assessments***

**37.** Although the entire ST&RA can be regarded as a risk assessment, several force ST&RAs contained a number of specific task risk-assessments, for example the search of premises where there is believed to be an armed suspect. Even where the tasks were of a similar nature, different approaches to their risk-assessment were adopted by forces.

**38.** We recognise that individual forces may have access to different equipment or tactics that will vary their risk-assessment. Nevertheless, we would suggest that, in common with the ST&RA, risk assessment should improve through greater collaboration of forces and participation in the NPFTC licensing process.

### ***National Police Firearms Training Curriculum***

**39.** By endorsing recommendation 6, ACPOS has in effect adopted the NPFTC national standard for the police use of firearms in Scotland. Consequently, Scottish forces have structured their training well and in a manner consistent with the NPFTC. However, with the exception of Strathclyde, they have been slow to take on the accompanying licensing process and the improvements this would deliver.

**40.** For a force to demonstrate that it trains officers according to the NPFTC guidelines, it must be awarded a licence of curriculum compliance by the NPIA. This is achieved by making a submission to the NPIA which covers such details as the teaching materials, assessment processes and standard operating procedures (SOPs) to be used, and by the production of the force's firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment.

**41.** Initially the NPIA will examine a force and, following consultation, agree a compliance gap analysis and an action plan to address outstanding matters. They will then issue a provisional licence of curriculum compliance. The provisional licence will be monitored by way of an NPIA 'health check'. Forces are then required to make a further submission to the NPIA who, on re-inspecting the force, can then issue either a full licence, a full licence with a development programme attached, or an improvement notice.

**42.** The involvement of forces in this process brings benefits, not only in terms of compliance with the standards, but by embracing the continuous improvement associated with it.

**43.** By November 2006 all Home Office forces had met the requirement to have a provisional licence. A little under two years later, 16 forces in England and Wales had gone on to be awarded full licences of curriculum compliance.

**44.** In February 2006 Strathclyde Police invited the NPIA to give a presentation on the licensing process to representatives of all Scottish forces. The following year Lothian and Borders Police hosted a similar presentation. To date within Scotland, only Strathclyde Police has achieved a provisional licence under the NPFTC, which was issued in November 2006. In addition, the Ministry of Defence Police, based at various locations within Scotland, has a provisional licence and is to be assessed for a full licence in November of this year. Lothian and Borders Police have applied for a provisional licence. The NPIA has not received any other applications from Scottish forces. We believe within the timescale of this workstream all forces should have been at provisional licence status.



45. Home Office forces are not permitted to train firearms officers or commanders without a licence. Any force not able to train its own officers must outsource this training from a compliant force. Here, Strathclyde Police is progressing with its licence with a view to delivering tactical/Silver command training for Scotland from 2009.
46. However, following decisions made by ACPO Police Use of Firearms (ACPO PUF) and the NPIA, strategic/Gold command training will only be delivered by the NPIA. It is anticipated that many Scottish forces will continue to outsource courses as required, such as Gold command and firearms instructor courses. HMICS noted that while Scottish officers valued attending such courses, there were consistent comments that national courses did not always give proper consideration to Scotland's separate legal requirements.
47. The current lack of licensed training in Scotland is such that the NPIA foresees difficulties with obtaining mutual aid from Scotland for the 2012 Olympics: *"the recommendation from NPIA Implementation team would be that Scottish officers would NOT be accepted for deployment in England and Wales"*<sup>5</sup>.
48. Finally in this section, we also observed an inconsistent approach across Scotland in the level of training given to non-AFOs. While it is right that specialist training be focused on those officers who will use it, there is a need for the whole workforce to be aware of their role within an incident involving firearms. HMICS would welcome a co-ordinated and consistent approach to this.
- 49. We fully support ACPOS' recommendation but have found its implementation to be partial and slow. We are particularly concerned that the development of ST&RAs, which should underpin forces' approach to the use of firearms, has been inadequate in several forces.**

#### ACPOS 2006 RECOMMENDATIONS 1 – 5, 7 AND 8

##### *Recommendation 1 – "That the proposed Protective Services Framework be considered which incorporates the use of collaborative arrangements and Lead Forces"*

50. Following the October 2006 publication of the PSCCR report, the Firearms Training Advisory Group Scotland (FTAGS) met in January 2007. At that meeting the chairman, ACC Ian Learmonth, directed that a Working Group from FTAGS be formed. Accordingly, the inaugural meeting of the Police Use of Firearms working group was held in March 2007. From this the following terms of reference were approved and subsequently adopted by the Group:

*"To progress the recommendations contained within the ACPOS Protective Services Capacity & Capability Review (Police Use of Firearms Workstream) relative to baseline and specialist firearms support.*

*In so doing, generic service level agreements and fully costed options are to be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision."*

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5 NPIA representative during thematic inspection.



51. The ACPOS PSCCR Strategic Review Group meeting in August 2007 endorsed the creation of two Strategic Alliance Co-ordination Units (SACUs) for baseline and specialist service firearms provision in Scotland:

- **East SACU** – Grampian Police/Tayside Police/Lothian and Borders Police/Central Scotland Police/Fife Constabulary.
- **West SACU** – Strathclyde Police/Northern Constabulary/Dumfries and Galloway Constabulary.

52. The SACUs meet quarterly, attended by nominated representatives from each force. The format includes both individual SACU meetings and a forum with both SACUs present.

53. The West SACU is in effect led by Strathclyde Police, which can supply both Northern and Dumfries and Galloway Constabularies with the services they lack. The five forces in the East SACU have more similar capabilities and as a consequence there has been less clarity around how efficiencies and improvements could be secured. While there have been discussions about certain specialist services being led by a specific force, no agreement has been reached. Recognising the need for greater strategic involvement in this forum, the ACPOS officers with responsibility for firearms matters in the East SACU met in August 2008 to examine how this might be achieved.

54. When the East SACU was formed, Tayside, Fife and Central Police did not have regularly deployed ARVs. In the intervening period, they have not only initiated regular ARV deployments but have also sought to enhance this with a collaborative tri-force agreement to ensure mutual support if and when required.

55. We acknowledge the collaborative measure put in place to form these structures. There is also evidence of collaboration between all Scottish forces and other agencies and forces in the form of Memoranda of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence Police (MDP), the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC), and forces in which these organisations have a presence. Further protocols have been developed between Scottish forces and the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA) and the adoption of these is progressing well with only one force left to complete theirs.

**56. While there are clear collaborative arrangements within each SACU, progress continues to be slow. Despite the recommendation being approved, it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.**

***Recommendation 2 – “That the baseline requirement identified be considered and approved”***

57. The PSCCR report recommended a ‘Suggested Baseline Requirement’ that each Scottish force should, as a minimum, have access to for firearms support/capability. This requirement is as follows:

- Authorised Firearms Officers (AFOs)
- Basic AFOs
- Rifle Officers
- Bodyguards (VIP Close Protection)
- Armed Response Vehicles (ARVs)
- Tactical Firearms Advisors
- Strategic Firearms Commanders
- Tactical Firearms Commanders
- MASTS Commanders
- Post Incident Managers



**58.** Armed Response Vehicles can take on different formats. For example, while one force can have a dedicated unit with ‘standing authority’ to patrol overtly armed, another might have a vehicle which has a specific function, such as roads policing, until it is called upon to act as an ARV. The decision on what model a force operates should be informed by its ST&RA. Additionally, the specific weapons and tactics that the crew members of an ARV are trained in is a matter for individual forces, again in line with its ST&RA.

**59.** At the time of our inspection, only one Scottish force had achieved the minimum firearms support/capability described above.

**60.** An informed baseline relies on a sound ST&RA to identify the needs of each force and how they should best be serviced. However, the ST&RAs of each force differ greatly in content and are not sufficiently robust to do this. Until all forces have a sound ST&RA in place there will be no definitive understanding of the actual baseline requirements. Indeed the preparation of these documents may show a change to the proposed baseline service requirement. We appreciate that circumstances and requirements change over time and therefore would accept any deviation from the baseline should a force ST&RA provide solid evidence in favour of this.

**61.** During the inspection we attended the SACU co-ordinating meeting in July 2008. There we saw a clear indication of the willingness of each force representative to participate fully in implementing this recommendation. However, there was still no agreement on some of the terminology and definitions used. This means that for baseline requirements such as AFOs and ARVs forces may use the same term for a different capability. This problem is by no means restricted to Scotland. Nevertheless, we anticipate that the planned increase in the involvement of ACPOS officers will resolve this matter.

**62.** **Although this recommendation was approved, those forces without a robust ST&RA are not in a position to contribute fully to the development of an agreed baseline. Therefore we do not regard this recommendation as discharged.**

***Recommendation 3 – “That the specialist support identified be considered and approved”***

**63.** The PSCCR report recommended that the following ‘Access to Specialist Support’ be provided by identified lead forces:

- *Mobile Armed Support to Surveillance (MASTS)*
- *Dynamic Entry/Hostage Rescue*
- *Suicide Killer Intervention*
- *Armed Surveillance*

**64.** We previously drew attention to the need to improve MASTS provision in our 2003 primary inspection of the Scottish Crime and Drug Enforcement Agency (SCDEA). In that report we recommended that:

*“ACPOS rigorously pursue the issue of firearms support for surveillance activity towards an early conclusion in order that national guidelines are clearly understood and any resulting training requirements addressed.”<sup>6</sup>*

<sup>6</sup> HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland. *SCDEA Primary Inspection Report 2003*. (<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2003/07/17688/23211>). Edinburgh, 2003.



65. Since making this recommendation we have reviewed the matter on two occasions, most recently in 2006. At that time, we observed that it had *'not [been] discharged and its urgency and need [were] perhaps greater than when it was initially made'*.

66. Presently within the whole of the UK there is no set minimum standard as to what constitutes either MASTS or armed surveillance. Some Home Office forces have a capability in both these areas, as does SOCA. What little guidance there is in the ACPO MoG or the NPFTC and has been interpreted in varying ways. However, this inspection does not seek to pre-empt the work of the UK Covert Armed Surveillance working group, which was established in February 2008 and is working on a number of matters to define standards and provide guidance.

67. There still remains an unacceptable lack of progress in relation to specialist support services. Some five years after our first recommendation, there is no tangible progress on the subject of MASTS and while some training and initial steps have been taken by forces such as Tayside, actual capabilities have not progressed. Strathclyde Police is the only force in Scotland that has any capability for MASTS beyond the most basic response. In the absence of any impending resolution, we would welcome at least a structured interim measure. Again, the benefit of a sound ST&RA would inform all forces of their requirements for this service.

68. Recent press comment has highlighted steps being taken to secure further access to firearms for the SCDEA. As these will involve changes to legislation, they will not deliver improvements in the short term.

**69. Although this recommendation was approved, persistent delays and inaction mean that it has not yet been implemented or complied with. We therefore do not consider it to be discharged.**

***Recommendation 4 – “Subject to approval of the above recommendations, that generic service level agreements be developed to enable the delivery of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service provision”***

70. Sharing specialist services, such as underwater capabilities, across forces has been normal practice for many years. In such cases, the force with the available expertise and capacity is referred to as the 'Lead Force'. Increasingly this approach is now being extended to encompass both operational and 'back-office' functions.

71. We support the development of shared services where it is efficient to do so. We also accept that the need for access to specialist support is greater for some forces than others. Indeed, the frequency of operations requiring this level of support can be rare in some forces, and the collaborative arrangements in place should reflect this. However, only a competent ST&RA will fully inform this debate.

72. Within the West SACU, Strathclyde has taken on the role of lead force and at the time of our inspection was discussing options for providing specialist support to the other two forces. For Northern Constabulary, this arrangement was in the form of a service level agreement (SLA), whereas for Dumfries and Galloway a memorandum of understanding (MOU) was being developed.

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7 HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland. *SCDEA Second Review Inspection Report 2006*. (<http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/06/07102121/0>). Edinburgh, 2006.





**73.** An SLA is a formally-negotiated agreement between customers and their service provider, outlining the services to be delivered, the availability and costs. An MOU is a document indicating an intended common line of action agreed by the participants. In the police service it generally covers mutual aid, where a force will provide assistance if possible. It does not have the formality or the specificity around availability and cost associated with an SLA.

**74.** We concur with ACPOS' recommendation, which explicitly calls for SLAs rather than MOUs to be developed, as we believe these would create suitably robust and formal arrangements for such an important aspect of policing.

**75.** As discussed at paragraphs 52-54, the East SACU had yet to reach agreement on which of its forces should lead on specific specialist functions. As a result, discussions around appropriate SLAs had not taken place.

**76.** **Although this recommendation was approved, we find that it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.**

***Recommendation 5 – “That costed options be developed in support of collaborative arrangements and Lead Force service delivery”***

**77.** We recognise that costed options will depend on both the nature of the specialist support required from a lead force and the equipment necessary to provide it.

**78.** The actual costs for firearms resources, in terms of both staff and equipment, are considerable. A 'full-time, 24-hour' ARV unit of two vehicles crewed by two officers each, can involve at least 25 officers. The initial equipment and ammunition to train a Strathclyde tactical firearms officer has been calculated at £5,870, with ongoing annual ammunition costs for training of £1,092. A single piece of night vision equipment can cost in excess of £5,000. Again, exactly what resources are needed can only be demonstrated by a comprehensive ST&RA.

**79.** Collaborative arrangements, whereby lead forces provide services to those with no demonstrable need for 'full-time' resources, are a logical method of ensuring that best use is made of specialist resources and that this is cost-effective and contingent upon need. For the West SACU forces that were pursuing the SLA option, discussions as to the actual costs involved were still underway at the time of the inspection.

**80.** We acknowledge that costed options are on the SACUs' agenda, and that some progress has been made. Nevertheless, we are concerned at the slow pace of the overall process, which has meant that existing options are not well developed.

**81.** **Although this recommendation was approved, it has not been fully implemented or complied with and therefore we do not regard it as discharged.**

***Recommendation 7 – “That HMIC be invited to conduct a thematic inspection in two years to assess progress made”***

**82.** As previously stated, we included this thematic inspection in our 2008 programme precisely because of this recommendation. We also met with the ACPOS portfolio holder for the police use of firearms to ensure that our remit was consistent with the Service's needs.

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**83. HMICS regards this recommendation as discharged.**

***Recommendation 8 – “That HMIC include the baseline service requirement within its inspection protocols as a measure of efficiency and effectiveness”***

**84.** Some forces had clearly developed their ST&RAs in accordance with NPIA guidelines, and therefore had an informed view of their baseline and specialist needs. We are reluctant to make it mandatory to comply with a baseline that may not be suitable for all forces, especially given the costs involved.

**85. We believe that this recommendation has been superseded by the need for individual forces to respond to the findings of their own ST&RAs.**

#### **ACPOS RESPONSE TO ‘STOCKWELL’ AND GLASGOW AIRPORT INCIDENTS**

**86.** Much of this report concentrates on the recommendations in the ACPOS PSCCR. It is, nevertheless, also pertinent to comment on significant events that have occurred since its publication and which have had implications for the Service.

**87.** Within our terms of reference, specific mention is made of the ‘Stockwell’ and Glasgow Airport incidents. At the time of writing, the inquest into the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes had just been concluded and the implications for the police service in Scotland are still being assessed. Therefore we do not propose to comment on this area in this report.

**88.** At the conclusion of the first Stockwell inquiry a working group was set up to examine the published report and outline the implications for the police service in Scotland. Its findings have since been circulated to all forces, and although certain matters are still being considered by ACPO we are satisfied that ACPOS Police Use of Firearms (ACPOS PUF), (formerly ACPOS Firearms Training Advisory Group, Scotland, FTAGS), is well placed to oversee any further developments and promulgate good practice. A similar approach was apparent in the aftermath of events at Glasgow Airport. In this case, any matters raised were taken to the SACUs.

**89.** Taken together these incidents have served to highlight to all those involved the urgency with which this work needs to be carried out. The resources needed for Strathclyde Police to effectively deal with the events at Glasgow Airport and its aftermath have also served to demonstrate the requirements for specialist firearms support.

#### **EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR STAFF IN SPECIALIST ROLES**

**90.** The NPIA guidelines for Appendix 10 of an ST&RA recommend that the diversity of staff working as firearms specialists be considered. We believe that this is relevant to all specialist roles, not just firearms ones. Police forces have recognised for some time that steps should be taken to improve the diversity of their staff, as is clear from the positive progress apparent across Scotland. In the last three years, the proportion of female police officers in Scotland increased from 21% to 24%. At the time of our inspection 35% of newly-recruited officers were female, while the percentage of recruits of black or minority ethnic origin rose slightly from 1.6% in 2004/5 to 1.9% in 2006/7.



**91.** While these overall improvements are welcome, forces have recognised that attention should also be paid to staff in specialist policing units. Several examples were encountered of events or initiatives designed to improve the diversity of firearms staff. To date these have not had a large impact. Interestingly, when seeking data on the gender and minority ethnic profile of authorised firearms officers, we found that in many cases force systems were not configured to provide this level of detail.

**92.** An exception to this was Fife Constabulary. In its *Annual Equality and Diversity Employment Monitoring Report 2008, 'Diversity Matters'*, the force provides comprehensive data on the gender, ethnic origin, disability and age of its staff. Although the figures themselves highlighted the lack of female (one) and black and minority ethnic staff (one male, no females) working in firearms specialisms, it was encouraging to see this level of detail being captured and monitored on a continuous basis rather than just in response to our request.

**93.** In addition to profiling general AFOs, Fife recorded similar data down to more detailed levels of specialism such as firearms instructors, firearms incident managers, and firearms Silver (tactical) commanders. The force also applied this approach across a wide range of other specialist functions.

**94.** We endorse this approach to monitoring as good practice and would encourage forces to follow Fife's lead. Doing so should help focus attention on increasing diversity across all specialisms.

### **Conclusion**

**95.** The importance of conducting thorough ST&RAs has been commented upon throughout this report. These documents are the foundation on which police use of firearms should be based. Although the guidelines date from 2006, the process was in fact started following the 'Statement of Intent' in 2004. And yet the slow progress of some forces would suggest that these have not been given due priority. Moreover, in our opinion, the lack of these assessments in several forces has hampered their ability to respond to the majority of other recommendations from the PSCCR.

**96.** The joint progress achieved so far by the forces of the West SACU has undoubtedly benefited from the lead role of Strathclyde Police. However here too, what gains have been made have not been fully capitalised upon, nor have they been translated into finalised agreements consistent with recommendations 1, 4 and 5. In the East SACU, the ACPOS lead officers have recently acknowledged the need to increase their strategic grip on the process in its five constituent forces, a move which we believe will bring benefits to the SACU.

**97.** The East SACU has also started work on an overarching ST&RA, which should inform the need for shared specialist services. We welcome the development of what is in effect a joint threat assessment. However we also note that it is reliant upon each force being able to submit its own robust assessment in order to inform this wider picture.

**98.** In sum, we are aware of the benefits to be derived from the ACPOS recommendations and are therefore deeply concerned by the slow overall progress in their implementation. We would encourage forces to build on what has been achieved so far and to focus on actual outcomes, that is, on providing more efficient services to meet with greater consistency the needs of police forces and communities across Scotland.



**99.** We believe that applying for a provisional licence of curriculum compliance while working towards a full licence will require forces to address many of the areas where progress has been slow. The licensing process involves submission of the ST&RA and other basic documents recording the force's approach to police use of firearms. Taking part in this process should ensure that forces have more complete information to inform their decisions on what baseline and specialist services are required. It will also assist in driving further improvements as each force moves from provisional to full licence.

**100.** Consequently we make only one additional recommendation:

**HMICS recommends that all forces work to achieve NPJA NPFTC licensing within six months from the date of publication of this report. This will require forces to produce robust and comprehensive ST&RAs, and will bring them under continuing scrutiny in the short term.**





## Appendix A

### MANUALS AND GUIDANCE

1. The police use of firearms in Scotland is governed and informed in a number of ways, the principal source documents being:
  - The Association of Chief Police Officers' Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms<sup>8</sup> (ACPO MoG).
  - The National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC).
  - The Home Office 2003 Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons (this document applies to Home Office forces in England and Wales only).
  - ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons in Scotland, 2004 (the voluntary compliance of ACPOS to the above Code of Practice).
  - The Centrex/National Centre for Policing Excellence, NCPE, (now the National Policing Improvement Agency, NPIA) Firearms Threat and Risk Assessment Guide, 2006.
2. The paragraphs below provide some background to, or extracts from, the above documents and are intended to provide readers with ready access to the foundations of the police use of firearms.

#### *The Association of Chief Police Officers' Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms (ACPO MoG)*

3. The ACPO MoG defines an Authorised Firearms Officer and sets the criteria for the issue and use of firearms by police:

#### *Authorised Firearms Officer*

4. An AFO is a police officer who has been selected and trained in the use of firearms in policing operations. The officer will have reached the required level of competency in weapon handling, tactical knowledge, shooting skills and judgment as required by the chief officer of the force concerned. Individual officers may have received training in more than one weapon and/or in a variety of tactics. There is also a range of specialised roles for which officers will receive specific firearms and tactical training. All AFOs are subject to refresher training and re-qualification, the frequency of which is dependent on role.<sup>8</sup>

#### *Criteria for Issue*

5. Firearms are to be issued to AFOs (following authorisation by the appropriate authorising officer):
  - a. where the authorising officer has reason to suppose that they, in the course of their duty, may have to protect themselves or others from a person who:
    1. is in possession of a firearm, or
    2. has immediate access to a firearm, or
    3. is otherwise so dangerous that the officer's use of a firearm may be necessary.
  - b. For the humane destruction of animals which are dangerous or are suffering unnecessarily.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *The Association of Chief Police Officers' Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms*. ACPO, January 2003.  
<http://www.acpo.police.uk/asp/policies/Data/firearms.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> *ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms*, chapter 3 Sec 2.2



### ***Circumstances when weapons may be fired***

6. “Firearms may be fired by AFOs in the course of their duty only when absolutely necessary after traditional methods have been tried and failed or must, from the nature of the circumstances, be unlikely to succeed if tried.”

7. In Scotland, forces will include the following:

“A Police Officer is not entitled to open fire against a person unless the officer has reasonable grounds for believing that that person is committing, or is about to commit, an action which is likely to endanger the life or cause serious injury to the officer or any other person and there is no other way to prevent the danger.”<sup>10</sup>

### ***National Police Firearms Training Curriculum***

8. Previously the ACPO MoG had a specific section on training. This has since been removed and developed into the National Police Firearms Training Curriculum (NPFTC).

9. The ACPO working group on Police Use of Firearms (ACPO PUF) are responsible for the ACPO MoG and have tasked the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) with reviewing, creating and maintaining the manual. They have also directed the NPIA to produce and continue to update the NPFTC. This includes examining forces and issuing provisional and full licences of curriculum compliance.

10. Extracts from this document have not been included as they generally relate to tactical information that may be of value to criminals.

### ***The Home Office 2003 Code of Practice on the Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons and ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons in Scotland, 2004***

11. Compliance with the Home Office Code of Practice, the ACPO MoG and the NPFTC is a statutory requirement for forces in England and Wales. However, in Scotland the Statement of Intent outlines the decision of the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland (ACPOS) to align itself with the Home Office forces and comply voluntarily with these standards. The statement also confirms the role of HM Inspectorate of Constabulary for Scotland (HMICS) in ‘continu[ing] to monitor police use of weapons requiring special authorisation’.<sup>11</sup>

12. Outlined in the ‘Basic Requirements of this Statement’ is the responsibility of chief police officers in each force to have conducted a firearms, threat and risk assessment. This should in turn inform the following decisions:

- “what types of weapons need to be available within their forces, either from each force’s own resources or by agreement with one or more other forces;
- the numbers of officers required to be trained in their forces in the use of such weapons and in providing tactical advice in the use of such weapons, and the numbers and ranks of officers to be trained to command incidents involving such weapons;
- arrangements for the deployment within their forces of weapons and personnel trained to use them”.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>10</sup> ACPO Manual of Guidance on Police Use of Firearms, chapter 3 Annex 3B

<sup>11</sup> Section 2.3 ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons in Scotland 2004

<sup>12</sup> Section 3.2.6 ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons in Scotland 2004



**13.** Such a structured approach to this area of policing reflects the consideration that must be given to operations that have potentially life-saving or fatal outcomes.

**14.** The Statement of Intent identifies the purpose of the force firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessments as follows:

The threat and risk assessment must:

- identify and assess the known and foreseeable threats and risks to the police (personnel and organisation) and the public;
- assess the risks in terms of proportionate resources, planning and resource allocation;
- identify gaps in current policies, procedures and training;
- include a list of recommendations and action plans, that address the identified threats, risks and gaps;
- provide a clearly evidenced link between threats and current firearms establishment; and
- provide a rationale for current levels of resources.

**15.** The Statement of Intent advises that each force's assessments should be updated regularly. The NPPIA goes further, stipulating that the ST&RA be completed every year, but that analysis and information regarding incidents and operations be a matter for continual update.

The ST&RA may include<sup>13</sup>:

- the pattern of crime in the police area;
- the geographical and logistical considerations affecting the availability of weapons requiring special authorisation, and the deployment of personnel trained to use such weapons or to command incidents involving their use;
- the threat posed by armed persons such as criminals, terrorists and armed groups, which members of the force may have to confront;
- the force's potential obligations under mutual aid agreements; and
- the force's responsibilities in respect of national emergencies and nationally based plans.

Chief officers of police should then use these assessments as a basis for deciding<sup>14</sup>:

- what types of weapons need to be available within their forces, either from each force's own resources or by agreement with one or more other force;
- the numbers of officers required to be trained in their forces in the use of such weapons, and in providing tactical advice in the use of such weapons; and the numbers and ranks of officers to be trained to command incidents involving such weapons; and
- arrangements for the deployment within their forces of weapons and personnel trained to use them.

**16.** The creation by individual forces of a firearms Strategic Threat and Risk Assessment (ST&RA) is a requirement of the 2004 ACPOS Statement of Intent. The construction of an ST&RA, and its purpose, was further clarified by the production of the Centrex/National Centre for Policing Excellence, NCPE, (now the National Policing Improvement Agency, NPPIA) Firearms Threat and Risk Assessment Guide, 2006.

<sup>13</sup> Sec 3.2.5 ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons Scotland 2004

<sup>14</sup> Sec 3.2.6 ACPOS Statement of Intent on Police Use of Firearms and Less Lethal Weapons Scotland 2004



## Appendix B

### Nationally reported statistics for police use of firearms

NUMBER OF OPERATIONS AGAINST PERSONS KNOWN OR BELIEVED TO BE ARMED										
NUMBER OF SUCH OPERATIONS WHERE FIREARMS USED	Central	Dumfries and Galloway	Fife	Grampian	Lothian and Borders	Northern	Strathclyde	Tayside	Scotland	
1996/97	9	9	16	11	87	5	38	15	190	
1997/98	6	4	5	11	153	3	95	15	292	
1998/99	15	3	8	13	130	2	77	8	256	
1999/00	10	6	5	17	66	7	17	13	141	
2000/01	8	3	5	11	94	10	14	5	150	
2001/02	1	15	6	11	96	5	24	5	163	
2002/03	6	11	8	6	165	0	103	1	300	
2003/04	3	6	13	6	197	1	131	1	358	
2004/05	1	4	5	6	181	4	117	3	321	
2005/06	3	4	9	1	150	3	203	1	374	
2006/07	4	4	25	5	77	4	413	12	544	
ARMED VEHICLE OPERATIONS INCLUDED IN ABOVE	Central	Dumfries and Galloway	Fife	Grampian	Lothian and Borders	Northern	Strathclyde	Tayside	Scotland	
1996/97	0	6	0	0	53	0	35	0	94	
1997/98	0	0	0	4	57	0	23	2	86	
1998/99	0	3	3	1	79	0	29	7	122	
1999/00	0	6	0	3	47	0	16	8	80	
2000/01	0	2	0	8	75	1	9	0	95	
2001/02	0	4	1	9	89	na	22	0	125	
2002/03	0	0	0	3	141	0	na	0	144	
2003/04	0	4	2	5	189	0	97	0	297	
2004/05	0	1	0	0	161	4	81	0	247	
2005/06	0	0	2	0	134	3	150	1	290	
2006/07	0	4	2	0	73	4	304	0	387	





<b>FIREARMS OPERATIONS – PROTECTION</b>										
NUMBER OF OCCASIONS ON WHICH FIREARMS ISSUED FOR PROTECTION	Central	Dumfries and Galloway	Fife	Grampian	Lothian and Borders	Northern	Strathclyde	Tayside	Scotland	
1996/97	7	7	12	71	109	16	44	22	288	
1997/98	11	5	10	85	107	30	40	29	317	
1998/99	7	4	8	122	84	12	39	11	287	
1999/00	100	4	6	97	124	21	64	11	427	
2000/01	5	3	10	164	110	12	32	7	343	
2001/02	93	6	5	154	123	13	73	13	480	
2002/03	81	3	4	191	115	12	97	15	518	
2003/04	106	3	18	59	119	15	60	7	387	
2004/05	6	2	11	68	121	7	52	8	275	
2005/06	7	2	16	70	133	24	67	8	327	
2006/07	6	4	14	92	158	16	104	6	400	
NUMBER OF PERSONS PROTECTED	Central	Dumfries and Galloway	Fife	Grampian	Lothian and Borders	Northern	Strathclyde	Tayside	Scotland	
1996/97	7	7	10	111	122	9	41	12	319	
1997/98	11	5	58	114	691	16	68	16	979	
1998/99	5	4	8	0	89	12	39	6	163	
1999/00	7	4	6	108	125	21	20	12	303	
2000/01	5	3	10	104	36	12	21	7	198	
2001/02	8	6	6	82	26	13	21	13	175	
2002/03	7	4	4	72	28	14	97	10	236	
2003/04	7	3	19	59	25	17	60	7	197	
2004/05	4	2	4	68	119	7	17	8	229	
2005/06	6	2	24	74	53	11	67	9	246	
2006/07	6	5	17	81	31	6	114	8	268	