Custody inspection report - Highland and Islands

Custody centre condition and facilities

21. The custody centres inspected were found to be of varying age and construction ranging from modernised traditional construction to more contemporary builds. Each custody facility was incorporated into the footprint of existing operational police stations. All utilised a single-story layout and all facilities, including cells, were fully functional and in good order. In some cases, cells were in excellent physical condition with no significant defects or visible ligature hazards.

22. We examined the route into each custody centre. Access to all was afforded via rear yards bounded by high walls and or buildings forming secure compounds. We found that with the exception of Lerwick, which had manual swing gates, all were capable of being secured against unauthorised access by fully operational electronic gates, remotely controllable from the respective custody offices.

23. The rear compounds could accommodate custody transports of any size and doubled as parking areas for operational police vehicles. They were also utilised to house other essential building infrastructure as well as storage for materials and refuse. All yards were accessed directly from public roads and, with the exception of Fort William, all had notices restricting unauthorised entry. Approaches to the facilities were well covered by CCTV, viewable from each custody office.

24. At Inverness, the car park led to a large, caged vehicle dock secured by an additional fully functioning electronic gate, again controlled and monitored remotely via CCTV linked to the custody office. The rear yard at Inverness also provided secure access to the adjacent Sheriff Court building and consequently, affords improved security and efficiency for the transit of detainees to court.

25. It was noted that while gates at all centres were fully operational at time of inspection, staff and officers indicated those at Stornoway and Lerwick were normally left open for convenience, which elevated the potential risk of detainee escape and unauthorised incursion. The rear compounds of all facilities were free of unnecessary or hazardous items.

26. The access point to each custody centre was secured by way of CCTV, which was remotely controllable, and had electronic keypad or card pass security points. In all cases, the entrance point led directly to the respective detainee processing areas, each containing a single charge bar. None of the ancillary centres had a holding space to accommodate detainees awaiting processing. However, in the case of the ancillary centres, this is rarely required due to low throughput levels.

27. All charge bars were equipped with Plexiglas type screens which afforded segregated and secure workspace for officers processing detainees. However, in the case of Lerwick, Kirkwall and Fort William, there was limited protection against unwanted incursion into the police side of the charge bar by unruly detainees. Officers indicated they take this into consideration when processing potentially violent detainees.

28. There is audio recording at all charge bars and cameras capture the charge bar desktop to record personal property being logged and bagged. Charge bars at the ancillary centres also have webcams located on the rear wall directed toward the workspace and detainees being processed. This allows custody sergeants at Inverness to view and hear a detainee’s booking in process as well as having a clear view of the individual in question to enable comparative assessment.

29. As noted, renovation work was taking place at Inverness at the time of inspection. The work included adaptation of existing space to create a bespoke holding room that will afford ample secure accommodation for detainees to access the newly segregated double charge bars, as well as a further new discrete charge bar. All of which represents welcome improvements to processing arrangements, and the level of security and confidentiality afforded to detainees.

30. On inspection, a single security issue was identified at Stornoway relating to the initial access routes to the custody centre, which could present a potential escape risk. Notably, the custody side of the charge bar afforded access to the wider station footprint and further unsecured station exits via a conventional door. While this was equipped with a standard lock, it was open and did not have the key inserted suggesting this route was not routinely secured during processing. Similarly, in Kirkwall, there was an un-secured egress point to the wider station, albeit on the police side of the charge bar. However, this was relatively accessible as it only required the pressing of a button to exit. These issues were raised with local staff.

31. As outlined in our report on the joint inspection of primary custody centres in Argyll and West Dunbartonshire, we have made recommendations and identified areas for improvement which have relevance across the custody estate. One such area identified from this report stated:

“The custody centres should review internal and external security features and take appropriate steps to mitigate risks.”

While these issues have relevance for the above noted custody centres, we do not intend to make additional recommendations or areas for improvement in this regard.

32. Charge bar areas in each centre contained a variety of information posters. Some were directed towards detainees regarding expected standards of conduct, as well as a variety of posters providing information relating to available support services relevant to each locality – such as ‘Ewens Room’ and the Highland Custody Link Project. There were some police only information posters conveying details about police conduct and, where relevant, outlining the rules applicable to the facility when designated for use as legalised detention cells^[5] for convicted persons in transit. We considered this comprehensive and well-placed provision of information to be good practice.

33. Detainee property storage in each centre was located variously either in bespoke rooms immediately adjacent to the charge bar or, as is the case at Lerwick and Kirkwall, within the charge bar itself. In each instance, secure storage was provided by way of individual steel lockers or cages pertaining to each cell. They were capable of being locked securely and all storage spaces were well covered by CCTV cameras.

34. The religious materials available to detainees comprised of copies of the Bible, Quran, and prayer mats – with directional information provided by staff on request.

35. Located on the wall directly behind the charge bar at Wick, is a bank of eight boxes referred to as ‘AirSense’ monitors, used to constantly sample air quality within cells, and also to detect if a detainee is smoking within a cell. These units operate constantly, generating a significant degree of noise which can impede clear communication during the processing of detainees. It also affects the microphone on the remote viewing camera, rendering any exchange between the detainee and processing officer inaudible to Inverness based custody sergeants. Staff stated the noise is highly disruptive and presents a risk of miscommunication of critical information pertaining to detainee vulnerability or care needs. Following our inspection, we have been advised that this issue has been addressed.

36. This issue was also apparent during an interview with an elderly detainee at Lerwick custody centre. They advised that the internal ventilation system in the cell, though effective, was extremely noisy and resulted in them being kept awake during both nights of his detention, which caused fatigue and discomfort. This noise was present during our interview, and was sufficiently loud to impede clear communication. The issue and the complaint from the detainee were raised with custody staff. We have since been advised that this issue has been addressed.

37. Each centre had sufficient staff office accommodation adjacent to custody processing areas, which afforded discrete and confidential workspace for custody related or general duties. All were found to be a reasonable size with ample workspaces and IT resources for the typical staff compliment or demand profile of each centre. It was noted the temporary office at Inverness, also situated in the same modular unit as the charge bar was very cramped, yet functional, and soon to be replaced by a newly renovated staff office and separate staff rest area.

38. Custody staff offices had wall mounted CCTV screens displaying images of external security points, internal spaces within the custody centre, and CCTV feeds from custody cells. In most cases, these screens were well-placed, adjustable and capable of affording a clear view of the images from all workspaces.

39. The CCTV within custody staff offices doubled as the in-cell CCTV observation facilities for detainees that were subject of constant observation regimes. However, these spaces were not separated by any closure and were therefore exposed to disruption and distraction from other colleagues in the room.

40. The quality of images on the screens at most centres were bright, sharp and fully controllable, providing unobstructed views of cell occupants. However, viewing screens at Lerwick, located high on the office wall, and at Stornoway, located within the local policing sergeant’s office, were very small and therefore provided small on-screen images, which were not suitable to monitor detainees under observation. Difficulties were increased when images of multiple cells were required to be monitored at the same time. Custody staff highlighted that it is difficult to see any small movements by detainees, which could raise a risk of undetected self-harming.

41. The custody centres had varying but practical configurations, which housed additional facilities including detainee engagement and interview rooms, well-appointed medical examination rooms, staff-only rest areas, multiple storerooms, photograph/impressions rooms, and forensic storage space. Lerwick and Stornoway centres also featured a separate office and workspace for the dedicated use of GEO-Amey staff, which reflected a good use of available space.

42. Custody centres had access to ample bespoke and adapted storage facilities throughout. These were utilised variously for clothing and bedding, food and administration materials. Centres were found to be well stocked and in good order.

43. Inverness and Wick centres had access to electronic fingerprinting machines commonly referred to as ‘Live Scan’, which digitally capture detainees’ finger and hand impressions and enable live time cross referencing with police databases for identification purposes. Notably, all other ancillary centres did not have these facilities, instead relying on traditional, and somewhat outdated, ink and paper processes.

44. Although a long-established procedure, the process is more laborious, requiring the manual collection of impressions that are thereafter mailed to a checking centre often taking days to be processed. The approach is prone to error and poor-quality impressions. It does not afford the significant benefits associated with the Live Scan, which enables officers to immediately and confidently identify detainees who either fail to disclose or deliberately seek to conceal their identity.

45. It can elevate also risk levels as the establishment of a person’s true identity can provide access to relevant information held on databases pertaining to a risk profile or vulnerabilities, both critical components regarding officer safety and accurate care planning for detainees.

46. All centres featured well-appointed kitchens, which were conveniently situated to afford safe and efficient facilities for both detainees and staff. Each contained a sufficient variety of appropriate foodstuffs. Kitchens were clean and hygienic, adequately lit with access to appropriate fire safety equipment, first aid and suitable food hygiene and preparation guidance. At Stornoway and Lerwick, staff often obtained hot meals for detainees from the nearby hospitals as part of an established agreement to ensure good nutrition.

47. We noted that custody staff at Wick purchase food from the local supermarket rather than use that supplied by CJSD, which is not consistent with policy.

48. In Kirkwall, a washing machine and drier used to clean detainee blankets and anti-harm clothing were located in the kitchen, and the associated laundry bin was located in the same room. This was positioned close to the microwave and food preparation counter – raising concerns about hygiene standards. This was highlighted to custody staff who noted the issue for remedial action.

49. All cells within Stornoway, Fort William, Wick and half of those in Inverness, contained wall recessed, anti-ligature handwashing units providing hot, and potable cold water, on demand. These facilities were suitable for handwashing only and not intended for general washing.

50. The main washing facilities at the custody centres consisted of external washbasins and a minimum of two separate shower cubicles, each practically situated in the cell corridors and capable of affording hot showers with appropriate screens or doors for detainee modesty. All showers were wheelchair accessible. Lerwick also featured a wet room/toilet. The water supply for the sinks, showers and in-cell basins was fully functional with hot water on demand. Ample washing materials and feminine hygiene products were readily available at each facility.

51. There were sufficient, clearly visible and practically located fire exits, safety signage, emergency lighting, and materials located throughout each custody centre which included fire safety warden specific guidance and identifiers stored in clearly marked locations. There were sufficient stores of rigid handcuffs for evacuation of detainees in the charge bar areas of each facility, with the exception of Wick, where there was no supply of handcuffs or indeed, fire marshal armbands or tabards for use in a fire evacuation. This was brought to the attention of the custody sergeant, who noted this for remedial attention.

52. While routine weekly fire alarm tests were being carried out, no recent physical evacuation fire drills had taken place at any of the centres.

53. As outlined in our report on the joint inspection of primary custody centres in Lanarkshire, we have made recommendations that have relevance across the custody estate. Recommendation 2 from that report states that:

“Police Scotland should ensure that a full evacuation of custody centres is undertaken in accordance with fire safety regulations.”

While this has relevance for Highland and Islands custody centres, we do not intend to make an additional recommendation in this regard.

54. Custody centres had bespoke detainee interview rooms located within, or in convenient proximity to, each centre. The rooms were artificially lit, well-ventilated, and had secured desks and seats. The rooms were not covered by the custody CCTV but were equipped with affray bar links. Other than at Stornoway, which utilised the finger printing room for consultation/visits, all other centres contained sufficient visiting or consultation rooms located within the custody footprint.

55. Custody staff were not issued with personal alarms, however, the majority of wall surfaces and adjacent rooms were fitted with multiple alarm strips, the activation of which will activate a loud siren audible throughout the centres and adjoining stations. These strips were easily accessible, highly visible, and linked to a central control panel located in the custody office. Alarm strips were subject of a regular testing regime.

56. All centres were equipped with a backup power supply, and supervisory staff were conversant with business continuity management contingencies, which was positive to note. The general condition of the custody centres, notwithstanding the issues outlined, was good.

Condition of cells

57. Cells at Inverness were contained within two main cell corridors – one leading directly from the charge bar area and the other smaller, newer block running parallel connected by a central corridor forming an ‘H’ layout. On conclusion of the current renovations, a separate corridor of four cells adjacent to the charge bars will be returned to the overall compliment. Cells had a stencilled message on the wall encouraging detainees to seek addiction referral support via custody staff where necessary, which we consider good practice.

58. All cell doors in the older corridor were of a more dated construction with two position service hatches, while in the adjoining corridor, they were fitted with slam locks and modern three position hatches. Renovations will include full upgrades to cell doors. There was one dry cell and toilet covers were also available when required.

59. At Fort William, all eight cells were within a single cell corridor leading from the charge bar. The single corridor did not enable strict gender or age-based segregation, however owing to low occupancy, detainees would be separated by distance where practicable. All cell doors were of a contemporary construction with three position service hatches, vertical peep slots and fitted with slam locks.

60. The five cells at Wick were also in a single cell corridor leading from the charge bar. One cell was designated for women, with a door separating it from the others and provision of a dedicated shower. There were no dedicated dry cells, however the water feed to cells can be manually disconnected as required.

61. Stornoway’s seven cells were distributed in a single cell corridor leading from the charge bar, with a central dividing wall. There were no dedicated dry cells, however the observation cell could be used for short periods with the affray bar deactivated. There were no bespoke detention cells. The cells were also capable of being used as legalised cells for the accommodation of prisoners. All cell doors were of an older construction with two position service hatches, peep hole and fitted with slam locks.

62. Cells at Lerwick were within in a single corridor leading from the charge bar. There was a single observation cell that could be rendered dry as required. The cells were capable of being used as legalised cells for the accommodation of prisoners. All cell doors were of an older construction with two position service hatches, peep hole and fitted with slam locks. However, the doors were inward opening and had concealed hinges (when closed) with the door keep recessed into the wall and external lock plate bolts rounded off. These are therefore not compliant with existing College Of Policing Buildings and Facilities Authorised Professional Practice standards.^[6] This could pose potential emergency access challenges in the event of a violent, disruptive or unconscious occupant. The issue was raised with custody staff during the inspection.

63. Kirkwall’s cells were located a single cell corridor leading from the charge bar. However, two of these were designated for women and were separate from the other cells, with a dedicated shower.

64. While the general condition of cells was good, none of the cells were further adapted for accessibility needs other than one cell at Inverness that was fitted with a raised bench and had two call buttons for better accessibility. All cells were well lit by dual mode artificial lighting and natural light from variously positioned skylights or glass brick windows. With the exception of Inverness, which featured intercom call buttons, all other cells had one-way call buttons that activated at charge bars and the staff office. Those available for inspection were tested and were fully operational.

65. All cells contained smoke detectors linked to the charge bar and staff office. Most cells contained well placed functional CCTV units, apart from Wick and Kirkwall, where only a few cells featured CCTV cameras. All facilities featured ceiling mounted microphones in corridors.

66. Cell checks at Inverness were conducted each week by custody staff. Ancillary centres are examined every six months. Staff checks of the facilities included the Automated External Defibrillator (AED) equipment, where present. In the cases of Stornoway, Wick, and Lerwick, AED devices were available in publicly accessible locations on the external walls of the police stations. At Fort William, the AED was in the public counter, and that facility was also adjoined to a Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS) base. Any issues found by staff that required attention were recorded electronically as well as manually on the office white board, and addressed under the direction of the custody supervisor.

67. Cleaning is provided by police appointed cleaners who attend seven days per week. If cells are vacated and cleaning staff are unavailable, but the space is needed, custody staff and local officers have indicated they will carry out cleaning duties themselves, despite not having received formal training in the safe and appropriate use of cleaning chemicals. Specialist services can be secured by arrangement, for example when deep cleaning is required. However, one such specialist provider on Stornoway was under evaluation pending the outcome of a review into the failure to provide cleaning services on several occasions – whereby staff had to undertake the work.

68. As outlined in our report on the joint inspection of primary custody centres in Dumfries and Galloway, we have made recommendations that have relevance across the custody estate. Recommendation 5 from that report states that:

“Police Scotland should ensure that custody staff receive appropriate training and guidance where cleaning is part of their role.”

While this has relevance for the above noted custody centres, we do not intend to make an additional recommendation in this regard.

Custody centre staffing

69. The CJSD chief inspector reports to a national CJSD operations superintendent that is currently based in Inverness. Custody staff at Inverness stated that managers are regularly present and visible, with senior managers also frequently travelling to meet staff in person. This was reputed to have always been the case, however, contrasts with the findings from several of our previous custody inspection reports. We consider this to be good practice.

70. Due to the significant geographical footprint of N division, coupled with a dispersed populace, the provision of police custody services comprises of a bespoke operating model featuring a central primary custody centre in Inverness, staffed by members of the CJSD that, where practicable, provide support, coordination and direction via remote video links to operate thirteen ancillary centres staffed by local policing officers from N Division.

71. Custody sergeants are responsible for all criminal justice decisions, and their function is specified in legislation. CJPCSO team leaders line manage custody staff and are responsible for the care and welfare of detainees, but only once a sergeant has approved the initial care plan.

72. At Inverness there is always a sergeant on duty. If a team leader is absent, they are not replaced, and their responsibilities are adopted by sergeants. There are four teams of five CJPCSOs, each team having a team leader. There are no custody constables at Inverness, which is never operated on a ‘constable led’ basis.

73. CJSD employ a methodology known as Operational Base Levels (OBL), which refers to a framework for managing minimum staffing across the custody estate. Nationally, the custody OBL is broadly designated as one sergeant plus one staff member, a CJPCSO, team leader or constable for every ten detainees. This methodology allocates staff based on the number of cells available, seemingly with no consideration of throughput volumes and the disproportionate demand associated with booking in, processing and release.

74. Inverness has an OBL of a sergeant plus three staff, and four at peak demand times. We were informed that if there was only a sergeant and two staff members, detainee numbers could be capped at twenty. CJPCSOs must take two, one-hour breaks, thus reducing the compliment by one for at least six hours per shift. There was universal agreement among staff interviewed that the ratio of one staff member to ten detainees was not sufficient.

75. As outlined in our previous custody reports, custody staff spoke about feeling pressurised at busy times with insufficient staff numbers – against a business demand that cannot be stemmed, slowed or diverted. This is a sentiment common at other centres, and highlighted in our Greater Glasgow report. Recommendation 1 of that report stated:

“Police Scotland should examine the staffing levels at the custody centres in Glasgow and make arrangements to ensure that appropriate staff resource is in place to maintain safe and effective custody centre operations.”

Consideration should therefore be given to reviewing the rationale for the existing OBL to ensure it remains suitable and fit for purpose.

76. The ancillary centres are small and remote police stations that typically operate with a local policing compliment of one sergeant and two constables who must assume the role of custody officers. When a detainee is held, there is a drive to adopt single officer care, which allows two officers to deploy operationally. Some centres seek permission to employ single officer care from the custody review inspector (CRI) via the custody sergeant, as set out in policy, however we found that some officers routinely do not and act independently.

77. These situations are challenging, particularly when officers may need to attend a call, perhaps hours away. Consideration can be given to recalling officers to duty to cover custody, however it is unclear if such decisions are documented sufficiently on NCS records. This raises questions around local policing planned resource levels, invariably set at a sergeant and two constables, that cannot deliver two officers to custody and two to local policing simultaneously. While during the day, office-based officers can be available to assist, this is not the case during out-of-hours periods.

78. There is guidance in place for circumstances where lone custody officer care is approved. It notes that officers must not enter a cell alone. However, staff felt that they may be required to place themselves at risk to immediately rouse an unresponsive detainee in a cell, or risk providing care by awaiting support of colleagues. This scenario, although rare, represents a shortcoming and potential risk for officers performing unaccompanied custody duties.

79. We found that budgetary impacts are experienced across ancillary centres because of the necessity to recall officers or pay overtime to provide short term custody cover, while maintaining a core policing service. This also applies to the frequent backfill of GEOAmey related duties through performing transportation tasks. We found officers to be accommodating of these issues and the challenges faced by GEOAmey, recognising the distance and logistic challenges that exist.

80. A common impact felt on the islands is the difficulty in retention of officers who wish to transfer to the mainland following conclusion of probationary periods or seeking development that is not available locally. In Shetland and Orkney for example, this necessitates a standing process of offering six or nine-month attachments to the Islands, which brings additional costs for travel, accommodation and overnight allowances. Additionally, officers are generally unfamiliar with the area and local practices, and may not be trained in custody duties.

81. Local policing officers based in ancillary centres reported that they receive a weekly CJSD newsletter covering key topics and relevant matters, which they felt was of value and made them feel part of the process of improvement. Some explained that they join a monthly meeting chaired by the CJSD Superintendent, covering general business, estate and custody developments. They felt there were good links with CJSD, a sense of investment in their facility, and responsive escalation pathways for developing issues.

Arrival at custody and booking-in process

82. Sergeants based at Inverness make all criminal justice decisions. There is little challenge from local policing, and many felt that the system was understood and worked well. The sergeant is also responsible for any detainee held at one of the thirteen ancillary centres. Nine of the ancillary centres have webcams installed behind the charge bar to allow the sergeant to view and hear booking in. Barra is the only centre in the region without a webcam. Sergeants endeavour to view some of each booking in, but acknowledge that other demands can preclude this.

83. When a detainee is arrested, the arresting officers contact the custody centre to provide brief information on the detainee and relevant circumstances. This allowed custody staff to commence background checks on various police IT systems, notably CHS, PNC, the NCS and iVPD,^[7] to better understand detainee particulars prior to their arrival. We found that this practice worked well at ancillary centres.

84. Inspectors observed five new detainees arrive at Inverness custody over a short period of time, which included drug searches and drink drive procedures. The sergeant was also supervising a detainee at Stornoway, having been remanded at court, and escorted by GEOAmey. However, due to a flight cancellation, they were unable to be transferred to prison.

85. The discussions, decisions and activity of releasing one detainee and booking in five new detainees seemed challenging and busy, but was well managed. It was made more difficult by the temporary facilities, where the booking-in desk was in a temporary building in the car park. The sergeant was required to move around to assist staff and converse with arresting officers and on occasion retreated to a quieter sergeant office located in the main police station building for private consultations and recording decisions.

86. During this period staff were efficient, professional, and courteous towards detainees. Detainees were provided with their rights, asked vulnerability questions and a risk assessment was made. The team leader was present throughout and took the lead in assessing risks and assigning a care plan. Inspectors also observed booking in at Fort William and Lerwick, which was conducted in a similar professional manner.

87. Standard searches were conducted appropriately by the arresting officers. Property was taken from detainees during standard searches and placed on the charge bar. However, after detainees were taken to a cell, their property was then logged onto NCS, sealed in a bag and moved to the detainee property store. Policy indicates that personal property should be logged and secured in the presence of the detainee, however we did not see this happen during our custody inspections. Staff largely rely on CCTV to rebuff any allegations relating to missing property.

88. Strip searches were conducted in the destination cell, and staff ensured that the CCTV images did not appear on a monitor at the time of search. Of the detainees we observed being booked in, the strip searches were carried out appropriately and with custody staff present.

Legal rights

89. Part of a sergeant’s role is to record the necessity and proportionality of arrest under the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2016, giving due consideration to the Lord Advocates Guidelines (LAG), and to apply a rationale for that and any subsequent criminal justice decision making. The final decision for the sergeant, is to consider the disposal for each detainee and accompany that with a detailed rationale recorded on the NCS. Of the detainees we observed and those we examined on the NCS, we found that records consistently included a detailed and satisfactory rationale for arrest. This is reflected nationally and can be attributed to a period of very intrusive scrutiny in the years following the Covid-19 pandemic.

90. Detainees should be offered a letter outlining their rights on arrival. In most cases we reviewed this was completed, though we noted six instances where there was no record of it being provided.

91. As part of the booking process every detainee is asked if they wish for intimation of their arrest to be passed to a solicitor. The recording of this provision of rights was complete in all instances. In around half of the cases reviewed, the detainee had asked for a solicitor to be informed and, in most instances, this had been recorded on NCS and updated to confirm that a solicitor had been contacted.

92. Notification to a reasonably named person was requested in 35 records within our sample. This included contact made with parents in the case of child detainees and there were notes to explain that contact was made or attempted. There was evidence that repeated attempts were made to contact reasonably named persons where necessary.

93. The Police Interview – Rights of Suspects (PIRoS) form is only completed when a detainee is to be interviewed as a suspect. Where a detainee has been arrested as officially accused, or is not interviewed, it is unlikely that a PIRoS will be recorded. We witnessed PIRoS being carried out with detainees in a proper manner.

94. In the records sample, there were nine records for children aged 15 or under and one for a 16 year old subject to a supervision order. All records had notification to a reasonably named person recorded, however three records indicated that no one attended to act as an appropriate adult. These related to a 14 year old held at Inverness for twenty hours, a 15 year old held for six hours at Inverness, and a third was aged 14 and held for less than an hour at Fort William. Of the ten child records we reviewed, there were notes to suggest senior officer oversight in just three.

95. We highlighted the need for increased management oversight of children in custody in our report on Glasgow custody centres whereby Recommendation 3 of the report states:

“Police Scotland should ensure that custody decisions regarding children detained in custody are subject to robust management oversight and are recorded appropriately.”

While this has relevance for Highland and Islands custody centres, we do not intend to make an additional recommendation in this regard.

96. Our records review found that three children, aged 12, 13 and 15 years of age were held overnight in police cells at Inverness having been arrested for what inspectors considered to be relatively minor offences that took place in a residential children’s house – before being returned the following morning. While we recognise the challenges and pressures experienced by partner agencies, this raises concerns about the threshold for accepting and detaining children under these circumstances, particularly for lengthy periods.

97. While the provision of suitable alternative accommodation remains a challenge for childcare agencies across the country, we do not consider police cells to be an appropriate interim option, especially for such a period. Had the decision been to hold a child for court, then a child detention certificate requiring the local authority to accommodate them would have been required, which was not in place in these circumstances.

98. In practice, only those who are arrested as not officially accused, or under suspicion, are the subject of scrutiny by the CRI – with reviews taking place at six, twelve and eighteen hours. These reviews require that investigation is diligent and expeditious. After an investigation is complete, a detainee’s status may change to ‘officially accused’. An officially accused person in custody is not monitored by the CRI. The CRI had input to four records within our sample.

99. We found instances of delayed release, similar to that found in previous inspections. In one case, a detainee charged with a relatively minor offence was held for almost sixteen hours. The decision to release was made over nine hours prior to release and while the delay is likely to be based on intoxication and a desire to prevent further offending until sober, this was not outlined or recorded on NCS. In contrast, a record relating to a detainee at Fort William, that was not immediately released following a decision to do so, was updated to provide an appropriate rationale for the delay.

100. Article 5 of the Human Rights Act, 1998 relates to the right of liberty. Where a person’s liberty is to be delayed after charge, there should be a note to explain the legal grounds for this as the grounds of arrest have lapsed.

101. We noted a similar absence of notes in our inspections of Glasgow and Falkirk custody centres. Reference to this matter was also made in our report on the joint inspection of Ayrshire custody, within which Recommendation 1 states:

“Police Scotland should review compliance with policy relating to the delay of release following a disposal decision being made and ensure that staff adhere to this.”

While this has relevance for Highland and Islands custody centres, we do not intend to make an additional recommendation in this regard.

102. Overall, release decisions appeared appropriate and consistent with Lord Advocates Guidelines. Custody staff gave due consideration to issues relevant to release such as the time of day, the clothing worn by the detainee, their age and ability to care for themselves, the distance to home, and availability of transport methods. This was particularly evident in rural ancillary centres where public transport options were poor and distances often significant. We found that in many cases police officers would escort detainees home.

103. There were some instances where detainees were redirected to the police station after appearing at court to be returned home. Having appeared at court, we understand that responsibility for transport to a person’s address lies with the court or a local authority in the case of children, however officers perceive a duty of care and often oblige. Considering the distances involved, these journeys can remove operational officers from core duties for hours.

104. Detainees are assessed prior to release and asked two pre-release risk assessment (PRRA) questions prior to leaving, regardless of their status. These relate to whether or not the individual has any thoughts of self-harm or suicide, or thoughts of harming anyone else. The PRRA was completed in all cases, and all responses were negative.

105. When a detainee is transferred to GEOAmey to be escorted to court, custody staff must complete a person escort record. This form is important in that it informs the escort provider of any identified health issues and any other identified risks that a detainee may have to ensure their ongoing care. We examined a sample of these and found them to have been completed to a good standard.

Risk assessment and care plans

106. Local policing officers process detainees in ancillary centres, sometimes watched by Inverness based custody sergeants over a webcam link. The officers, and often the local sergeant, will agree a suitable care plan ratified by the sergeant at Inverness. We found that there appears to be significant devolved responsibility to local officers on an understanding that they are present and perhaps best placed to assess the detainee. Subsequent care remains largely with them and there appeared to be limited intrusive supervision by CJSD sergeants of the care for detainees at ancillary centres, beyond the initial booking in process.

107. During the booking-in process, a risk assessment is carried out for all new arrivals to police custody. Detainees are asked a range of questions by custody staff based on a pre-determined vulnerability questionnaire. The purpose of the questionnaire is to identify past or present issues in relation to physical and mental health, substance use, self-harm, suicidal ideation or other vulnerabilities.

108. Effective risk assessment is vital to ensure that detainees can be managed and cared for appropriately. These questions are personal in nature, and we saw that staff were sensitive and respectful in their approach. The questionnaires were completed well. We saw risk assessments and care plans being formulated though discussions between the CJPCSO and the team leader or sergeant.

109. The initial risk assessment process allows custody staff to determine a bespoke care plan for detainees and involves determining whether the person presents high or low risk and applying a corresponding level to determine the appropriate frequency of wellbeing observations. This approach is based on an assessment of threat, risk and vulnerability. Responses to the vulnerability questionnaire and the subsequent care plan should be recorded on NCS. Based on the outcome of the risk assessment, detainees are subject to observations and rousing^[8] in accordance with the following standardised scale:

• Level 1 – general wellbeing observations. For an initial period of six hours, all detainees are roused at least once every hour. Thereafter, hourly visits are still undertaken but detainees need not be roused for up to three hours. This level is suitable for detainees who are assessed as low risk.
• Level 2 – intermittent observations. Detainees are visited and roused at 15 or 30-minute intervals. This level is the minimum for detainees suspected of being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, whose level of consciousness causes concern or where there are other issues necessitating increased observation. This level can also be enhanced by the addition of CCTV observation of the detainee in their cell, with images appearing on a monitor in the staff and/or supervisor's office.
• Level 3 – constant observations. The detainee may be under constant observation via CCTV, a glass cell door or window, or a door hatch. Visits and rousing may take place at 15, 30 or 60-minute intervals.
• Level 4 – close proximity observations. Appropriate for those detainees at or posing the highest risk. This involves detainees being supervised by staff in the cell or via an open cell door.

110. Team Leaders and supervisors have other tactical options to mitigate risk. For example, a referral can be made to a healthcare provider, the detainee can be provided with anti-harm clothing or can be placed on enhanced observations. Enhanced observations, means that the cell CCTV images are streamed live to a monitor in the custody office for staff to view occasionally as they carry out other tasks. It is a less intrusive and resource intensive option compared to the above noted level 3 observations, although policy indicates that it should be accompanied by 15 or 30-minute observation cell visits.

111. From the sample of 81 records we examined:

• 20% of detainees were intoxicated on arrival
• 44% had consumed alcohol and 16% had used drugs prior to arrest
• 19% declared they were alcoholics and 12% were drug dependent
• 42% were on prescribed medication
• 49% disclosed a mental health condition and 41% reported they had previously self-harmed or had attempted suicide
• 12% stated they had difficulty with reading and writing

Almost all detainees had some form of criminal or police information record.

112. Statistics relating to mental health are similar to those we found in our previous custody inspections. Overall, there is a correlation between health, vulnerability and offending which is reasonably consistent across the country. It highlights the high level of risk, addiction, mental health, and medical health challenges presented to police custody daily.

113. We found that the vulnerability risk assessment of 52 detainees were assessed as high risk and 27 as low risk. No risk assessment was entered in two records. We considered that three records rated as low risk should have been rated as high risk, however, suitable care plan mitigation was in place. Some detainees were marked high risk due to age, or the nature of offence, and we consider these considerations to be good practice.

114. We found that in some cases the detainee had not engaged with the vulnerability assessment, and it was either not in place or added some time later. However, in the main, a care plan was put in place to mitigate risk. There was a lack of detail recorded in some cases where a care plan had been reviewed and amended. In general, the recording of criminal justice decisions was clear and often accompanied by detailed rationales, but rationales relating to care plans were often weaker or omitted.

115. Within the sample, 28% were placed on level 1 observations. The majority of detainees were placed on level 2 observations when brought into custody. Overall, we saw that where a detainee was considered to be high risk, there was an appropriate increased observation plan associated with it. There were five cases where a high risk assessment was accompanied by level 1 observations. Four related to children that were not lodged in a cell and released in short time, and one had a referral to a nurse as an alternative tactical measure – all of which were proportionate.

116. The issue of assessing detainees as high risk without having increased mitigation in place appears less prevalent at the Highland and Islands custody centres.

117. As indicated, a tactical option to address identified risks is to require a detainee to wear anti-harm clothing, and custody centres retain a small supply. There is, however, a lack of availability of sufficient variably sized anti-harm clothing, which remains an issue across the custody estate. This can impact on the dignity and safety of female or small stature detainees who regularly have to accept oversized garments. We found no indication of this issue being effectively addressed by way of service delivery protocols.

118. Custody policy allows for occasions when a detainee need not be roused every hour through the night. If a detainee is deemed low risk and has been detained for more than six hours, a decision can be made by a supervisor that a detainee can be left to sleep for a period of three hours. Staff should continue to visit the cell hourly and on two consecutive visits need only record signs of life; chest rising, regular breathing, sleeping etc. We noted eight records where this had been applied and in five instances we found the policy to be applied correctly with a clear rationale. There were however, gaps in the recording of a rationale in the remaining cases.

119. Observation visits and the provision of food, drinks, blankets, pillows and books, when requested, are generally carried out by CJPCSOs. Such activity should be recorded on the NCS. At Highland and Islands centres, as at other custody centres, staff make a note of each transaction and then update information onto the NCS when they return to the office, which can take some time depending on any interruptions. This delay in recording can lead to omissions of information, inaccuracy in the detail, and can raise questions about the integrity of recorded information.

120. Overall, we found gaps in the timely recording of observation visits across the custody centres, with the exception of Fort William. Brief comments in the NCS records and apparent long delays in completing visits raises questions about the level of care and welfare provided to detainees.

121. In our review of NCS records, we examined the time difference between the cell visit time logged on the NCS and the time stamp relating to when it was recorded on the system. Of the records examined, 71 had cell visits recorded, and the majority of these were recorded within ten minutes, which is good. There were however, some much longer delays with no explanation for the gaps noted.

122. This matter has been the subject of previous HMICS recommendations where the ability to make contemporaneous records of interactions with detainees using an electronic tablet was considered best practice. Recommendation 3 from our joint custody inspection report on Lanarkshire stated:

“Police Scotland should ensure that processes for recording cell checks are carried out consistently and recorded on the national custody system timeously.”

We understand that electronic tablets previously provided for this purpose have been temporarily removed from all centres pending a review. However, we consider this recommendation to continue to have relevance for practice across all custody centres.

123. Custody policy outlines that custody officers cannot leave the custody centre when a person is detained. We learned that this can result in pressures as staffing levels are limited and, at times, local policing sergeants assume the role of custody officer – and some operational circumstances could require their attendance. Similar pressures exist for local policing officers that also have responsibility for custody supervision, which, as stated, is the model for the ancillary centres across the region.

124. In terms of undertaking observations, custody officers at ancillary centres acknowledged there were occasional delays in recording visits due to other operational pressures or the need to respond to serious incidents that demand immediate attention by available officers. However, they maintained that custody centres would never be left unsupervised and observation duties would always be maintained, but acknowledged there may be late entries on the system.

125. The level of potentially competing demands for officers supervising custody, while, at times, needing to respond to serious incidents, raises concerns about the strength of the model. Sergeants at Inverness have responsibility for detainees across the centres, however reference was made to routinely delegating responsibility for care and welfare to officers at the ancillary centres. Inspectors were therefore not confident that there was a sufficient level of intrusive oversight of detainees at ancillary centres.

126. When an arrested person is brought to a police station they should always be searched. Often this search is limited to clothing and pockets, known as a standard search, but there may be occasions where it is appropriate that the search involves the removal of the detainees clothing, referred to as strip searches. These should be conducted in as dignified manner as far as is possible and must be authorised by a sergeant based on risk, necessity, and proportionality.

127. There were 19 cases of a strip search being undertaken in our sample, and the majority were appropriately authorised and accompanied by a suitable rationale. In four cases the strip search was based on previous intelligence regarding drug use, however there was no specific information about how recent this may have been or any note of concealment issues to justify the removal of clothes. We would anticipate fuller and more detailed rationales being recorded on the NCS to outline legal necessity in such circumstances.

128. We have previously raised concerns regarding the recording of strip searches. Recommendation 3 from our report on the joint inspection of Tayside custody centre states:

“Police Scotland should ensure that the recording of strip searches at Dundee custody centre provides an accurate reflection of practice.”

While this has relevance for Highland and Islands custody centres, we do not intend to make an additional recommendation in this regard.

129. The recent introduction of a new voluntary interview protocol has received a positive response from local policing officers in the region. This process allows officers to manage a person’s solicitor access requirements on their electronic devices, meaning that routine investigative interviews can be processed remotely by officers without the need to access custody facilities. This has been described by local officers and custody staff as a positive development, which has benefited the efficient operation of custody centres and reduces officer abstraction from core duties. The process exists independently of CJSD.

Detainee care

130. Referral to a healthcare professional (HCP) was made in 47 cases, 17 of which were at Inverness and 30 related to the ancillary centres. An HCP was contacted and attended on all occasions.

131. At Inverness, we found that all medication was dispensed by the onsite healthcare professionals. At ancillary centres, medication was held by the local policing sergeant who administers this according to the prescription provided by the HCP. In some centres medication was stored on an office desk rather in secure cupboards.

132. The issue of training and compliance was addressed in our joint custody inspection report relating to Dumfries and Galloway. Recommendation 13 of that report states:

“Police Scotland should ensure that custody staff are provided with appropriate training in relation to the administration of medication and that this is provided and refreshed in accordance with national guidance and best practice.”

While this has relevance for Highland and Islands custody centres, we do not intend to make an additional recommendation in this regard.

133. At Inverness there were just two detainees available to interview and none in the ancillary centres at the time of the inspection. Both detainees were complimentary about the custody staff and the care they provided.

134. Fifty three records indicated that meals had been provided. There were 15 records where no meal provision was recorded and, given the length of detention, we would expect that they would have been. We anticipate however, that this is most likely to be the result of recording errors rather than a lack of provision.

135. Detainees are typically offered a wash in the morning prior to attending court. Those being released to return home are not generally offered a wash or shower, although if requested, this is accommodated wherever possible. In our examination of NCS records, of the 48 detainees held for court, there was no record of a wash being offered in 37 cases. However, again we anticipate this is a gap in recording rather than omission of provision.

136. The offer of exercise to detainees is unusual and in large part this is due to most police custody centres not having the facilities for this, nor the staff time to supervise exercise. We found that exercise was offered in four cases within our sample – three at Stornoway and one at Wick. All related to people detained for a lengthy time, which we consider good practice.

137. Detainees are routinely asked if they would like to be referred to an agency to support them with issues such as addiction or mental health. The provision of services differs from area to area, however the NCS has a compulsory field that staff must update to indicate if the offer was accepted, declined or was not considered appropriate.

138. During this review, a referral was accepted in eight instances and declined in 28. Forty five records had been updated to the effect that services were not applicable. However, in some of these cases, inspectors considered that the circumstances outlined within records would have warranted a referral to specialist support services. We acknowledge that our knowledge of the individuals concerned is limited, however given the vulnerability of many detainees, as outlined previously in this report, we would expect to see a higher rate of referral.

139. It is accepted however, that there are fewer referral routes in rural areas than in cities. We found that unlike other areas of Scotland, services offered in rural areas tend to be from statutory services. In N division, local policing officers make referrals through the iVPD system, where colleagues in a concern hub will consider the most appropriate route for referral.

Staff training

140. All custody staff, and local policing officers who perform the custody role in ancillary centres, are required to complete standard custody training, which is comprised of two mandatory courses, a custody officer induction course covering custody care and welfare lasting three days, and two days training on the NCS.

141. Custody staff should also be trained in first aid, officer safety, fire safety, and data protection. Some custody staff are trained in CHS and PNC, although we were informed that the NCS pulls basic information from CHS that is sufficient for decision making. There is a new programme of refresher training hosted at the police training centre at East Kilbride, however, the location is particularly challenging for officers and staff based in Highland and Islands.

142. We found gaps in training for officers supervising custody at some of the centres inspected. While some localised training roadshows have been delivered in the past, there are limited local training opportunities available resulting in significant training gaps of up to six months. At Stornoway, two teams had fewer than half of staff trained, and on one team no officers were trained.

143. Similar gaps were present among staff teams at Shetland and Fort William. This can result in increased costs to resource trained officers, and often necessitates remote processing of detainees by trained staff on the mainland, which has an impact on existing teams with already depleted resources.

144. Some custody supervisors had received two days online supervisor training, which replaced the former two-week supervisors course delivered at the Scottish Police College. This is delivered in three half day online inputs. Supervisors felt that this training was not sufficient and highlighted where they felt gaps in the training remained. Concerns were raised by some staff that there is no specific team leader training; an issue that was highlighted in our report on the inspection of custody centres in Greater Glasgow.

GEOAmey and referral services

145. Officers based at ancillary centres highlighted that the service provided by GEOAmey can be sporadic and is often delayed. Islands centres are required to utilise legalised cells because GEOAmey are often unable to organise transport from islands to the mainland in good time, or have insufficient staff to undertake the task. They do not operate 24/7 and stop at 1900 hours, meaning officers take over the legalised role thereafter until they return.

146. Custody officers were well briefed on the different protocols required to operate legalised detention, and there were numerous posters reinforcing guidelines. However, as GEOAmey are not routinely based on islands or in remote areas, their attendance is by arrangement. This introduces a weakness in service provision, which must then be addressed by local policing officers, further removing them from core operational duties.

147. In Stornoway, the appropriate adult (AA) service is facing difficulties due to a current lack of qualified personnel. This has led to frequent cancellation of detainee interviews, sometimes for days, to await an AAs arrival from the mainland. This can be experienced to a degree with solicitors whereby cases may be abandoned due to a lack of solicitor availability. In terms of solicitor representation, pre-interview phone consultations are satisfactory, however physical attendance is challenging and requires considerable forward planning. The majority of detainees appearing at court are represented by off-island solicitors, whom are not often able to attend. There are therefore ongoing challenges in ensuring that detainees have an appropriate level of solicitor access and representation on the islands.

[5] The Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989 establishes certain police station cells as legalised detention cells. These are usually located in rural or remote areas. The cells can provide temporary legal detention of an individual that is either awaiting trail at court, or awaiting transfer to prison. Provisions of the Act allow authorised centres to hold prisoners for up to 30 days.

[6] All cell doors should open outwards and be fitted with the Home Office anti-ligature handle, food hatch, viewer with privacy cover and an adjustable and removable door keep.

[7] Police information systems include the Police National Computer system (PNC), Criminal History System (CHS), and interim Vulnerable Persons Database (iVPD).

[8] Rousing involves gaining a comprehensive verbal response from a detainee, even if it involves waking them while sleeping. If a detainee cannot be roused, they should be treated as a medical emergency.