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Overview
172. Police Scotland has established a structured, risk‑led and increasingly mature approach to the provision of specialist policing functions in support of the CWG26. Specialist operational, investigative and protective policing capabilities are clearly identified, appropriately prioritised and aligned with the assessed threat, risk and harm profile associated with the Games.
173. Strategic oversight of specialist capability planning is clear and well embedded within Gold and Silver-level governance arrangements. Engagement with national policing and security partners is effective and supports a shared understanding of capability requirements, dependencies and resilience considerations. These arrangements provide a credible foundation for co-ordinating specialist resources and ensuring that specialist functions are integrated within the wider operational policing model for the Games.
174. Planning documentation demonstrates that specialist functions are embedded within core command, decision making and escalation structures, rather than treated as standalone or peripheral elements of delivery. This integration supports coherence between protective security, operational response, investigation and the maintenance of BAU policing across Scotland.
175. Training, accreditation and exercising arrangements for specialist functions are generally well governed and informed by learning from recent major events. Specialist capability assumptions are risk based and aligned with national standards. Where capability pressures or constraints exist, these are recognised within planning assumptions and managed through proportionate mitigation, including national co-ordination and mutual aid frameworks where appropriate.
176. While the overall position is positive and proportionate to the current stage of preparation, some elements of specialist capability continue to mature. These include the further consolidation of assurance arising from planned exercising activity, and the completion of planning elements dependent on external confirmation and organiser‑led activity. These issues are recognised by Police Scotland and are being actively managed through established governance processes.
Specialist training, capability and readiness
177. Police Scotland has effective and proportionate arrangements in place to identify and deliver the specialist training required to support the safe delivery of the Games. We found that these arrangements are clearly risk led, aligned with national standards, and supported by established governance and assurance processes.
178. Specialist policing capabilities required for the Games have been identified through structured planning activity and formal threat, risk and harm assessment processes. Training and accreditation requirements are embedded within strategic and operational planning documentation and are subject to regular review, ensuring continued alignment with the evolving risk profile associated with a high‑profile international event.
179. We found that the approach to identifying specialist training needs demonstrates a clear and appropriate link between assessed risk and capability development. Equality, human rights and authorisation considerations provide assurance that officers will be deployed only where they hold appropriate training, current accreditation and legal authority. Specialist refresher training and accreditation status are actively monitored, with clear escalation routes through the RDU and Silver and Gold governance arrangements where risks to capability emerge.
180. At an operational level, specialist expertise is reflected within venue‑specific planning and command arrangements, demonstrating that training is being applied in practice. We established that some specialist activity remains ongoing, consistent with the live nature of Games planning, and will require continued oversight to ensure timely completion as delivery approaches.
Specialist policing functions and crime capabilities
181. Police Scotland has effective and proportionate operational support and crime‑related specialist capability arrangements in place to support the policing of the Games. Specialist operational resources are assessed, planned and governed in a manner that supports both Games‑time delivery and the maintenance of BAU policing across Scotland.
182. Planning demonstrates that the specialist capabilities required to manage disruption, protest activity and high‑impact incidents have been identified early and resourced proportionately. Arrangements seek to minimise abstraction from local policing divisions while preserving sufficient specialist depth to respond to emerging risk.
183. Public order capability is assessed as sufficient. Planning reflects the increased level of protest activity experienced by Police Scotland in recent years and considers the potential for concurrent protest activity both inside and outside the Games footprint. Incidents within the Games footprint will be led by designated public order commanders, while lower‑level incidents elsewhere will continue to be managed by local policing divisions.
184. Firearms capability and command resilience have been considered as part of operational support planning for the Games. Arrangements are aligned to established national standards and designed to support both Games‑time demand and BAU policing. Governance and contingency arrangements provide assurance that armed policing capability can be sustained and escalated where required, without disproportionate impact on wider operational resilience.
185. In addition to public order arrangements, we found that CID capability is embedded within Police Scotland’s operational support arrangements for the Games, rather than treated as a standalone function. CID resources, working alongside public protection teams, will provide dedicated investigative capability during the Games, integrated within the command structures. Crime is planned to be triaged through established command arrangements, ensuring that investigative activity is proportionate, prioritised and aligned with wider operational decision making, while maintaining BAU investigative capacity.
186. Police Scotland has identified cyber as a relevant specialist capability for the policing of the Games. Experienced cyber investigators are available and report having sufficient capacity to support the event while maintaining BAU responsibilities. Key cyber‑related risks have been explicitly recognised within planning assumptions, including potential disruptive attacks, fraud‑related activity and emerging technological risks. Cyber capability is embedded within core command structures and provides specialist advice and intelligence to police command, the Organising Company and its dedicated cyber security partner, supporting the collective management of cyber‑related risk across the Games footprint.
187. As outlined previously in this report, the Organising Company, the SC3, police and cyber security partners have collaborated on the assessment of cyber threats and a proportionate response – a process that will continue throughout the Games.
Safety and security arrangements for dignitaries
188. Police Scotland has established robust governance, specialist capability and national partnerships to deliver safety and security arrangements for dignitaries attending the Games. Such protection is clearly recognised as a priority risk and is appropriately embedded within Gold-level protective security and CT governance arrangements, ensuring that protective security considerations directly inform decision making.
189. We found that arrangements are supported by a structured multi‑agency governance framework, including the Dignitary Security Working Group, which brings together Police Scotland Royalty and VIP (RVIP) teams, Royalty and Specialist Protection (RaSP), the Metropolitan Police Service, the Home Office and Games planners. This forum provides clear ownership of dignitary‑related risk, supports co-ordination of protective security, communications and protocol considerations, and enables issues to be escalated and resolved through established governance routes.
190. Relevant specialist capability is available and aligned to dignitary protection requirements. This includes RVIP policing capability, specialist firearms resources, counter‑terrorism intelligence inputs and planners experienced in providing security for previous major events. CT security co-ordination arrangements are well established, with CT SecCo and intelligence representatives embedded within command structures, ensuring that refreshed threat assessments directly inform protective security planning as preparations mature.
191. The protective security approach adopted for dignitaries demonstrates an appropriate balance between safety, proportionality and public reassurance. Approved measures include the use of intelligence‑led disruption and reassurance tactics, aligned with broader Games protective security arrangements. These measures are proportionate to the assessed threat profile and consistent with policing by consent.
192. We found that aspects of detailed planning remain dependent on external confirmation, including the final composition of international and domestic dignitary attendance. As a consequence, a small number of Bronze-level plans and deployment arrangements require further refinement once confirmations are received. We are satisfied that these dependencies are anticipated and appropriate at this stage of preparation for an event of this scale and complexity, and are recognised, tracked and managed through established governance and escalation arrangements. They do not undermine confidence in overall dignitary protection capability.
193. To strengthen assurance on dignitary security arrangements, Police Scotland should work with the Organising Company and relevant partners to formalise and test communication and escalation arrangements for sensitive incidents involving dignitaries.
194. In particular, clearer validation – through exercising of decision‑making authority, escalation routes and agreed media‑handling protocols – would support timely, co-ordinated responses, reducing any risk of confusion or reputational harm in circumstances where responsibility for public communications rests with the Organising Company.