Strategic review of policing the Commonwealth Games 2026

Governance

10. Police Scotland participates in a range of CWG26 governance structures at both internal and external levels. While this review considers aspects of external governance, its primary focus is on internal policing governance and oversight arrangements within Police Scotland and the SPA. As part of our review, we observed both Police Scotland CWG26 Gold governance meetings and SPA CWG26 policing oversight group meetings. These demonstrated that Police Scotland has established clear and mature leadership and governance arrangements, providing effective strategic direction, oversight and accountability for the policing of the Games.

11. Within these governance arrangements, we observed a well-defined command structure across all relevant business areas involved in the Games. There are three command levels, Gold (strategic), Silver (tactical) and Bronze (operational). For these particular Games, the Gold commander is an assistant chief constable (ACC), the Silver commander is a chief superintendent (CS) and the Bronze commanders vary in rank from inspector through to chief superintendent. The command structure is supported by scheduled governance processes, including six-weekly Gold and Silver governance meetings.

12. We reviewed the planning documentation for the Games, including the strategic plan. This plan sets out ten specific and measurable aims for a safe and secure CWG. We also reviewed tactical and operational plans to assess their consistency with the aims outlined in the Gold strategy. At the time of our review, several of these plans remained in draft form, with commanders describing them as live documents that continue to be refined as planning progresses.

13. We found effective reporting lines in place to support the development and refinement of plans. Commanders we spoke with told us that they received appropriate and timely support from the planning team, which assisted them in developing their plans. In particular, several commanders highlighted the value of one-to-one engagement with the Silver commander to review plans in detail. We also found that the planning team provides effective oversight of the development of these plans. At this stage of preparation, we are satisfied that the tactical and operational plans are progressing well and remain aligned with strategic aims.

Internal oversight

14. We identified that scrutiny is provided through Police Scotland’s CWG26 strategic oversight board, which operates under a clear ToR and meets regularly. Its purpose is to maintain a consistent strategic focus and ensure police accountability for Games planning. The oversight board provides a forum for the executive team to scrutinise planning progress and emerging issues. In addition, the chief constable has held one-to-one meetings with the planning team to review planning arrangements in detail.

15. Police Scotland has also set up a number of internal challenge panels, enabling peer scrutiny of Games planning. Such panels support effective challenge and command resilience by ensuring a detailed and informed understanding of plans in advance of delivery. Our review of these panels found that they were thorough and that they contributed positively to the overall development and refinement of Games planning.

16. The SPA has established a dedicated CWG26 policing oversight group, comprising a four-member panel, including a chairperson, drawn from SPA board members. This group has been in place since March 2025. Our review of documentation submitted to the group found Police Scotland had prepared well-structured and comprehensive papers, providing board members with timely and detailed information on progress with Games planning.

17. We also observed the oversight group’s meetings, which gave us a greater insight into the scope and effectiveness of its scrutiny of policing preparations. Through constructive challenge, the SPA maintained a strong focus on risk, assurance and accountability, with the level of scrutiny increasing incrementally as the Games has drawn closer and planning has become more refined. Members of the oversight group raised specific questions about public safety, staff welfare, resourcing, technology, finance, risk, internal and external audit, contingencies and preparedness for the Games.

18. Given that funding arrangements for these Games differ from previous events, there has been particular scrutiny by SPA members on financial arrangements. The SPA has been clear that there should be no financial detriment to policing in Scotland as a result of the Games. Police Scotland has indicated that financial matters are on track, which appears to have provided a level of assurance to board members at this stage.

19. This was reinforced by interviews we conducted with individuals attending the oversight and governance meetings, both internally and externally. These interviews, along with our observations of the meetings, confirmed they are operating as intended, with clearly defined ToR, regularly scheduled meetings and effective challenge and assurance processes that demonstrate leadership oversight and accountability at each level of command.

20. During the course of our review we spoke with a number of partners involved in the planning process with Police Scotland. They were positive about their working relationships with the police during Games planning and highlighted that Gold and Silver commanders listened, engaged constructively and provided appropriate challenge.

21. It is also notable that the SPA – in conjunction with the British Transport Police Authority (BTPA) – has a role in scrutinising the work of the British Transport Police (BTP) operating in Scotland. Scrutiny of the BTP is carried out via the Scottish Railways Policing Committee (where the SPA has representation), providing an opportunity to ask BTP about CWG26-related activity. Although HMICS has no remit to review BTP plans for the Games, our interviews with BTP staff have shown that BTP planning is at an advanced stage and it has a sound and effective relationship with the Police Scotland planning team at all levels.

External oversight

22. As indicated, Police Scotland sits on a number of external governance groups, the main one being the Organising Company Safety and Security Group. Police Scotland is a critical partner in this group and provides advice on safety and security, particularly in relation to venue security. The Counter-Terrorism Security Co-ordinators (CT SecCo) have provided detailed advice regarding the four main Games venues.

23. The funding model for these Games means that Police Scotland does not hold a dedicated CWG26 budget, and overall financial responsibility rests with the Organising Company. Consequently, any advice on safety and security measures that Police Scotland gives that has a financial implication, has to be considered by the Organising Company in terms of its overall budget. We are aware that there are ongoing discussions between the police service and the Organising Company regarding safety and security measures that Police Scotland has recommended.

24. The Scottish Government has established a Ministerial Oversight Group, which, at the time of our review, was chaired by the Health Secretary. While the Scottish Government does not hold financial responsibility for the CWG, it has a significant interest in the delivery of an event of this scale in Scotland, particularly regarding public safety and security. Police Scotland, alongside the Organising Company, has a role in providing assurance to the Scottish Government that appropriate safety and security arrangements are in place for the Games.

Command roles

25. Police Scotland has filled most senior command roles with experienced officers and staff. While a small number of commanders are newly trained and will be undertaking their first event of this scale, all are appropriately trained and accredited, with testing and exercising activity providing further command experience.

26. Many of the command roles have resilience in place, ensuring that commanders have suitable rest periods throughout the ten days of the Games. This has proven more challenging in specialist command areas, since such roles require specific training and experience. The specialist nature of these roles, combined with the relatively small number of individuals who fulfil them, makes these functions more vulnerable to issues such as sickness, ill health or retirement. Police Scotland has identified areas where resilience is limited and has developed workable plans to ensure that specialist command roles have appropriate resilience in place for the Games.

27. As part of the planning process, Police Scotland identified Bronze venue commanders at an early stage, to ensure that they were involved from the outset of planning. Venue commanders have conducted detailed familiarisation of the venues. This has included consulting with venue operators so that good working relationships are established before the Games begin. The venue commanders hold significant operational command experience, and have all completed their Event Policing Lead (EPL) training to enable them to command the venues they will be operating in.

28. We reviewed Police Scotland’s intelligence, cyber and counter-terrorism (CT) arrangements for the Games and the related partnerships that support these functions. We found that Police Scotland has clear and well‑defined intelligence, CT and protective security roles, supported by structured reporting and multi‑agency co-ordination. Strong partnership working is in place within Scotland and across the wider UK, with evidence showing that such arrangements were recently tested during the 2025 visits by the President and Vice President of the United States of America.

29. These arrangements have been strengthened through a dedicated intelligence cell with co‑located partners from across the blue‑light services, including the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) and the Scottish Ambulance Service (SAS). Arrangements are also in place for cyber and CT threats, with established links across the UK, and regular meetings planned during the Games to support information sharing. Collectively, these arrangements provide a solid foundation for Games planning and align with the wider command and governance structures already described in this report.

Assurance

30. Police Scotland and the SPA have also been proactive in seeking assurance reviews of their planning arrangements from external bodies. In addition to this review by HMICS, there have been independent reviews conducted by external bodies such as BDO, who provide accountancy and business advice to businesses and the public sector. A separate peer review was also conducted by the National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC), which provides support to police forces across the United Kingdom.

31. The stated purpose of the BDO review was to:

“Provide management and the Audit, Risk and Assurance Committee (ARAC) (of the SPA) with assurance over the design and operational effectiveness of the controls relating to the SPA/Police Scotland’s planning on the 2026 Commonwealth Games.”

      This included document reviews and interviews with staff            involved in planning for the Games.

32. The main aim of the NPoCC peer review was to:

“Provide an independent assessment of plans relating to key elements of the safety, security, and logistics operation.”

       NPoCC brought together subject matter experts in these           areas and interviewed staff and documentation before               providing its report to Police Scotland.

33. Both reviews conducted were largely positive in their findings regarding planning, with only minor areas identified for consideration by Police Scotland. It should be recognised that scrutiny can place an additional burden on planning teams trying to prepare for a major event. It is therefore encouraging that Police Scotland has sought external scrutiny in this way and taken on the additional work to support those reviews. This demonstrates openness, and a clear commitment to preparedness and assurance. The outcomes of the independent reviews also indicate that Police Scotland is well advanced in its planning for the Games.

Testing and exercising

34. We found that Police Scotland’s testing and exercising arrangements for the Commonwealth Games 2026 are well established. It has a structured, planned and progressively delivered programme of activity in place, designed to test command and control arrangements, specialist capabilities and multi-agency interoperability as plans mature.

35. Police Scotland has developed a dedicated testing and exercising strategy that frames exercising as an iterative process rather than a one-off event. This approach aligns testing activity with the Gold strategy, statutory resilience responsibilities and established governance arrangements. It is intended to support the progressive validation of assumptions, identification of gaps, and refinement of plans as delivery approaches advance – rather than reliance on final stage assurance alone.

36. Early testing and exercising activity have already informed planning refinement, and our observations confirmed that exercises are being delivered in practice rather than remaining theoretical. Relevant commanders and partners have contributed to testing command, co-ordination and information flow arrangements in a manner consistent with the stated assurance objectives.

37. Police Scotland has also established a comprehensive programme of specialist testing and exercising. CT exercising spans strategic, tactical and specialist capabilities, while firearms exercising is planned for specialist firearms commanders and tactical firearms commanders. Public order arrangements are scheduled to be tested through a dedicated Silver-level challenge event.

38. External assurance mechanisms, including the previously-mentioned NPoCC peer review, are appropriately positioned as complementary to internal testing and exercising, rather than substitutes for it. This reinforces the importance of operational exercising in proving readiness, with external scrutiny providing an additional challenge and assurance.

39. The Organising Company retains responsibility for leading its own exercising activity, including an organiser-led command post exercise. While Police Scotland has mitigated this dependency through continued internal testing and exercising, targeted workshops and command-level tabletop activity, these measures do not fully replicate consistent organiser participation in integrated, multi-agency exercising.

40. The Organising Company has commissioned a private company to undertake its testing and exercising programme on its behalf. Police Scotland is utilising SMARTEU to undertake blue-light exercising. Due to planning timescales, it has been challenging to ensure both programmes align and complement the overall planning for the event. However, this has now been addressed, and a joint command post exercise is planned for 25 June 2026, which meets the objectives of both organisations.

Concept of operations

41. With any significant event such as CWG26 there must be effective command and control structures in place to manage the event effectively. The Organising Company is developing an overarching CONOPS with contributions from Police Scotland – in particular from Command, Control and Communications (C3) division, which has developed its own Bronze operational plan. It is important that the CONOPS for the event operates smoothly, and we have been informed that there are plans to trial the CONOPS plan during testing and exercising activity to provide assurance on its operability.

42. Police Scotland has established the key multi-agency structures for the Games, in the form of the Police Operations Command Centre (POCC), which will be situated in Govan, Glasgow. This has been described as a Multi-agency Command Centre (MACC) as there will be other agencies within this command centre including representation from SFRS and SAS. As such, it is more akin to a multi-agency command centre than a police-only POCC. The Organising Company will also be operating a separate Games Operational Centre (GOC) from a different location in Glasgow. Police Scotland is working with the Organising Company to examine how the GOC, the POCC/MACC, and the four separate venue control rooms will connect with each other and share information in line with the developing CONOPS. This multi-agency command and control structure is illustrated in Figure 2.

43. The command centre models described above mirror some previous major events that Police Scotland has been involved in. Police Scotland and other blue-light partners (alongside Glasgow City Council and others) will be embedded within the four venues. As there are separate venues and separate POCC/MACC and GOC in place, many of the daily meetings will take place virtually during the Games. Therefore, ongoing testing will be important to ensure that the structure will operate smoothly once the Games begin, without introducing avoidable risk.

44. An area requiring specific assurance is the use of separate information management systems (IMS) by blue-light services and the Organising Company. The blue-light services will be using the Central Logging of Intelligence and Operations (CLIO) IMS, while the Organising Company will be operating the Raven IMS. Both systems will be available in the POCC/MACC and GOC, as well as each of the individual venue control centres. However, thorough testing is required to ensure interoperability, effective information flow, and timely access across command structures. As the Games CONOPS continues to develop, Police Scotland should maintain ongoing refinement of its own CONOPS documentation, setting out clear command protocols and information sharing arrangements.

45. A multi-agency Gold group has been established and held its initial meeting in April. While we are confident that strategic leaders liaised on a regular basis, the establishment of this group is a positive step that will support oversight, risk ownership and collective assurance as the Games approach.

Communication

46. Communication is a key factor of governance and assurance for the Games, both internally and externally, providing oversight and confidence in the effectiveness of operational planning and delivery arrangements. Internally, Police Scotland has communicated effectively, with regular briefings and reliable information flow across teams. These communication arrangements are supported by established command briefing structures, providing appropriate oversight and consistency.

47. There is ongoing contact between the planning team and police divisions to ensure officers and staff are given as much notice as possible regarding their duties during the Games. The communication Bronze plan emphasises maintaining BAU visibility and general policing messages. Structured frontline and line manager briefings support consistent internal and public messaging. The Gold commander has also published a number of CWG blogs on the police intranet to provide organisational-wide updates and assurance on planning progress.

48. A dedicated Police Scotland communications cell will operate during the Games, providing operational co-ordination of internal messaging and supporting command centre communication flows. External communication arrangements are set out through a corporate communications strategy, supported by intranet resources and established social media channels. Plans are in place for misinformation management, with messaging being developed to provide clarity and reassurance to the public where misinformation is considered a potential risk.

Legal requirements

49. The Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 outlines a number of general duties for police officers in Scotland. These include the duty to prevent and detect crime, to maintain order and to protect life and property. This will have relevance for public safety in respect of policing the Games, however, as noted elsewhere in this report, the Organising Company has responsibility for venue-specific security.

50. Decisions taken in support of police responsibilities are subject to scrutiny both during and after the event, particularly for CT and firearms planning. Police Scotland has applied established legal and ethical principles when planning CT and firearms prevention measures, ensuring that all decisions are lawful, necessary and proportionate. A formal information management strategy is in place, providing assurance that legal, ethical and data protection requirements are embedded within operational planning and decision making.

Ethical considerations

51. Police Scotland has put governance arrangements in place to ensure that ethical considerations, including community impact, public confidence and reassurance, are included in its planning. An equality and human rights impact assessment (EqHRIA) has been completed as a formal control to record these considerations and document the rationale for decision making. This provides assurance that planning is anchored within a lawful, necessary and proportionate human rights framework.

52. Evidence shows that Police Scotland has drawn lessons learned from previous major events to inform and shape current planning for the Games. It will also use any learning from these Games to inform future events (in conjunction with its partners), using post-event evaluation and debrief arrangements, with day-to-day learning captured on the CLIO IMS. Planned activity includes a staff survey and a structured debrief involving a staff panel convened prior to the Games, supporting organisational learning and post-event assurance.

Risk

53. Policing an event of this scale involves the identification and management of a range of strategic and operational risks. While some risks are owned by the Organising Company, others are shared; Police Scotland has a significant role in mitigating risks that affect public safety and security.

54. We found that Police Scotland has sound risk management structures in place to identify, monitor and review strategic risks for the Games. Regular internal meetings support risk awareness, shared ownership and collective responsibility for mitigation. Risks are documented, mitigations are recorded, and there are clear routes for escalation where risk levels change, or issues cannot be resolved at operational level.

55. Police Scotland works closely with the Organising Company on shared risks, with planning leads describing clear escalation routes for raising concerns. Evidence gathered shows confidence in managing difficult discussions relating to threat, risk and safeguarding. Police Scotland maintains oversight through established governance and escalation arrangements and has demonstrated willingness to challenge decisions where it believes risks are not being mitigated to an acceptable standard.

56. Consistent with the governance and escalation arrangements described earlier in this report, safety and security advice provided by Police Scotland to the Organising Company is recorded on the CLIO IMS, including whether advice is accepted, declined or partially accepted. This provides a clear audit trail and assurance that decisions, mitigations and residual risks are formally documented and subject to appropriate scrutiny. At the time of writing, there has been no requirement to activate formal escalation routes.

Financial arrangements

57. As outlined, the financial arrangements for these Games differ from those in place for the 2014 CWG. While funding for the 2014 Games was provided by the Scottish Government, funding responsibility for the CWG26 rests with the Organising Company.

58. Police Scotland has worked closely with the Organising Company to agree a Delivery Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) covering planning costs, and submitted invoices to date have been paid in full. These costs include full cost recovery for all staff within the Police Scotland planning team, providing assurance that policing has not incurred financial detriment during the planning phase. Work is ongoing to finalise the MoA covering policing costs associated with the delivery phase of the Games.

59. At this stage, Police Scotland leadership reports no financial pressure or concerns regarding the funding model and remains confident that there will be no financial detriment to policing as a result of the Games. We would, however, expect the delivery MoA to be concluded at the earliest opportunity to provide full financial assurance ahead of delivery.

Vetting and accreditation

60. Police Scotland cannot provide full assurance in certain risk areas that remain the responsibility of the Organising Company, including vetting, accreditation and safeguarding. Evidence shows that Police Scotland has actively raised concerns about these areas, particularly regarding the safeguarding of volunteers.

61. Police Scotland continues to work with the Organising Company, providing policing experience and guidance to ensure appropriate vetting and accreditation for all involved in delivering the event.