Strategic review of policing the Commonwealth Games 2026

Overview

62. Police Scotland has established a well-structured, intelligence-led and increasingly mature approach to operational planning, logistics and preparedness for the policing of CWG26. Effective leadership, partnership working and established command arrangements provide strong foundations across strategic, tactical and operational levels, supporting confidence in overall readiness at this stage of delivery.

63. Planning benefits from clear command structures, regular governance cycles and early workforce commitment, informed by learning from previous major events, including COP26 and Operation Roll (the policing operation for the US President’s visit). Early allocation of most required officer posts reflects a disciplined and forward-looking approach to resourcing.

64. While the overall position is positive and proportionate to the current planning phase, some areas require continued focus as preparations mature. These include finalising aspects of venue‑level command and control, health and safety assurance, and the full embedding of EDI considerations. These issues are recognised by Police Scotland and are being actively managed through established governance and planning processes, and do not detract from the overall strength of the foundations in place.

Command structure, capability and resilience

65. Police Scotland’s established Gold/Silver/Bronze command framework provides a strong platform for the delivery of the Games policing operation, underpinning clear accountability and effective decision making.

66. Command resilience has been purposefully built into planning arrangements, with provision in place to access additional experienced commanders, alongside established deputy and shadow arrangements, ensuring continuity of command should individuals become unavailable or operational demands intensify. Defined escalation routes exist to support timely decision making at Silver and Gold level, complemented by established national co-ordination and support mechanisms, including access to specialist or additional command capability where required.

67. We found that command capability and cohesion are further strengthened by the fact that Gold, Silver and Bronze commanders continue to work together operationally in the policing of large-scale, high-risk sporting events as part of BAU policing. These deployments provide ongoing opportunities to operate collectively, exercise joint command arrangements and maintain familiarity with command interfaces, decision‑making processes and multi‑agency working. This continuity of operational experience supports confidence that command arrangements are not solely theoretical but grounded in recent and relevant practice.

Planning capacity, structure and co-ordination

68. Police Scotland has invested appropriately in a well-resourced and experienced planning function capable of delivering the CWG26 policing operation to an acceptable standard. The planning team is fully staffed, with planners selected for their relevant major event experience and specialist competencies, providing a strong foundation for the scale and complexity of the task.

69. The planning team told us they have sufficient resource to carry out all the key planning tasks. Their structure is settled and effective, supported by dedicated planning cells that cover the different functions, with clear ownership, co-ordination and accountability across all areas.

70. Planning operates within established governance and co-ordination arrangements, including regular Silver-level oversight and structured engagement with the Organising Company and other relevant partners.

71. There has been good progress against key planning milestones. The majority of Bronze plans have been submitted, and a structured programme of testing and exercising, led by SMARTEU, is in place. This activity is providing positive momentum across the programme and supports confidence that planning demand is being met within available capacity.

Threat, risk and harm management

72. Threat, risk and harm management for the Games is structured, intelligence-led and subject to clear strategic oversight. A standalone strategic risk register is maintained and reviewed regularly, evidencing disciplined risk ownership and governance, and informing planning and delivery decisions.

73. Risk identification has been proactive and proportionate to the current planning stage. Early escalation of key risks, including volunteer vetting and accreditation, recovery of policing costs, the impact on BAU policing and potential for protest activity demonstrates effective horizon scanning and planning.

74. This approach is further strengthened by arrangements to identify and manage cumulative or concurrent risks arising from parallel events that could affect policing demand or resourcing. Close liaison with Glasgow City Council on city-wide events demonstrates awareness of the wider operational environment beyond the Games and supports early identification of compound risk.

75. Threat assessment is informed by strong intelligence integration. We found that national and venue-specific CT threat assessments, informed by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) outputs, feed directly into risk management, venue security planning and tactical development. While some formal intelligence products will continue to mature in line with the planning, there is no evidence at this stage of unmanaged or unidentified critical risks.

76. Threat and risk management arrangements have been informed by external peer review activity, including engagement with the NPoCC. This has given additional confidence in CT, firearms and public order planning (including preparedness for Operation Plato‑related incidents^[4]), and in the overall threat and risk management framework.

77. While some recognised risks and external dependencies remain, we found that these are well understood, actively managed and subject to appropriate governance. At this stage, they do not undermine confidence in Police Scotland’s ability to identify, assess and mitigate threat, risk and harm for the Games.

Integrated intelligence and threat assessment

78. The integration of intelligence into planning and preparedness for the Games is well developed and represents a clear operational strength. It is positive to note that intelligence leadership has been embedded within command structures from an early stage, ensuring intelligence informs strategic intent, operational priorities and preparedness activity, rather than operating as a separate or reactive function.

79. This integrated approach extends beyond competition venues to include non-competition environments such as athlete accommodation, where safeguarding, protest, crime and CT considerations require consistent intelligence oversight. This reflects a broad and realistic understanding of the Games footprint and the range of risks that may arise beyond core venues.

80. Police Scotland has established coherent arrangements to integrate both conventional and CT intelligence in support of Games planning. A dedicated intelligence capability is being developed to manage non-CT risks, including crime, public order, protest activity, safeguarding and emerging demand. This capability operates alongside established CT intelligence structures, with the two domains remaining distinct while connected through aligned tasking and information sharing.

81. We found that there is a structured and proportionate intelligence assessment cycle that underpins operational readiness. Intelligence products are provided at defined planning milestones and will increase in frequency as the Games approach, supporting both planning and Games-time command decision making. CT threat assessment is treated as dynamic, so that risks are reviewed continuously and given a Games-specific threat grading. These assessments are appropriately balanced with conventional intelligence relating to crime trends, protest activity, cyber risk, community tensions and safeguarding.

82. Intelligence is translated effectively into operational activity. This includes the planned use of intelligence-led protective security tactics, such as Operation Servator^[5] deployments, to provide visible reassurance, test hostile reconnaissance and support disruption and deterrence across venues, transport hubs and the wider Games footprint. Intelligence also informs deployment decisions, resource prioritisation, venue‑level preparedness and protective security planning, including for crowded places and transport-linked environments.

83. Clear escalation routes ensure that relevant intelligence informs Silver and Gold command in a timely manner, while dedicated and scalable resourcing across both intelligence domains supports Games-time demand without adversely affecting BAU policing. CT preparedness is also supported by proportionate awareness training to the Organising Company and wider partners, including Action Counters Terrorism (ACT) and See, Check and Notify (SCaN). This promotes a shared understanding of hostile reconnaissance indicators and reporting pathways, reinforcing intelligence-led protective security arrangements.

84. Strong police-to-police and national CT partnerships further support situational awareness, with intelligence assessments aligned to national threat understanding and protective security guidance.

85. We identified that some risks remain as planning matures, including the previously-mentioned system interoperability; timely dissemination of appropriately-sanitised intelligence beyond policing; and the complexity of assessing risk across a dispersed accommodation and venue footprint. However, we concluded that these issues do not undermine the overall strength of intelligence integration, provided they remain subject to focus, oversight and testing as preparations progress.

Information sharing and situational awareness

86. Information sharing arrangements for the policing of the CWG26 are generally effective and reflect a coherent and structured approach to integrating intelligence, command and partnership working. Information sharing is embedded across strategic, tactical and operational planning, supported through established intelligence cycles, governance forums and multi‑agency co-ordination arrangements, providing a sound basis for situational awareness and decision making.

87. Within policing, mechanisms for sharing intelligence and operational information are well developed and aligned to the command structure. The deliberate integration of CT and conventional intelligence supports a coherent assessment of threat, risk and harm, enabling proportionate and timely information sharing at appropriate command levels as preparations mature.

88. At a partnership level, information sharing is established through sustained engagement with the Organising Company, Glasgow City Council, blue-light partners, transport policing and national specialist units. Planning for the POCC/MACC represents a significant enhancement to real-time information sharing and shared situational awareness during Games-time operations. This intent is well understood among senior planners and partners and reflects learning from previous large-scale events.

89. We identified some variability in how information sharing arrangements are understood at Bronze command and partner operational levels. While strategic intent and governance frameworks are clear, full operational assurance remains partly dependent on the maturity of C3 arrangements and the finalisation of organiser-led documentation and CONOPS. A continued focus on system interoperability, exercising and the practical articulation of information sharing arrangements at operational level will further strengthen assurance as planning progresses.

Venue-level security planning and delivery arrangements

90. We found that venue security planning is developing well and is clearly structured. Police Scotland provides intelligence‑led oversight and professional advice, while responsibility for venue-specific security, crowd and traffic management appropriately rests with the Organising Company. This separation of roles is well understood and consistently reflected across planning documentation, providing clarity of responsibility and accountability.

91. Gold, Silver and Bronze command arrangements are in place to support delivery at venue level. Trained and suitably experienced venue Bronze commanders were appointed at an early stage and are supported by the central planning team. Where required, additional experienced commanders provide enhanced oversight, supporting effective co-ordination, escalation and alignment with Gold-level strategic intent. Venue plans are subject to Silver-level oversight, providing a clear mechanism for co-ordination, escalation and alignment with wider operational planning.

92. Venue security arrangements are strongly informed by intelligence integration, including sustained engagement with a CT SecCo, Counter-Terrorism Security Advisers (CTSA) and relevant national partners. This includes formal site assessments and walkthroughs of venues, fan zones and transport-related locations, helping to shape the design of proportionate protective security measures. Advice covers access control, physical security and vehicle mitigation, supporting a balanced approach that prioritises public safety while maintaining public reassurance.

93. CT venue security is overseen through a co-ordinated CT security function, providing consistency across the Games footprint. At several principal venues, locally embedded CT security capability further strengthens venue specific planning. There are also ongoing improvements to baseline security infrastructure as preparations mature.

94. We found that police influence at venue level will be further strengthened through the embedding of a Police Scotland planner within the GOC. This arrangement will provide direct police input into venue‑level operational and security decisions led by the Organising Company, improve real‑time visibility of emerging issues, and enable timely professional challenge where required.

95. Clear escalation mechanisms are in place where venue-related risks cannot be mitigated locally. These include escalation through the Organising Company Safety and Security Group, the Games Operations Board, and the relevant Local Authority Security Advisory Group. Collectively, these arrangements provide a credible and proportionate framework for challenge, escalation and resolution at venue level.

96. We found that venue security planning is supported by strong multi‑agency co-ordination, involving Police Scotland, local authorities, emergency services, BTP, CT partners and private security providers. Joint site visits, exercising and planned use of established multi‑agency co-ordination arrangements during Games-time operations support integrated delivery and shared situational awareness.

97. We identified that C3 arrangements to support venue security are progressing, although aspects of venue-level command and control were still being finalised at the time of our review. While the overall command model for the Games is well conceived, more clarity is needed about venue control room operation, decision‑making authority, escalation routes into the MACC, and the management of emerging public safety and operational risks at venue level, including the effective handover between organiser‑led security and police response.

98. Police Scotland should maintain its ongoing engagement with venue security partners, supported by the continued development, finalisation and testing of both internal and organiser‑led CONOPS. This will support a shared and consistent understanding of venue‑level command, control and communications arrangements and strengthen confidence as Games‑time operations approach.

99. Responsibility for the vetting and accreditation of the venue security workforce appropriately rests with the Organising Company. Early Police Scotland advice, scrutiny and professional challenge have informed the Organising Company’s approach to vetting, reducing access-related risk to within tolerable levels. Proportionate, risk-based vetting for all volunteers has now been agreed by the Organising Company, but arrangements were still being refined at the time of our review. Effective implementation of this by the organiser will be key to sustaining confidence in venue security.

Resource planning and workforce readiness

100. Police Scotland has established a structured and coherent approach to resource planning for the policing of the Games. This is underpinned by a dedicated People and Resourcing Strategy, which provides a clear framework for workforce identification, deployment, sustainability and officer welfare. Early and sustained engagement between the Resource Deployment Unit (RDU), Silver commander and the central planning team has enabled resourcing considerations to inform operational design from the outset, rather than being applied retrospectively.

101. Resource planning is supported by clear and established oversight arrangements, providing a stable framework as planning transitions from development into operational delivery. Learning from previous major events has informed the approach (with an emphasis on early workforce identification, sustainability and wellbeing), supporting effective deployment during the Games.

102. Early integration of the RDU into the planning team represents a notable strength. RDU provides specialist advice on deployment models, shift patterns and workforce agreement considerations, supported by Games‑aligned resource advisers who provide continuity between national planning teams and local policing divisions.

103. A bespoke workforce agreement has been reached between Police Scotland and the Scottish Police Federation and, since our review, has been signed off by both parties. The planned use of a bespoke agreement is likely to enhance policing of the Games by improving flexibility, resource alignment and operational resilience. It is also expected to support officer welfare and reduce the risk of disputes, enabling commanders to respond effectively to operational demands.

104. Resource planning is led by RDU and supported by a structured, establishment-based methodology that allocates officers proportionately across divisions based on capacity, while explicitly factoring in specialist capability requirements. The operation involves appropriate and proportionate policing deployments over the 10 day period including conventional and specialist policing resources.

105. We found that specialist capability requirements, including public order, firearms and CT roles, were prioritised ahead of conventional resourcing, reflecting a deliberate sequenced approach. Governance and escalation routes are in place; these will protect specialist capacity, ensure accreditation and refresher training requirements are met, and prevent specialists being diluted into general roles.

106. We note that efforts have been made to maintain continuity of resources throughout the event, ensuring consistent deployment across shifts and roles. This approach supports stronger situational awareness, improved communication, and helps build rapport with attendees and partners. Maintaining continuity also enhances operational effectiveness by reducing handover gaps and ensuring a consistent policing presence.

107. Police Scotland implemented a planned and effective resourcing process from within their ranks through seeking volunteers to undertake shifts. Volunteers were identified early and integrated into BAU-sensitive planning arrangements. The volunteers included police officers, staff members, special constables and Police Scotland youth volunteers, strengthening both operational effectiveness and community engagement.

108. We identified that engagement with local policing divisions is conducted through formal resourcing requests, Silver-level governance arrangements, and regular interaction with the central planning team. Dedicated resource advisers provide continuity between RDU, divisions and planners, supporting dialogue on abstractions, workforce availability and local pressures as planning progresses. However, we did not engage directly with divisional commanders out with Glasgow Division during this review and, as a result, assurance is limited regarding the consistency of understanding and management of resourcing impacts across all policing divisions.

109. Some elements of the resourcing picture remain assumption based. Important elements such as organiser‑led security delivery, final venue security standards and the maturity of venue‑level CONOPS were not fully resolved at the conclusion of our review, creating a risk of late adjustment to resource numbers, skill mix and specialist capability. These risks are explicitly captured within a dynamic risk matrix, incorporating legal requirements, workforce agreements, welfare considerations and impacts on training, leave and rest days. The matrix is monitored and updated, with mitigation actions escalated through Silver and Gold governance as assumptions mature.

110. Where internal specialist capacity was assessed as requiring support, early engagement with national partners, including NPoCC, has enabled the timely consideration of specialist resilience and mutual aid options. These arrangements are supported through established governance and escalation routes, ensuring that mutual aid is appropriately framed as a targeted contingency measure, rather than a default resourcing solution.

111. The availability of key operational enablers to support workforce readiness has been factored in. Body-worn video (BWV) availability is treated as a BAU capability, so was not regarded as a Games-specific operational risk in planning assumptions. Its rollout was progressing at the time of our review and has since been completed within Greater Glasgow division. There will be sufficient availability of BWV devices at operational staging posts for the officers deployed during the Games.

112. Custody arrangements are incorporated within wider workforce and operational readiness planning, including the appointment of a dedicated Criminal Justice Services Division Bronze commander. Designated Glasgow custody centres have been identified as the primary facilities for Games‑related arrests, with contingency plans in place to open additional centres if required. At the time of this review, no concerns were identified about custody capacity or resilience.

113. Officer welfare is treated as an integral component of workforce readiness and is informed by learning from previous major events. Shift patterns, fatigue management and rest day protections demonstrate a focus on sustainability, although many arrangements remain largely untested at scale.

114. Financial governance arrangements are in place and subject to senior oversight. However, challenging planning timescales relating to the baton relay, ceremonies and fan zone, continue to create uncertainty about resourcing scale, workforce demand and cost. These elements remain particularly exposed to late change and will require focused monitoring to improve operational and financial certainty as delivery approaches.

Mobilisation and mutual aid arrangements

115. Mobilisation and mutual aid arrangements for the CWG26 demonstrate positive progress and have benefited from early engagement and national co-ordination. Police Scotland engaged at an early stage with NPoCC and the Home Office Major Events Team, providing assurance that national capacity considerations are understood and that mutual aid requests can be progressed promptly if required. This early engagement supports a co-ordinated and proportionate approach and reduces the risk of late or reactive mobilisation activity, should operational demand escalate.

116. We found that the overarching mobilisation framework is credible and reflects learning from previous major events. Staging posts and associated mobilisation concepts have been identified and aligned with wider resourcing, logistics and wellbeing strategies, including consideration of accommodation, travel, welfare, briefing and familiarisation requirements for any incoming officers. These arrangements include provision for Scots law and procedural inputs, demonstrating a structured approach to deployment, command oversight and staff welfare.

117. Current planning assumptions indicate that mutual aid is expected to be limited in scope. Most operational and specialist capability is intended to be delivered from within Police Scotland, and mutual aid is not currently anticipated for general duties or public order policing. This position is appropriately caveated, recognising that changes in threat, parallel operational pressure or unforeseen events may require reassessment as delivery approaches.

118. Mutual aid planning appropriately reflects resilience considerations associated with specialist functions. Police Scotland has recognised capacity pressures and availability constraints within areas such as specialist firearms, consistent with wider national demand patterns. These risks are managed through established governance and escalation arrangements and mitigated through access to UK‑wide specialist mutual aid and strategic reserve provisions, which are well rehearsed and designed to ensure continuity of specialist capability during periods of heightened demand.

119. While the strategic approach to mobilisation of mutual aid is sound, several components remained under development including confirmation of logistical arrangements.

120. Completion and testing of these elements will be essential to ensure consistent command, control and accountability during Games‑time operations and to support the effective integration of assisting forces.

Testing and exercising – operational readiness

121. Testing and exercising activity is supporting Police Scotland’s operational readiness for the Games. Exercising has focused on testing and refining command and control arrangements, specialist capabilities and multi‑agency interoperability as plans mature, and has provided increasing confidence in the police‑led response.

122. The previously-mentioned phased programme of testing and exercising by SMARTEU has enabled early testing of key assumptions at an appropriate stage of planning. We observed exercising activity and heard from Bronze commanders, specialist teams and functional leads that this had helped to clarify roles, test command arrangements and identify practical issues before final plans are confirmed.

123. This has also supported operational learning and refinement. We observed multi-agency tabletop exercises, workshops and command and control activity. These involved relevant commanders and partners, and contributed to testing command, co-ordination and information flow arrangements with evaluation reports evidencing the capture of strengths, learning and areas for improvement.

124. Specialist exercising has contributed positively to readiness in higher‑risk areas. CT exercising spans strategic, operational and specialist capabilities, while firearms and public order arrangements are subject to planned challenge activity. These exercises provide targeted assurance on the most complex and risk‑critical aspects of the policing operation.

125. Cyber capability is well connected to national policing and security partners, and contributes specialist advice and intelligence to planning. Planning activity is progressing well between the Scottish Cyber Coordination Centre (SC3), Police Scotland, the Organising Company, the National Crime Agency and cyber security partners. The group has arranged a series of meetings to explore the coordination structures that would be activated, as well as communication and notification pathways, in the event of a cyber incident. This has helped to establish a clear, shared understanding of how information, reporting, and intelligence will flow into and through the command structures that have been established.

126. The partners will continue to assess cyber threat levels and undertake scenario planning to develop a proportionate response. They also intend to establish a daily multi-agency cyber situational awareness group during the Games – as implemented for other major events – to monitor the broader cyber threat landscape.

127. In terms of onsite emergency response from the SFRS and SAS, including having fire and ambulance service appliances based at the Games venues, we found that this is being considered as BAU by the services and the Organising Company. A small number of SFRS resources will be based at venues. The SAS and SFRS will both be represented within the MACC.

128. As stated earlier in this report, the Organising Company retains responsibility for leading its own exercising activity, which is delivered through a commissioned provider, including delivery of an organiser-led command post exercise. Continued effort is needed to ensure alignment between police-led and organiser-led exercising, shared learning and strengthened joint assurance, reflecting the Organising Company’s central role in safety and security delivery.

Staff wellbeing and workforce support arrangements

129. We found that Police Scotland has treated staff welfare and wellbeing as a core component of CWG26 planning and delivery. Evidence demonstrates a proactive, structured and learning‑informed approach, with wellbeing treated as integral to operational effectiveness and workforce resilience, rather than as a supplementary consideration.

130. Wellbeing arrangements are embedded within the Games People and Resourcing Strategy, ensuring that welfare considerations inform workforce planning, deployment decisions and abstraction modelling. This integrated approach reflects a clear intent to balance Games‑time operational demand with BAU resilience, fairness and workforce sustainability. Learning from previous major events has informed both strategies, supporting a coherent and consistent approach to people management.

131. There is a dedicated Games wellbeing strategy, developed to meet such commitments and aligned to Police Scotland’s wider people and workforce principles. Oversight and assurance are provided through a formally constituted wellbeing governance group, and staff association meetings. We found active scrutiny of wellbeing-related risks, constructive challenge and engagement from relevant departments and staff associations, and appropriate escalation of issues to Silver command.

132. We also found that wellbeing considerations are actively reflected within resourcing, logistical and deployment planning, rather than being managed separately. Planning documentation, including a guide for officers and staff, demonstrates that decisions on deployments, shift patterns and staffing models explicitly consider fatigue management, rest periods, overtime control, excusal processes, accommodation, catering and transport.

133. Arrangements are in place to monitor staff wellbeing during Games‑time operations. These include daily debrief processes and the use of a Citizen Space questionnaire, enabling officers and staff to raise welfare or logistical concerns promptly. Such mechanisms complement established supervisory and command escalation routes, supporting the management of issues in near real time.

134. We found that wellbeing-focused guidance, FAQs and staff communications are being finalised in advance of deployments – reflecting recognition of the importance of providing clarity and certainty to reduce anxiety and support wellbeing.

Health and safety arrangements

135. Health and safety arrangements are embedded within established governance structures for the CWG26. Dedicated health and safety representation is in place at Gold commander meetings and within the Wellbeing Governance Group, providing structured oversight, professional advice and clear escalation routes. Governance arrangements are clearly developed and provide organisational grip, with evidence that health and safety considerations are routinely discussed and integrated with wider welfare and logistics planning.

136. A dedicated health and safety risk assessment is in place, setting out a comprehensive assessment of hazards and controls across venues, routes and operational activity. This includes consideration of officer and staff safety, welfare provisions, staffing, equipment, training, Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) standards and multi‑agency working. The risk assessment incorporates assurance mechanisms, including briefing and debriefing arrangements, SCoPE^[6] reporting and ongoing monitoring, intended to support oversight during delivery. Documentation makes clear that operational plans are to be read alongside the health and safety risk assessment, reinforcing the integration of health and safety within operational decision making.

137. Planned familiarisation visits to venues and routes, including joint working with partners, are intended to support the practical identification of operational risks and agree mitigation measures. Bronze leads indicated that existing arrangements support safe delivery, while recognising that further detail, validation and assurance will be required as plans are finalised.

138. We identified the finalisation and testing of health and safety documentation as an area for development, particularly at Bronze level. Further work is needed to complete and confirm remaining health and safety plans and to finalise details in the health and safety risk assessment, including the testing and validation of identified control measures. Completion of this will strengthen assurance that health and safety arrangements are fully developed, consistently applied and ready for implementation across all venues and routes, ahead of delivery.

Workforce awareness and briefing arrangements

139. Police Scotland has developed a clear, coherent and credible framework for briefing officers and staff in preparation for policing the Games. Briefing is recognised by senior leaders as a critical enabler of safe, lawful and proportionate policing and is embedded within the command structure as the primary means of translating strategic intent into frontline delivery.

140. Briefing arrangements are structured around a defined cascade model. Gold command sets the overarching direction, tone and risk appetite for the operation, including expectations relating to ethics, human rights and organisational values. Silver command translates this direction into tactical priorities and control measures, while Bronze command is responsible for developing and delivering role‑specific and venue‑specific briefings to officers and staff. This model is well understood by the commanders interviewed and reflects established practice from previous major event policing.

141. The use of Gold commander blogs and wider senior leader messaging represents a positive feature of the overall briefing and engagement approach. These communications provide visible leadership, reinforcing organisational values such as proportionality and policing by consent, while giving reassurance to officers and staff about the maturity of planning and levels of senior oversight.

142. Police Scotland has developed a dedicated CWG26 intranet site to support briefing and information sharing. The site is intended to provide a central and authoritative source of information about the Games, including planning updates, operational guidance and welfare messaging. At this stage, the site reflects good practice and demonstrates a commitment to accessibility and consistency of information, particularly for officers and staff who may be abstracted, returning from rest days or joining the operation at different points.

143. Police Scotland has planned a structured programme of briefings, including pre‑deployment briefings, venue and role‑specific briefings, and daily or shift‑based briefings during delivery. These are expected to cover the intelligence and threat context, public order considerations, suspicious activity reporting, venue‑specific risks, escalation routes, and legal and ethical expectations.

144. While briefing is clearly recognised as an essential control measure, formal assurance mechanisms confirming briefing coverage and understanding were still developing. This is proportionate at this stage; however, these arrangements will need to strengthen as Police Scotland transitions from planning into delivery.

Complaints and conduct arrangements

145. Police Scotland has established clear and appropriate arrangements to manage complaints and conduct matters arising from the Games. A dedicated Bronze commander has been appointed, with responsibility for complaints and conduct, providing defined ownership, senior oversight and clear accountability within the command structure. Deployed officers will receive a briefing on how to address and manage any complaints that may arise.

146. In addition, a comprehensive Professional Standards Department (PSD) complaints and conduct strategy is in place. This sets out detailed and structured arrangements covering the full range of potential complaints and conduct matters and provides a clear framework for delivery, escalation and assurance. These arrangements align appropriately with existing BAU PSD processes, which are well embedded and understood across the organisation.

147. The PSD strategy clearly defines what constitutes a Games‑related complaint, crime or offence. This includes the application of specific markers within PSD systems to ensure accurate identification, monitoring and reporting, enabling effective oversight of Games‑related matters and supporting timely escalation where necessary. Collectively, these arrangements provide confidence that complaints and conduct matters arising from the Games will be visible, auditable and subject to appropriate scrutiny.

148. At the time of our review, the awareness of Games-specific complaints and conduct arrangements among other Bronze commanders was variable. Since our review, the Silver commander all Bronze has briefed all Bronze commanders on these arrangements, which have also been incorporated into officer briefing materials.

149. Detailed arrangements are in place for managing complaints involving mutual aid officers. These are underpinned by a mutual aid agreement signed under section 98 of the Police Act 1996 by all UK chief constables, which confirms that forces remain responsible for complaints concerning officers from their own force. In line with this agreement, clear processes have been defined whereby criminal complaints relating to mutual aid officers will be investigated by Police Scotland, while non‑criminal complaints and conduct matters will be progressed by the officer’s home force. These arrangements provide clarity of responsibility and support a consistent and proportionate approach.

Equality, diversity and inclusion arrangements

150. Police Scotland has demonstrated a clear intention to ensure that EDI considerations inform the planning and delivery of policing for the CWG26. This intent is reflected across strategic documentation, governance discussions and emerging operational arrangements, which emphasise legitimacy, proportionality and the maintenance of public confidence.

151. A key mechanism supporting these arrangements is the EqHRIA referenced in the governance section of this report. This sets out a commitment to lawful, proportionate and human rights-compliant policing; identifies potential impacts on communities and individuals; and provides a basis for the consideration and mitigation of equality and human rights risks as planning progresses.

152. Beyond the EqHRIA, EDI-relevant activity is evident through safeguarding arrangements, workforce wellbeing governance and community engagement structures. We identified evidence of strong partnership working, active consideration of proportionality and visibility in policing models, and engagement approaches intended to support reassurance, accessibility and public confidence. Taken together, this indicates that EDI principles are present within existing governance and planning arrangements.

153. Since our review, the Bronze community impact structure^[7] and processes have developed significantly. The operation will adopt Police Scotland's EDI Strategy and policies. Throughout delivery community advisors will be available to support the operation and a dedicated team will monitor community impact and sentiment, reporting trends to the Silver commander. The Community impact Bronze commander will provide support to the Organising Company as required throughout the operation.

Learning, continuous improvement and legacy arrangements

154. Drawing together learning referenced elsewhere in this report, this section focuses on how Police Scotland is capturing, applying and assuring organisational learning during the Games, and how this will be retained for the policing of future major events.

155. Learning has been applied at an early stage of preparation rather than being deferred until post‑event evaluation. Strategic and functional planning documentation consistently references historic learning, with evidence that lessons have informed early assumptions relating to command resilience, proportionality, intelligence governance, logistics and workforce wellbeing. Previously tested approaches have been adapted to reflect the scale, risk profile and constraints of the Games, demonstrating purposeful and contextual application rather than replication.

156. We found that formal mechanisms to support learning during the planning phase are well established. These include learning summaries, challenge panels, independent scrutiny, and structured testing and exercising supported by facilitated debriefs and evaluation reports. Learning from these processes is considered at appropriate governance levels and used to refine plans ahead of delivery. In addition, the use of focus groups and structured engagement sessions is a strength, capturing experiential learning from officers and staff with recent major event experience and adding practical insight into command clarity, welfare, communications and logistics.

157. Arrangements are also in place to support learning during delivery. Performance dashboards covering crime, arrests, complaints, injuries, finance and resourcing are intended to provide near‑real‑time insight to support informed operational decision making and reflective adjustment. Specialist functions have established routine incident and exercise debriefing arrangements, which are expected to continue throughout the event period. The planned use of CLIO to record decisions, security advice and outcomes will support auditability and provide a clear foundation for both immediate review and post‑event learning.

158. Post‑event debriefing and operational data collection arrangements are in place for the capture of reported crime, CT-related reports, arrests, disorder and suspicious activity. Responsibility for crime-related data collection and supporting analytical insight appropriately sits with the Commonwealth Games Crime Coordination Unit. There are several measures in place to assess the effectiveness of the operation including the Gold Commander's Acceptable Outcomes, Success Measures and Planning Debrief documents. All should be continually reviewed to ensure learning is captured and shared and considered for future events.

159. As a result, assurance remains limited about the extent to which it will be possible to assess whether deployed mitigations were proportionate to the assessed threat, risk and harm, or how effectively intelligence‑led assumptions translated into operational outcomes.

160. Learning and legacy arrangements are currently dispersed across multiple documents and workstreams. While learning activity is extensive, there is limited evidence at this stage of a single, consolidated mechanism to centrally capture, prioritise and track learning arising from exercises, governance activity, focus groups and external scrutiny.

161. Establishing a clearly defined and consistently applied process, with agreed ownership, governance and reporting arrangements, would strengthen assurance regarding the accuracy of the intelligence picture, the proportionality and effectiveness of deployed mitigations, and the organisation’s ability to evidence learning and legacy from intelligence‑led major event policing.

[4] Operation Plato is the UK national code name for the police and emergency service response to a marauding terrorist attack.

[5] Operation Servator is a policing tactic used by Police Scotland to deter, detect and disrupt a range of criminal activity (including terrorism), through high-visibility patrols using unpredictable deployments.

[6] SCoPE is the in-house developed application used by Police Scotland as a national HR/duty management system since the inception of the service in April 2013.

[7] The Bronze community impact structure is led by a Bronze commander and supported by a Policing Together team responsible for monitoring and assessing community impact, including EDI issues and hate crime.